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CHAPTER 1
General Introduction
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Decision-making in social interactions 
Every day confronts us with numerous decisions, from small ones (e.g. which restaurant 
I choose for dinner tonight?) to those of immense impact (e.g., should I marry him?). 
Given that we humans live in a highly complex and dynamic environment, most of these 
decisions are made during social interactions, in which we usually take others’ beliefs, 
behaviours as well as the present social norms into account. For example, relative 
monetary gain through an interpersonal comparison process has been shown to modify 
individuals’ subsequent risk-taking decisions (Losecaat Vermeer, Boksem, & Sanfey, 
2014). Also, people usually behave in accordance with others’ social expectations 
(Chang & Sanfey, 2013), and individuals turn out to prefer to punish norm violators 
even at a personal cost, in order to foster cooperative environments (Losecaat Vermeer, 
Heerema, & Sanfey, 2016). Indeed, explorations of decision-making have increasingly 
started to acknowledge that our decisions are influenced by varied factors during 
social interactions with others. Examples of this are social identity (in-group and out-
group), social distance (social bonds between individuals), social comparison (better 
or worse off than others), social image (reputation in a social community), and social 
norms (behaving consistent with others). Furthermore, although previous, rigid, models 
in behavioural economics have provided a mathematical quantification by which to 
understand rational and strategic decisions (Camerer, 2003a), empirical evidence in 
social neuroscience and neuroeconomics has converged to suggest that these models 
are often not applicable to daily decisions (Fehr & Camerer, 2007a), This indicates that 
social factors play a vital role in decision-making during social interactions. Therefore, 
investigating and exploring decision-making in social interactions can provide a very 
useful way of understanding the psychological processes, and the associated neural 
mechanisms, underlying real-life choices. 
Cooperation
Although cooperation in a competitive world is challenging for some people, a world 
without cooperation might be even more difficult. For example, where the global 
warming is increasing at an alarming speed, yet countries are still focused on the local 
economic benefit from accelerating productivity while ignoring the global protection of 
the environment. Where there is overfishing in the ocean, waste is thrown in the public 
park, and lack of garbage recycling. Imagine that you are working in a company, where 
no one wants to make a contribution, yet everyone is waiting to benefit from other 
people’s efforts. These examples illustrate the concept of “Tragedy of the commons” 
(Hardin, 1968), which refers to the conflict between the self-interest and common 
benefits within a group in an environment with shared resources, but no management. 
11
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From the above-described scenarios, we can see that human cooperation is essential and 
necessary for us to live in a harmonious society.
Trust and reciprocity
Trust is another important social construct, pervading almost all of our social relationships. 
For example, citizens trust the government to protect their rights, guarantee their 
security, and provide better living conditions; investors trust bankers to secure their 
finances as promised; patients trust doctors to correctly treat their disease; customers 
trust sellers to provide products with prices that faithfully represent the product’s value; 
students trust teachers, and children trust their parents. Could you imagine living in 
a society where foods are infused with pesticides, where medicine is fake? The crisis 
of confidence that would ensue would ruin all types of relationships. In addition, while 
trust is crucial for establishing a social relationship, reciprocating someone else’s trust 
also plays a vital role in maintaining this stable cooperative partnership. For example, 
investments might be abused by an agency; collaborators might take advantage of your 
efforts and contribution without any acknowledgement; you might have spent a lot 
of time to help friends but none will return the favour. Trust and reciprocity are both 
necessary for a long-term and stable social relationship.
Social norms and altruistic punishment
Although mostly invisible, the notion of a social norm exists in all human societies. 
However, the formation and enforcement of social norms is still largely unknown. As we 
know, social norms guide different types of social behaviours. For example, people tend 
to wear clothing of a similar style as that of work place colleagues; say hello or shake 
hands when you meet someone; silence your cell phone when you’re attending a lecture; 
fulfill a promise you made earlier and so on and so forth. Observing and measuring how 
an individual’s social decisions shift in accordance with particular social norms provides a 
novel angle to further understand interactive decisions. And, it is additionally useful and 
interesting to examine individuals’ reactions when a particular social norm is violated. 
For instance, witnessing an injustice may motivate people’s tendency to help, either by 
punishing the offender or compensating the offended. Thus, social norms shape and 
modify individuals’ social behaviours to some extent, and norm violations motivate 
people’s punishment or compensation decisions in social interactions. Both processes 
provide opportunities for gaining knowledge of decision-making in social interactive 
settings.
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Key neurocognitive processes in decision-making in social interactions
The development of neuroimaging technology towards the end of the 20th century gave 
rise to a new discipline - cognitive neuroscience. A seperate branch within cognitive 
neuroscience, called neuroeconomics, has grown and developed rapidly by utilizing 
both cognitive neuroscience as well as devleopments in experiemntal and theoretical 
economics. Neuroeconomics strives to provide a novel and simple way to examine 
human decision-making, with a particualr interest in interactive decisions (Camerer, 
Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2005; Fehr, Fischbacher, & Kosfeld, 2005; Glimcher & Fehr, 2004; 
Sanfey, Loewenstein, McClure, & Cohen, 2006). One popular branch in particular is 
aimed at understanding human social cognition, social emotions and social behaviour 
(Adolphs, 2003; Cacioppo, 2002; Lieberman, 2007). A recent approach has also added 
computational modeling to the mix to better understand psychiatric disorders (Kishida, 
King-Casas, & Montague, 2010; Montague, Dolan, Friston, & Dayan, 2012; Rangel, 
Camerer, & Montague, 2008). 
A variety of functional neuroimaging methodologies have been used to probe the neural 
underpinnings of decision-making in social interactions. One class of methods mainly 
consists of indirect measurement of neuronal activity via images of blood flow and 
metabolic activity. Examples are functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) (Box 1), 
positron emission tomography (PET), and near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS). Another 
class of methods includes the direct measurement of electrical activity on the scalp, 
which are emitted by cortical or subcortical structures. Examples of this type of method 
are electroencephalography (EEG) and magnetoencephalography (MEG). Yet another 
class of neuroscientific methods consists of neurostimulation, where by delivering 
electric currents to brain regions of interest, the activity patterns in these areas can 
be temporarily changed. Examples of this type of approach are transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS) and transcranial direct-current stimulation (tDCS), In addition, 
patient lesion studies, pharmacological interventions and genetic studies also have been 
shown to provide extremely valuable data for understanding decision-making in social 
interactions.
The development of the above-described research approaches and technologies has 
motivated researchers to go in search of a foundation of interactive decision-making in 
the brain. For the past 20 years, Neuroeconomics research has proposed that multiple 
processes are involved in various types of decision-making in different social interactions 
(Figure 1.1). This line of research has focused on exploring the neural systems that are 
associated with decisions involving trust, reciprocity, fairness, altruism, punishment, 
social norm compliance, social learning and so on. It has gained knowledge of the 
underlying neural mechanisms of social decision-making and has strived to provide 
13
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insights for understanding the role of social factors (such as social preferences) in 
decision-making during social interactions.
Figure 1.1 Model of the neural systems that mediate nine different types of social 
decisions, showing (a) medial and (b) lateral views of the human brain. Solid lines: 
surface structures; dashed lines: deep structures; −: inhibitory influences; +: stimulatory 
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influences; arrows: white matter connections. DMPFC: dorsomedial prefrontal cortex; 
TPJ: temporo-parietal junction; VMPFC: ventromedial prefrontal cortex; dACC: dorsal 
anterior cingulate cortex; DLPFC: dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; VLPFC: ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex; dACC: dorsal anterior cingulate cortex; LOFC: lateral orbitofrontal 
cortex; STS: superior temporal sulcus; 5-HT: serotonin; OT: oxytocin; T: testosterone. 
Adapted from (Rilling & Sanfey, 2011a)
Classical economics assumes that an individuals’ decision-making is based on a rational 
evaluation of all of the available information. Behavioural and neural evidence revealed 
by neuroeconomics and social neuroscience indicate, however, that social motives 
(represented in different types of social preferences or social emotions) and economic 
self-interest might conflict with each other when making a particular decision in social 
interactions (Chang, Smith, Dufwenberg, & Sanfey, 2011b; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). By 
taking advantage of the findings in neuroeconomics and social neuroscience, we gain a 
better understanding of a choice-based approach to social interactions.
A brief overview of the studies in neuroeconomics aimed at understanding the neural 
underpinnings and psychological processes of decision-making in social interactions has 
highlighted the significant and stable role of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in balancing self-
interest and social motives, and processing value computations during decision-making. 
Moreover, subcortical regions also seem to be involved in decision-making processes, 
especially as related to social factors. For example, the ventral striatum (e.g., nucleus 
accumbens, caudate, putamen) is related to many social processes, such as donating 
to charity (Harbaugh, Mayr, & Burghart, 2007; Izuma, Saito, & Sadato, 2010a; Moll, 
Krueger, Zahn, & Pardini, 2006a), punishing norm violators (de Quervain, et al., 2004a), 
trusting people (Krueger, McCabe, & Moll, 2007), mutual cooperation (Rilling, Gutman, 
Zeh, Pagnoni, & Berns, 2002b), and reciprocation (Phan, Sripada, Angstadt, & McCabe, 
2010). Additionally, the anterior insula (AI) and amygdala – which are traditionally 
associated with sensation and affective processing – are also involved in decision-making 
in social interactions involving emotions or negative affective experiences. For instance, 
the AI is activated when an individual has been treated unfairly (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, 
& Nystrom, 2003a), when empathy is experienced in reaction to the pain of a fair player 
(Singer, et al., 2006), and when trust is at risk of being abused (Aimone, Houser, & Weber, 
2014). The amygdala is activated when breaking a self-made promise (Baumgartner, 
Fischbacher, Feierabend, & Lutz, 2009a) and is associated with the suspicion of other’s 
untrustworthiness (Bhatt, Lohrenz, Camerer, & Montague, 2012). Furthermore, it is not 
strange to find that the brain regions associated with theory of mind processing, such 
as medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), temporoparietal junction (TPJ), middle temporal 
gyrus (MTG), posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), posterior cingulate cortex 
(PCC), are also involved in making a decision in social interactions.
15
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As we know, we humans live in an extremely complex dynamic social environment and 
our decision-making during social interactions can be affected by a myriad of factors. 
Although fruitful results have been obtained in the research field of neuroeconomics, so 
far, the field is still far from providing a full set of answers to all the questions we currently 
have about human social decision-making. Therefore, it is meaningful to further explore 
the most influential social factors in order to obtain a truly complete understanding of 
the mechanisms of decision-making.
Aim of the thesis
This thesis is aimed at investigating and exploring the neural mechanisms underlying 
human decision-making in social interactions. Specifically, (Aim 1) investigating the 
underlying neural basis of decision-making in social interactions affected by a variety of 
social factors; (Aim 2) examining the behavioural and neural effects of social norms and 
norm violations on decision-making in social interactions; (Aim 3) applying computational 
modeling approaches to provide a novel perspective in understanding the dysfunction 
and pathological mechanism of a psychiatric population; (Aim 4) integrating the current 
results with previous findings in this field not only to test the classical economics models 
and potentially provide empirical evidence for policy makers, but also to help us better 
understand our everyday real-life decisions.
To achieve this goal, methods from cognitive neuroscience, behavioural economics, 
and computational modelling are combined in this thesis. Firstly, fMRI, which allows 
us to image changes in blood flow in the brain associated with different processes. 
Secondly, behavioural experiments are implemented to examine the differences 
between manipulated conditions in terms of behavioural responses, reaction time, and 
physiological markers. Thirdly, computational modelling approaches and connectivity 
analyses have developed recently and are especially useful for exploring the individual 
differences and pathological deficiencies during decision-making in social interactions. 
Outline of the thesis
The thesis is divided into three parts based on the content of the empirical studies, with 
a particular focus on examining the behavioral and neural effects of social factors (e.g., 
social rank, social context, social reputation, social norm and norm violation) on decision-
making in different social interactions (such as cooperation, trust and reciprocity, norm 
violation and costly punishment).
This thesis consists one chapter of general introduction, one chapter of general 
discussion, and five empirical chapters (chapter 2, 3, 4, 5, 6). Chapter 1 provides an 
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overview of the research advances in the field of neuroeconomics that have revealed the 
potential neural mechanisms of human social cooperation. 
Part 1: Social influential factors (Chapters 2-4). Part 1 of this thesis introduces how 
decision-making in social interactions is influenced by social factors. Chapter 2 explains 
that the social ranking manipulated by different types of social comparison processes 
can affect individuals’ cooperative decision-making in a Public Goods Game. Based on 
the effects we find in Chapter 2, we modified the task for Chapter 3 by integrating the 
comparison processes in both a self-relevant and social-salient context, and explored 
the underlying neural processing of these comparison processes in different contexts 
of cooperative decision-making. In Chapter 4, we were particularly interested in how 
individuals’ cooperative decisions in both a monetary gain-sharing and loss-sharing 
situation are influenced by their partner’s prior reputation of trustworthiness. 
Part 2: Social norms and punishment for norm violations (Chapter 5).In this part of my 
thesis, I was particularly interested in how social norms play a role when people make 
Decision-
making in 
social 
interactions 
 
Chapter 1: General introduction 
Part 1: Social influence factors 
Chapter 2: Social ranks 
Chapter 3: Self and interpersonal comparison context 
Chapter 4: Social reputation effects in sharing-gain and sharing-
loss situations 
Part 2: Social norm and norm violation 
Chapter 5: Non-binding promise 
Breach of promise and costly-punishment 
Part 3:  Application to psychiatric population 
Chapter 6:  Psychopathy with lower guilt sensitive and less 
trustworthiness: A computational modeling approach 
Chapter 7: General discussion and conclusion 
Figure 1.2 Schematic overview of this thesis, including three parts of the dissertation 
project with five empirical experiments (Chapters 2 to 6).
17
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decisions in social interactions, focusing on the individual’s reaction to social norms 
as well as norm violations. In Chapter 5, we investigated the neural mechanisms of 
processing a promise message, as well as examining how these neural systems affected 
an individual’s subsequent interpersonal trust decisions. Further, we also examined the 
response of the brain to the breach of a promise, and to costly-punishment decisions 
toward the promise breaker.
Part 3: Application of neuroeconomics to psychiatric studies (Chapters 6). Aberrant 
decision-making is one of the obvious features of most of the psychiatric population. 
Although human neuroscience research is providing the biological basis for explaining 
these deviations, a computational modeling approach in the field of neuroeconomics 
provides a useful quantitive method for revealing and elucidating the key relationships 
in a complex system underlying various pathological decisions. In Chapter 6, a guilt-
aversion model was adopted from previous literature in order to explore guilt sensitivity 
and trustworthiness decisions in individuals scoring high on psychopathic traits.
FInally, Chapter 7 summarises the main findings of this thesis and provides a general 
discussion of how the current findings contribute to our understanding of decision-
making in social interactions.
Box 1: fMRI
fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging), is a technique which allows us to 
indirectly measure brain activity. As a brain region is more active, it consumes more 
oxygen via blood flow. fMRI images the representation of brain activation by detecting 
changes in the blood oxygenation level across brain regions. Thus, fMRI can be used 
to produce activation maps showing which parts of the brain are likely involved in a 
particular mental process. fMRI is a popular tool for imaging, and compared to other 
neuroimaging techniques, fMRI possesses several significant advantages. Firstly, fMRI 
is non-invasive and does not involve radiation, which means a higher level of safety for 
participants. Secondly, the technique provides the user with excellent spatial resolution 
and acceptable temporal resolution for most purposes. Thirdly and most importantly, 
it is relatively easy to implement standard experiments, especially in the field of 
Neuroeconomics. By combining fMRI with computerised game paradigms from game 
theory, scientists can design studies in which participants make their decisions inside 
the scanner by pressing the buttons in response to different pre-set social scenarios (or 
social interactions with other real or hypothetical players).
Box 2: Measuring decision-making in social interactions with Games 
The task paradigms used in this thesis were largely adapted from the field of game 
theory. Most of these games are played in a one-shot version, with anonymous partners 
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and real monetary payment, a set-up which is easily applied in neuroimaging studies and 
which provides a rich source for understanding both the psychological processes and the 
neural mechanisms underlying these decisions in social interactions.
Dictator Game (DG) The Dictator Game is played by two players. One player (the 
“Dictator”) is endowed with a sum of money and is then asked to decide on the division 
of this endowment between him/herself and another player (the ”Recipient”).
Ultimatum Game (UG)  The Ultimatum Game is also played by two players. Player 1 (the 
“Proposer”) decides how to split an endowed sum of money between themselves and 
the other player, as in the Dictator Game. However, Player 2 (the “Responder”), then 
has the opportunity to either accept or reject the offer. On the condition that Responder 
accepts the offer, the money will be divided as proposed. But if the Responder rejects the 
offer, both players receive nothing. 
Trust Game (TG) The Trust Game is also played by two players, with Player 1 referred 
to as the “Investor” and Player 2 as the “Trustee”. Player 1 is first endowed with a sum of 
money and must decide how much of this they want to invest with Player 2. Once the 
Investor has selected an amount, this is multiplied by a particular factor (e.g., four), and 
this multiplied amount is transferred to the Trustee. Importantly, both players know in 
advance about the nature of the transfer and the existence of the multiplier. After the 
transfer, the Trustee now has the opportunity to return some of this transferred money 
to the Investor, but is not bound to do so. Hence, the Trustee can choose to repay the 
Investor’s trust, or not. 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, two players each make a decision 
on whether to cooperate or defect with the other. Importantly, this decision is made 
simultaneously. Typically, the maximum payoff is when one player defects while their 
partner cooperates (the defecting player receiving all of the money). Mutual cooperation 
provides a moderate payoff for both players, while mutual defection yields the lowest 
payoff for both.
Public Goods Game (PGG) The Public Goods Game is typically played by more than 
two players, and is a modified version of the PD. Each player receives an equal monetary 
endowment and then decides, simultaneously with the other players, what proportion 
of their endowment they would like put into a public account, and what proportion 
they would like to leave in a private account. The total money contributed to the public 
account is then multiplied by a predetermined factor (e.g., 1.6), after which it will be split 
equally among all the players, irrespective of their contribution. The final payment for 
each player is the sum of money from the private account and their share of the public 
account. The PGG is typically used to measure cooperative decision-making in social 
interaction, since cooperation – if unanimous – can lead to better results for everyone. 
Third-Party Punishment In a Third-Party Punishment paradigm, participants typically 
play as a third player (the potential “Punisher”) while observing two other players 
engaging in a Dictator Game (DG). The Punisher is endowed with money and can spend 
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a proportion of this endowment to punish (i.e. take money from) the Dictator if they 
choose to do so.

PART I:
FACTORS OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE

CHAPTER 2
Social rank and social cooperation:
Impact of social comparison processes on 
cooperative decision-making
2
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Abstract 
Successful navigation of our complex social world requires the capability to recognize 
and judge the relative status of others. Hence, social comparison processes are of 
great importance in our interactions, informing us of our relative standing and in turn 
potentially motivating our behavior. However, so far few studies have examined in 
detail how social comparison can influence interpersonal decision-making. One aspect 
of social decision-making that is of particular importance is cooperative behavior, and 
identifying means of maintaining and promoting cooperation in the provision of public 
goods is of vital interest to society. Here, we manipulated social comparison by grading 
performance rankings on a reaction time task, and then measured cooperative decisions 
via a modified Public Goods Game (PGG). Findings revealed that individuals ranked 
highest tended to be more cooperative as compared to those who placed in the bottom 
rank. Interestingly, this effect was regardless of whether the comparison group members 
were the subsequent players in the PGG or not, and this effect was stronger in those with 
higher social orientation. In summary, the present research shows how different social 
comparison processes (assessed via social rankings) can operate in our daily interaction 
with others, demonstrating an important effect on cooperative behavior. 
25
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Introduction 
Social comparison is an extremely important factor in how we interact with others. 
This process provides a direct evaluation of where we stand in relation to others, and 
provides an indication of the characteristics of ourselves that we should modify in order 
to improve in a variety of ways. In the animal world, social rankings and hierarchies are 
ubiquitous, and primates, in particular, are quite adept at comparing themselves to one 
another via social rankings, a capacity that has important consequences for successful 
group living (Sapolsky, 2005). The human world is no less sensitive to hierarchies. There 
is a strong tendency to compare oneself with others, to estimate and tag others, and 
then categorize them along a spectrum of importance, often termed “social status,” in 
view of how valuable we perceive that person to be. Those whom we deem as high value 
like politicians, celebrities, athletes, film stars, and so forth, we place at the top of our 
social rankings, while those we typically consider as low value fall to the bottom of our 
social hierarchy (Kumaran, Melo, & Duzel, 2012). Successful navigation of our complex 
social world demands an ability to identify and estimate the relative status of others, and 
knowledge about others’ standings can help us to optimize our own social value.
A considerable amount of previous experimental work has demonstrated a clear and 
strong relationship between social comparison and behavior. For example, players who 
exhibited relatively better performance during social interactions were judged by others 
as worthy of a larger prize (Okeeffe, Viscusi, & Zeckhauser, 1984). When people were 
exposed to others who possessed highly valued personalities and traits they showed 
decreased levels of self-esteem, whereas the opposite effect was found when they 
were exposed to a socially undesirable person (Morse & Gergen, 1970), demonstrating 
the effects of social comparison on one’s own self-evaluation (Tsai, Yang, & Cheng, 
2014). Also, while absolute income has no apparent effect on general life satisfaction, 
individuals’ relative ranked income does predict life satisfaction (Boyce, Brown, & Moore, 
2010). Additionally, if high-status people were asked to give opinions of others who 
might potentially surpass them, they tended to offer quite reserved recommendations of 
that person, presumably to prevent the other from outperforming them in that context 
(Tesser, 1988). We can, therefore, talk about ‘downward’ social comparison, when we 
are better off than others, as well as ‘upward’ social comparison when we are worse off 
than our peers. 
Social comparison seems, therefore, natural, but when coupled with behavioral or 
affective consequences it can have striking effects on decision-making (Fishburn, 1977; 
Fiske, 2010a; Hevey, 1999). For example, households perceived to be economically 
worse off in comparison to others reported less purchasing decisions for durable goods, 
and thought more seriously about purchasing decisions (Karlsson, Garling, Dellgran, & 
26
••
 C
ha
pt
er
 2
Klingander, 2005). In a lottery task, individuals who experienced a large social gain in 
early trials as compared to others subsequently increased their risk-seeking behavior 
in the following trials (Bault, Coricelli, & Rustichini, 2008; Bault, Joffily, Rustichini, & 
Coricelli, 2011a). In short, social comparison processes illuminated the interpersonal 
concern by overshadowing the concern for personal outcomes independent of others.
Given the impact of social comparison on even quite fundamental decisions outlined 
above, such as consumer purchases or risk choices under uncertainty, we might expect 
that decisions made in an interactive social context (Rilling & Sanfey, 2011b) would 
be even more susceptible to the influence of our social comparative processes, and 
indeed social information has been shown to influence decisions in a wide variety of 
domains (Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989). Comparison of recycling 
behaviors between oneself and the ‘average’ person altered households’ subsequent 
recycling decisions (Schultz, 1999), as well as towel (re)use in hotels (Goldstein, 
Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008). Individual perception of the seriousness of one’s own 
legal infringement in terms of downloading software from the internet depends on 
beliefs about one’s position within the distribution of illegal downloaders in the UK, 
rather than the objective positions(Aldrovandi, Wood, & Brown, 2013). With regard to 
social games, in a ‘harvest’ game in which partners repeatedly harvest from a partially 
renewable monetary resource, participants decreased their current ‘harvests’ based on 
the relative upper ranked position among the group members (Bilderbeck, et al., 2014). 
In an Ultimatum Game, a commonly used task that assesses participants’ sensitivity to 
fairness and equity, recipients were more likely to reject monetary offers after they were 
informed that other recipients had been offered more money than they themselves had 
been (Wu, Zhou, van Dijk, Leliveld, & Zhou, 2011). Finally, social comparison between 
groups increased collaboration within each of those groups (Burton-Chellew & West, 
2012; Cardenas & Mantilla, 2015). This evidence suggests that that social comparison 
holds considerable sway in social decision-making in our daily life.
An important social decision that we are often faced with is whether or not to cooperate 
with others. Successful cooperation offers considerable benefits for ourselves and for 
others, but sometimes places us at risk of our cooperative acts being abused, and can be 
therefore a risky choice option. Ensuring sustained cooperation is challenging because 
cooperation sometimes has a price, namely that one can be taken advantage of by a so-
called ‘free-rider’. Despite this, human cooperation plays a vitally important role in the 
development and functioning of society (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004b). A unique distinction 
of the human species is that they shape social life by minimizing selfish behaviors and 
developing cooperative agreements with normative responsibilities and obligations 
(Bernhard, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2006; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003a). Nevertheless, the 
origin of cooperation, especially in a competitive world, is still somewhat of a puzzle 
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for philosophers, economists, psychologists, and neuroscientists (Fehr & Gintis, 2007; 
Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Nowak, 2006; Rand & Nowak, 2013). Hence, exploring and 
recognizing individual and situational factors that help in understanding cooperative 
behaviors is of great importance. 
A useful experimental task that has often been applied to the study of cooperative 
behavior in the laboratory is the Public Goods Game (PGG)(Hardin, 1968). This game 
models the willingness of players to contribute to the maintenance of a so-called ‘public 
good’, that is, a common resource that can freely be used by anyone without regard for 
whether one has contributed or not, for example, a public park. While the collective 
is best served by the existence of such a public good, each individual’s optimal choice 
is to withhold contribution and instead free-ride on the participation of others. This 
tension between public and private benefit is one extremely important consequence 
of cooperation. Ideally, everyone would gain a significant benefit based on mutual 
cooperation by contributing the maximum amount, but a self-interested tactic is to 
contribute nothing and reap the benefits of other’s cooperative acts. The PGG is an 
effective and useful tool to study mutual cooperation, and research has found that 
incentives such as reward and punishment are successful at promoting cooperative 
behavior within the group (Fehr & Gachter, 2000; Rand, Dreber, Ellingsen, Fudenberg, & 
Nowak, 2009). Nonetheless, despite extensive use of this experimental task, there have 
been few explicit tests of how social comparison can impact cooperative behavior in this 
particular context. 
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to explore how social comparison can affect 
cooperative decision-making, and to gain an insight into psychological processes 
underlying these effects. In order to achieve this goal, we address three specific research 
questions. Firstly, and most importantly, if social comparison indeed describes how we 
stand in relation to others, as we have outlined above, then how might different types of 
social comparison (i.e. upward or downward) affect and modify interpersonal decisions 
in a cooperative context? As described previously, evidence from a variety of studies 
suggests that there are robust effects of social comparative processes on purchasing 
decisions, risk choices, and fairness perceptions. Taken together, relative performance 
can initiate a downward or upward comparative process, which we would then expect to 
impact subsequent cooperative decisions (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004c).
Secondly, people usually have beliefs about the typical behaviors of others in societies, 
namely social norms, and often adjust their own behavior in accordance with this 
information. Therefore, beliefs about specific others might also be relevant to decision-
making, especially in a social context (Chang, Smith, Dufwenberg, & Sanfey, 2011a). 
Assuming social comparison processes do affect cooperative decision-making, we were 
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also interested in knowing how these regulatory behavioral effects were influenced by 
specific knowledge about those with whom one must cooperate. To answer this research 
question, we manipulated participants’ beliefs about their cooperative partners. In one 
case, they had knowledge about how the players in their cooperative group ranked 
relative to themselves – that is, the cooperative group were the same players as those 
they had previously competed with, and had been directly compared to (Relevant 
targets). In the second condition, the cooperative group was comprised of new players 
chosen after the social comparison task, that is, the participant had no direct knowledge 
of how he or she ranked relative to these players (Irrelevant targets). This allows us 
to better understand whether social comparison subsequently affects interactions only 
with those we know our rankings relative to, or whether the affective and cognitive 
processes altered by knowing one’s rank can have a more general impact on behavior, 
irrespective of who we interact with.
Finally, we are also interested in individual sensitivity to social comparison (Hemphill & 
Lehman, 1991). Social comparison orientation (SCO), as defined by Gibbons and Buunk 
(1999), refers to the tendency to compare oneself to others (Buunk, 2006). Previous 
research found that high SCO individuals reported relatively more positive effect after 
downward comparison and more negative affect after upward comparisons when they 
perceived a cooperative social climate at work(Buunk, Zurriaga, Peiro, Nauta, & Gosalvez, 
2005). This evidence shows that individual’s social comparison orientation tendencies 
would give rise to more salient effects on the subsequent interpersonal outcomes. To 
this end, we will assess individual differences in social comparison orientation by using 
the Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure (INCOM) (Gibbons & Buunk, 
1999), and examine how this measure corresponds to cooperative decision-making 
under conditions of both upward and downward social comparisons. 
We addressed these research questions by designing a paradigm in which participants 
would receive feedback about their performance in a task, in a social context, and then 
we subsequently observed their willingness to cooperate in an ostensibly separate task. 
To generate social comparison, participants completed a simple reaction time task at the 
same time as 4 other players. After a button press in response to a color-cue, participants 
were informed where they ranked amongst the 5 players, with the particular conditions 
of interest being rank #1, rank #3, and rank #5, corresponding to downward, neutral and 
upward comparison conditions, respectively. After this manipulation, participants then 
played a standard PGG with either the 4 players they had been ranked against, or with 
4 new, unranked, players. This allowed for an examination of whether any comparison 
effects were limited to those players who were actually in the comparison group, or 
whether they extended to novel players. In addition, participants played a third set of 
PGGs without a prior ranking task in order to assess their baseline levels of cooperation.
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Methods 
Participants
Participants were 39 college students from Radboud University Nijmegen, with an age 
range from 20 to 30 years (M = 23.03, SD = 2.39). They were recruited via advertisements 
informing them that they would be playing a decision-making game, and were 
compensated 8 euro for participation. There was an additional 8 euro payment possible 
based on their performance. On average, participants earned 4 euro as a bonus payment. 
The study protocol was approved by the local ethics committee (CMO region Arnhem-
Nijmegen, The Netherlands) under the general ethic approval (CMO 2014/288), and 
all the experimental methods were conducted in accordance with these guidelines. All 
participants provided written informed consent in accordance Declaration of Helsinki 
and the guidelines of local ethics committee.
Procedure
Instructions and practice
Participants were instructed as to the nature of the experiment. They were told that over 
the course of the experiment they would be paired up with other participants who had 
previously taken part in the study. They were informed that their own responses would 
be used by later participants, but that this data would be completely anonymized. It was 
explained that on each trial of the experiment, participants would be paired with 4 other 
(anonymous) players, and that they would never play with the same set of players twice. 
They were told that they could receive a monetary bonus of (maximally) 8 euros in 
total; 6 euros based on performance in the Public Goods Game (PGG: see below), and 2 
euros based on average ranking in the Circle task (see below). After that, they practiced 
the Circle task, and then saw six practice trials of the PGG, with all conditions practiced. 
They were allowed to ask questions during the instructions and practice session, and the 
experiment did not begin until it was clear that they understood the instructions. 
Social Comparison Manipulation: Circle Task
A simple perceptual task was used to manipulate social comparison. In the circle task, a 
small colored circle moved around the periphery of a larger static white circle. In each 
trial, the start color of the small circle was to be randomly assigned from a color pool of 
red, purple, blue, green, pink and yellow. The color of the small circle was then randomly 
replaced by another color in the pool at a random interval of between 0.64-0.8 seconds. 
The task for the participant was to press any key on the keyboard as soon as they detected 
that the color of the small circle had changed. Participants were informed that their 
performance measure was based on both the accuracy and the speed of their response. 
Following each trial of the task, a ranking list was generated based on the performance 
of 5 purported players in the task. In reality, this ranking list was pre-programmed so 
that the participant appeared systematically at each ranking. Participants were ranked 
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from #1 to #5, with higher likelihoods of ranks 1, 3, and 5. The rankings were determined 
randomly, with the proviso that rank 1 or 5 was automatically assigned if the response 
time was less than 0.05 s or larger than 1 s respectively (Figure 2.1). 
Basic Contribution Game
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                   Press 3 to decide 
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Press 1 to decrease;  Press 2 to increase;
                   Press 3 to decide 
    Selecting Contributing Game Partner...
How many tokens do you want to contribute
0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   
Press 1 to decrease;  Press 2 to increase;
                   Press 3 to decide 
How many tokens do you want to contribute
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Press 1 to decrease;  Press 2 to increase;
                   Press 3 to decide 
Figure 2.1 Experimental tasks and timelines. (a) A single trial of the basic public goods 
game. In this condition, participants are randomly paired with 4 anonymous partners to 
play the standard public goods game, (b) A single trial of the same group public goods 
game. In this condition, participants are randomly paired with 4 anonymous partners for 
the circle task, and then play the public goods game with the same set of people, (c) A 
single trial of the different group public goods game. In this condition, participants are 
first randomly paired with 4 anonymous partners to play circle task, and then paired with 
another 4 partners to play the public goods game. 
Cooperation Measure: Public Goods Game
A Public Goods Game was used to measure cooperation. In each trial of the game, 
participants were randomly paired with 4 other, anonymous, players. Participants 
were endowed with 10 tokens at the start of each trial and had to decide how many 
of these tokens they wanted to contribute to the group account and how many of the 
tokens they wanted to keep for themselves. Once all the players decided how much 
to contribute, the total contribution to the group account was then multiplied by 1.6, 
and this final amount was divided equally across all 5 group members. Earnings in each 
trial are therefore the sum of the tokens participants did not contribute to the group 
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account (initial tokens minus contribution) plus the payment from the group account 
(aggregated contributions to group account multiplied by 1.6, then divided by 5).
Behavioural Testing 
Three conditions were measured in the experiment, each consisting of 12 trials, for a total 
of 36 trials (Figure 2.1). Condition 1 (Basic-PGG) provided a baseline, with participants 
playing the Public Goods Game with 4 other anonymous partners. In Condition 2 (Same 
Group-PGG) and Condition 3 (Different Group-PGG), participants first played the Circle 
Task with 4 other anonymous partners. Following each trial of the task, a ranking list 
was generated based on the performance of the 5 purported in the task. In reality, this 
ranking list was pre-programmed so that the participant appeared systematically at each 
ranking. Participants were ranked from #1 to #5, with higher likelihoods of ranks 1, 3, 
and 5. After participants have seen the ranking list, in Condition 2 (Same Group-PGG), 
participants immediately followed by playing the PGG with the same set of partners, 
whereas in condition 3 (Different Group-PGG), participants then played the PGG with a 
different set of 4 partners.  In both Condition 2 and 3, on average, players were ranked 
#1 3 times, #3 3 times and #5 3 times. We randomized the entire 36 trials, consisting 
three experimental conditions, for each participant.
The first condition allows us to measure a baseline performance in a PGG, and then 
compare that performance to the other conditions where social ranking information 
is presented immediately before contribution decisions. The latter two conditions 
then enable us to distinguish between situations where the rankings are relevant for 
the cooperative decision (Same Group condition) or where they are irrelevant for that 
choice (Different Group condition).
Post experiment questionnaire
After completion of the experiment, participants filled out two short questionnaires. The 
first consisted of questions about the experimental procedure. The next was the Iowa-
Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure (INCOM) (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999), which 
was used to examine individual differences in social comparison orientation. Afterwards, 
there was a short interview about the strategy used during the experiment. Finally, a 
selection of trials was randomly chosen for each participant and randomly paired with 
choices from four other real participants to calculate their Public Goods Game bonus. 
Participants received an average of 1 euro for their Circle Task bonus, as these rankings 
were largely predetermined. 
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Results 
Individual’s baseline-level of cooperative behaviors
We first examined performance in the Basic Public Goods Game (where no competitive 
rankings were supplied) as an indicator of the general type of cooperative behavior 
exhibited in the task. Descriptive statistics of the contribution amount in this condition 
demonstrated considerable individual differences in behavior, though almost all 
participants contributed something on average (M=3.83, SD=2.91, 3 always contributed 
zero, and 1 contributed the maximal amount in every round) (see Figure 2.2).
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Figure 2.2 Individual differences of contribution in the baseline condition – Basic PGG
Effects of experimental conditions on cooperative behaviors
The main purpose of this study is to examine how the rankings and groups influence 
cooperative decisions, as well as the role of social comparison orientation.  Firstly, for 
analysis of the cooperative decisions, we used each participant’s contribution amount in 
the Basic Public Goods Game as a baseline measure, and then computed the deviations 
from that amount for each of the conditions of interest, namely the two other Public 
Goods Games (Same group and Different group) for each of the three ranking levels (#1, 
#3, #5). A 2 × 3 × 2 three-way mixed repeated ANOVA was implemented including group 
(same, different) and rank (top, middle, and bottom) as the within-subject factors and 
social comparison orientation tendency (HSCO, LSCO) as the between-subject factor. 
Figure 2 provides an overview of the results. The results show that the contribution 
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amount was significantly affected by the rankings in both the Same and Different 
group conditions, F (2, 74) = 6.12, p<0.01. Further analyses across the different ranking 
conditions found that there was a significant linear trend, F (1, 37) = 8.43, p<0.01, 
indicating that as the rank increased, contribution in the both Same and Different group 
Public Goods Game increased proportionately, with the contribution when top-ranked 
(M=2.73%, SD=1.61%) greater than that when middle ranked (M=1.42%, SD=1.43%), 
which in turn was greater than that when the bottom ranked (M=-4.00%, SD=1.59%). 
However, there was no main effect of group (F (1, 37) =0.42, p=0.52), and also no 
interaction was found (see Figure 2.3).
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Figure 2.3 Deviation of mean contribution rate from the basic public goods game in the 
same and different group conditions across ranks
Individual differences of social comparison orientation on cooperative behaviors
We are further interested in individual differences, and how sensitivity to social rank 
might play a role in cooperative decisions. For the Iowa-Netherlands Comparison 
Orientation questionnaire data analysis, the median of participants’ social orientation 
questionnaire score was 40 (M = 39.13, SD = 6.04), which was used as the threshold to 
separate the participants into LSCO (Low Social Comparison Orientation group, N=20) 
and HSCO (High Social Comparison Orientation group, N=19). An independent-sample 
t-test showed that the social comparison score in the HSCO group (M = 43.95, SD = 
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2.68) was indeed significantly higher than the LSCO group (M = 34.55, SD = 4.56), t 
(37) = -7.80, P<0.001.
To test how manipulated rankings impacted individuals with different social comparison 
orientation. A 2×3 mixed repeated ANOVA was implemented, including social comparison 
orientation (LSCO, HSCO) as a between-subject factor, rank (top, middle, and bottom) 
as the within-subject factor, and the contribution deviated from baseline condition as 
independent variable. Greenhouse-Geisser correction was carried out as the spherical 
hypothesis was violated. We found that the main effect of rank was significant in the 
HSCO group, F (2, 36) = 8.97, p<.001, though not in the LSCO group, F (2, 38) =1.20, 
p=.31 (see Figure 2.4).
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Figure 2.4 Deviation of mean contribution rate from basic public goods game in the same 
and different group across low social comparison orientation and high social comparison 
orientation group 
Discussion
In this study, we investigated the effects of social comparison on cooperative behavior. 
We hypothesized that social comparison, via its role in the assessment and evaluation of 
the self and the others, would affect social decision-making. The particular decisions we 
were interested in were choices about how much to cooperate with others, in particular 
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when this cooperative choice comes with the risk of exploitation by free-riders. Firstly, 
we were interested in the respective effects of upward and downward social comparison 
on cooperative decisions. The former refers to a comparison with those who are relatively 
better off than we are, while the latter occurs when we compare ourselves to those 
worse off. Secondly, we also explored how these social comparison effects impacted 
both ‘relevant’ and ‘irrelevant’ targets. Here we defined relevant targets as partners in 
the cooperation task with whom participants had been previously directly compared 
with on simple cognitive task, whereas irrelevant targets were those partners in the 
Public Goods Game with whom there was no previous comparison provided. Finally, we 
examined how individual differences in social comparison orientation, as assessed by an 
independent measure, could potentially underlie these effects. 
Our primary findings of interest were that, firstly, when people earned a place in the top 
rank of players, thus inducing downward social comparison, we observed a significant 
increase in cooperative behavior in the subsequent PGG, as compared to participants’ 
own baseline level of cooperation when playing without any social information. In 
contrast, when people were in the bottom rank, resulting in upward social comparison, 
their cooperative behavior decreased. Importantly, these effects did not depend on 
whether the comparisons were with relevant (Same group condition) or irrelevant 
targets (Different group condition), with similar results in evidence for each set of 
targets. Finally, when examining individual differences in these changes in cooperative 
behavior, we found these effects were strongest in participants with high social 
comparison orientation scores. 
Regarding our first research finding, on trials in which individuals achieved a higher rank 
on the cognitive task, on average they made more cooperative decisions, that is, they 
contributed significantly more to the public good than on those trials where they were 
placed at lower ranks. Additionally, while we found that higher social ranks enhanced 
cooperative actions, as described above, conversely, our results demonstrated that 
finding oneself ranked bottom of the list led to a significant decrease in cooperation. 
These interesting effects can potentially be explained in several ways. Firstly, higher 
rankings imply an advantageous position and represent higher competence, which is likely 
experienced as a social reward in most societies (Chiao, 2010; Fiske, 1992; Fliessbach, et 
al., 2007; Zink, et al., 2008b). This social reward process may well have a generally positive 
impact on mood (similar to ‘warm-glow’) (Andreoni, 1990; Andreoni, 1995) which 
could in turn lead to alterations in subsequent behavior, such as higher contributions 
in the following PGG  (Andreoni, 1990; Benabou & Tirole, 2006; Kidd, Nicholas, & Rai, 
2013). In a similar vein, the negative emotion experienced by low ranked status (e.g., 
frustration, sadness) could elicit less willingness to engage in social interactions (Harle, 
Allen, & Sanfey, 2010; Harle & Sanfey, 2007) and thus fewer cooperative decisions in 
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the subsequent PGG. An alternative account is that relative performance derived from 
the social comparison task might lead to an advantageous or disadvantageous social 
experience during the interactions with other players, which could then enter into the 
subsequent decision-making via social or interpersonal utility (Loewenstein, et al., 
1989). According to the inequality aversion model (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), individuals 
have a robust aversion to disadvantageous inequality in situations where they are 
confronted with poorer performance or outcomes in comparison to others. In addition, 
many people also demonstrate an aversion to advantageous inequality, that is, avoiding 
outcomes where they are made considerably better off than their game partner. This 
inequality aversion explanation suggests that fairness considerations about the relative 
performance of players on the cognitive task may come into play (Fehr & Camerer, 
2007b; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002). Thus, individuals’ social preferences of inequality 
aversion might modify the subsequent cooperative decisions in an interpersonal context 
(Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). Specifically, a strong distaste for 
disadvantageous inequality might decrease their interpersonal utility, which would explain 
why individuals at lower ranks decrease their subsequent cooperative behaviors in the 
PGG; whereas individuals’ reluctance to assume the position of advantageous inequality 
might increase their social utility, which can explain why individuals at higher ranks raise 
their contribution in the succeeding PGG. A third plausible explanation for our findings 
is that the increased cooperative behaviors observed by the higher ranked players might 
be motivated by considerations of avoiding anticipated negative emotions caused by 
(e.g., guilt)(Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007b). By this account, individuals with a higher 
rank might feel that cooperative behavior is expected of someone who is a ‘winner’, and 
this social norm may guide subsequent decisions to be more generous, and thus avoid 
the guilt associated with taking further advantage of one’s game partners(Chang, et al., 
2011a). Conversely, task ‘losers’ may subsequently decide to maximize their own profit 
in the game, and thus, contribute relatively less.  
Given that there was a Circle task bonus, which participants were informed they could 
earn additional 2 euros if their average ranking across all the social comparison trails were 
above rank 3, one may argue that a simple non-social motivation to maximize financial 
outcome could have played a role in the changes from the baseline in the average 
contribution in the other two social comparison PGG tasks. In our opinion, firstly, the 
2 euros bonus was based on the average ranking in the Circle task across all the social 
comparison trails that participants would not experience any monetary gain experience 
in a single trail during the task. Therefore, the social comparison effect should play a 
dominant role in the modification the motives for the following contribution tasks. More 
importantly, if this argument is true, which means potential monetary reward would 
occur in rank 1 and 3 but not in rank 5 in a single social comparison trial, we should 
observe the effect in condition rank 1 and 3 rather than rank 5 (supposed to be no 
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effect at all). However, in fact, our results showed that the experience of bottom rank 
(rank 5) during the Circle task decreased their contribution in subsequent PGG, which 
demonstrated the social comparison effect.
A second important result which can help shed light on the potential mechanisms of 
cooperation outlined above emerges from the two separate ranking conditions we 
employed here. In one condition, participants took part in the PGG with players they 
had previously been directly ranked against (‘relevant’ targets), while in a second 
condition they played the PGG with a different group than those they had been ranked 
with (‘irrelevant’ targets). Nonetheless, participants showed very similar patterns of 
cooperation across both conditions (greater cooperation for downward comparison, 
lesser cooperation for upward comparison). Given what we have discussed above 
about the inequality aversion model, one might hypothesize that the social comparison 
processes would have a greater impact on individuals’ contribution in PGG with relevant 
as opposed to irrelevant targets. However, participants tended to treat the two groups 
the same way regardless of ‘relevant’ or ‘irrelevant’ compared targets. Further, if players’ 
beliefs about the expectation of others would lead to changes in subsequent cooperative 
decisions, then one might again expect that this would occur to a larger extent in those 
they had been ranked against, as opposed to a set of players with whom they had no 
previous experience. Therefore, we believe this most plausible mechanism for the 
alterations in cooperative decisions as a function of social comparison is one of affective 
bias. The positive emotions from a ‘winning’ rank enhance cooperation independent of 
whomever one is engaged in the PGG with, while a ‘losing’ rank leads to indiscriminately 
lowered cooperative choices. These results can be integrated with findings of pro-social 
(e.g., charity donation) decisions, in which research found the neurobiological evidence 
of reward processing when people prosocially interact with others (Harbaugh, et al., 
2007; Izuma, Saito, & Sadato, 2008; Moll, et al., 2006b). Moreover, this was supported by 
studies of social exclusion, whereby people in a disadvantageous social situation, socially 
excluded by others, decrease their prosocial behaviors (Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, 
Ciarocco, & Bartels, 2007), for example, in terms of offering less to others in a Dictator 
Game (Moor, et al., 2012). 
Finally, our results clearly demonstrated that social comparison effects on subsequent 
cooperative decisions were much more salient to those individuals who independently 
scored highest on a test of social comparison orientation (SCO). This effect suggests 
that individual differences in social comparison orientation play a vital role in subsequent 
decision-making. According to the selective accessibility model (Mussweiler, 2003; 
Mussweiler, Ruter, & Epstude, 2004), social comparison effects may activate two 
different processing manners: contrast or assimilation. These effects could also extend 
to the following cooperative decisions depending on the processing of similarity 
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(assimilation process) or dissimilarity (contrast process) of the targets. In the social 
comparison processes, individuals tend to seek similarities or dissimilarities between self 
and others. Our results suggest that high SCO individuals might engage processing more 
broadly and deeply in the similarities of the comparison targets in situations of downward 
comparison, while focus more on processing dissimilarities of the comparison targets in 
the upward comparison scenario (Buunk, Taylor, Dakof, Collins, & Vanyperen, 1990). 
In summary, the present study provides novel experimental evidence for the role of social 
comparison processes on cooperative decision-making. Our design allows us to clearly 
show that psychological processes based on positive feedback from social comparison 
promotes increased cooperation in some circumstances and reduced cooperation 
in others, indicating that social preferences and social emotions play a crucial role in 
the interpersonal cooperative decision-making. In addition, particular contextual 
information, such as upward or downward social comparison, can adjust cooperative rates 
accordingly. Furthermore, individual differences in social comparison orientation mediate 
the comparison effects in both up- and downward comparison processes. In conclusion, 
these results not provide novel evidence for the theories of social comparison, but also 
provide important implications for our daily life. Future work could usefully extend this 
behavioral paradigm by exploring the neural mechanisms underlying social comparison 
processes on cooperation. 
CHAPTER 3
Neural mechanisms of social comparison on 
cooperative decision-making
3
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Abstract
Social comparison, in which we utilise information to evaluate our standing relative 
to others, is pervasive in human society. It has been linked to a variety of behavioural 
outcomes. Here, we are interested in how social comparison plays a role in subsequent 
interactive social decision-making. The particular social behaviour we explore is that 
of cooperation. Cooperation is one of the most important interactions in human 
society, and successful cooperation often benefits both ourselves and others. However, 
cooperative choices often put us at risk of being taken advantage of by others. The 
present study aimed to identify the neural mechanisms by which social comparison 
impacts cooperative decisions. Participants first played a simple cognitive reaction time 
task, followed by various forms of feedback about their performance. Participants were 
sometimes told they performed the best (top rank), sometimes average (middle rank) 
and sometimes worst (bottom rank), Two conditions were used, one in which these 
rankings were relative to other players, and one in which the rankings were relative to 
their own previous performance, thereby eliminating the social factor. Participants then 
played a modified Public Goods Game, a standard experimental measure of cooperation. 
Behaviourally, we found that individuals were more cooperative when they were 
previously ranked higher than those who were ranked at the bottom. This comparison 
effect was similar though weaker in the self-comparison condition compared to the 
interpersonal condition. In terms of neural activation, when examining the interpersonal 
and self-comparison conditions, comparing high rankings to low rankings led to increased 
activity in the bilateral putamen in the interpersonal comparison condition, whereas 
this effect was not observed in the self-comparison condition. Interestingly, contrasts 
between interpersonal and self-comparison conditions showed positive activity in brain 
regions commonly dedicated to theory of mind processing: medial prefrontal cortex 
(mPFC), and bilateral temporal parental junction (TPJ) and precuneus. In summary, 
the present research shows that social comparison (induced via social rankings) has a 
demonstrable effect on cooperative behavior, and that the motivation to cooperate may 
be associated with both reward processing (the so-called ‘warm glow’ effect of altruism) 
as well as with theory of mind mechanisms.
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Introduction 
We live in a society in which we encounter a variety of situations where we utilise 
information to evaluate our standing relative to other individuals. This is in turn typically 
linked to subsequent behaviors (Festinger, 1954). Often, these interpersonal comparison 
processes arouse social emotions (Takahashi, et al., 2009) or interpersonal satisfaction 
(Fiske, 2010b), and shift and reshape our subsequent behaviours and decisions (Bault, 
Joffily, Rustichini, & Coricelli, 2011b; Zink, Tong, Chen, Bassett, & Stein, 2008a). For 
example, say the annual evaluation of your work performance was worse than the 
previous year. When this performance is revealed by your boss and compared to other 
colleagues’ performance, this may well make you more motivated to put more effort 
in cooperating with others in the future. Therefore, better understanding of these 
behaviours and decisions does not only serve as valuable information for successful living 
in society individually, but also potentially provides useful information for policy makers 
regarding resource utilisation optimisation. 
Social comparison (comparison in an interpersonal context), traditionally a hotspot 
in the field of social psychology (Garcia, Tor, & Schiff, 2013), has recently become a 
focus of attention of social neuroscience (Fliessbach, et al., 2007; Qiu, et al., 2010; 
Swencionis & Fiske, 2014). The processes of comparison in an interpersonal context 
have been reported to strongly activate the reward processing circuit in the brain, 
especially the striatum, likely because of the positive emotion it arouses (e.g., joy of 
winning) or due to satisfaction about the relative outcomes (Fliessbach, et al., 2007). 
Further empirical studies have revealed that the processing of interpersonal comparison 
has been associated with social emotions, such as envy or Schadenfreude (gloating) 
(Dvash, Gilam, Ben-Ze’ev, Hendler, & Shamay-Tsoory, 2010; Kang, Lee, Choi, & Kim, 
2013; Takahashi, et al., 2009; Zink, et al., 2008a). These emotions have been shown to 
be related to brain activation in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and ventral striatum 
(VS), respectively. This has also been shown to affect subsequent risk-taking behaviors 
(Bault, et al., 2011b).  
Although interpersonal comparison processes commonly affect our behaviours in our 
social lives as well as in our financial risk-taking behaviours, there is surprisingly little 
experimental research focused on understanding the underlying psychological processes 
and neural bases of comparison in an interpersonal context and its effects on subsequent 
interactive decision-making. The particular social behaviour we explore here is that of 
cooperation. Cooperation is one of the most important functions in human society (Fehr 
& Fischbacher, 2004b; Fehr & Rockenbach, 2004; Rand & Nowak, 2013). Successful 
cooperation often benefits both ourselves and others; however, cooperative choices 
often put us at risk of being taken advantage of by others, which raises the question of 
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what motivates human social cooperation and the relevant influential factors (Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2003b).
Recent studies in neuroeconomics have begun to reveal the neurobiological basis of 
human cooperation (de Quervain, et al., 2004b; Harbaugh, et al., 2007; King-Casas, et 
al., 2005b; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003b; Tricomi, Rangel, Camerer, 
& O’Doherty, 2010). Some studies have reported that mutual cooperation in an iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (Rilling, et al., 2002a) and charitable donations in public goods 
provision (Harbaugh, et al., 2007) are associated with brain activation in the reward-
processing brain regions (e.g., ventral striatum, orbitofrontal cortex, and rostral anterior 
cingulate cortex) (Tabibnia & Lieberman, 2007), while others  demonstrated that theory 
of mind processing might be a prerequisite for cooperative actions (Bault, Pelloux, 
Fahrenfort, Ridderinkhof, & Winden, 2014; McCabe, Houser, Ryan, Smith, & Trouard, 
2001; Rilling, Sanfey, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2004a; Tusche, Böckler, Kanske, 
Trautwein, & Singer, 2016). The latter processes are thought to especially involve the 
medial prefrontal cortex, temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and PCC/precuneus. 
However, no studies have engaged in examining the neural underpinnings of cooperation 
in a social comparative context, and little is known of how interpersonal comparison may 
influence individuals’ cooperative behaviours, or the respective neural mechanisms that 
underlie these processes. To bridge this gap, the present study sought to investigate 
the neural processing of interpersonal comparison and explore how this processing 
might regulate subsequent cooperative decision-making. We investigate three research 
questions: 1) how does the brain process and evaluate performance feedback in an 
interpersonal comparison, (i.e. when an individual’s performance is compared to that 
of others), versus a self-comparison context (i.e. when an individual’s performance 
is compared to their own previous record); 2) how do these brain correlates affect 
individuals’ subsequent cooperative decision-making; 3) what brain mechanisms are 
at play when individuals make cooperative decisions in an interpersonal context as 
compared to a self-comparison context. 
To address these questions, we designed an experiment in which participants played 
the Public Goods Game, a well-characterized task examining cooperative preferences, 
in two contexts; interpersonal-comparison and self-comparison, as well as employing 
a no-comparison context as a baseline control. Specifically, we measured behavioural 
responses and used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to measure brain 
activity while participants performed our task. Participants first played a simple cognitive 
reaction time task, following which various forms of feedback were given about their 
performance. Participants were sometimes told they performed the best (top rank), 
sometimes average (middle rank) and sometimes worst (bottom rank). As mentioned 
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above, two contexts were used: one in which these rankings were relative to other 
players, and one in which the rankings were relative to their own previous performance, 
thereby eliminating the social impact in the latter context. Following this feedback, 
participants then immediately played a modified Public Goods Game. To summarise, we 
compared the different contexts according to the performance feedback given as well as 
the relative valence of the feedback. 
Based on the aforementioned theoretical approaches and empirical studies, we 
hypothesized that an individual’s sensitivity to winning in a social context and the 
corresponding sense of self-enhancement (i.e. outperforming others) will arouse 
salient positive emotions and interpersonal satisfaction, which is associated with reward 
processing in the brain. Thus, we would predict increased brain activity in the reward 
system (e.g. striatum) in these conditions. 
Methods 
Participants
A total of 39 participants were recruited at Radboud University Nijmegen, The 
Netherlands. None had a history of any neurological, psychiatric, cardiovascular disorders, 
head surgeries or regular use of drugs. Three participants’ data were excluded because 
of technical problems during scanning. The reported data, therefore, are based on the 
36 remaining participants (17 male and 19 female, mean age ± SD = 24.19 ± 2.47 years; 
range from 21 to 30 years). Participants received financial compensation of 25 euros 
for participating in the experiment, plus an additional bonus (maximum of 10 euros) 
they had earned during the Public Goods Game. In order to calculate the bonus, we 
randomly selected one trial from each participant’s data at the end of the experiment. 
Each participant’s decision on that trial was then randomly paired with other four 
participants’ decisions. We subsequently calculated the bonus payment according to the 
Public Goods Game rule. The study protocol was approved by the local ethics committee 
(CMO region Arnhem-Nijmegen, The Netherlands) under the general ethics approval 
(CMO 2014/288), and all the experimental methods were conducted in accordance 
with these guidelines. All participants provided written informed consent in accordance 
with the Declaration of Helsinki and the guidelines of the local ethics committee.
Task and Design 
Public Goods Game
A Public Goods Game (PGG) was used to measure cooperation. In each trial of this 
standard PGG (henceforth referred to as the ‘basic PGG’ in our experiment), participants 
were paired with 4 other partners, therefore creating a group of 5 anonymous players (
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group account ( ig  ∈ [0, y ],𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1, … ,𝑛𝑛}) whilst keeping the remainder for 
themselves. Once all the players have decided on the amount of their 
contribution, the total contribution to the group account is then multiplied by 1.6, 
and this final amount is divided equally across all (𝑛𝑛 = 5) group members. 
Payoff ( P ) in each trial therefore is composed of the sum of the tokens 
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Since a < 1, a marginal investment into G causes a monetary loss of (1 - a); the dominant 
strategy of a completely selfish participant is to choose ig  = 0 (i.e. a group contribution 
of zero). 
Experimental Conditions 
A simple perceptual task (the Circle Task) was used to manipulate self and interpersonal 
comparison. During this task, a small coloured circle moves around the periphery of 
a larger static white circle. On each trial, the start colour of the small circle is to be 
randomly assigned from a colour pool of red, purple, blue, green, pink and yellow. The 
colour of the small circle is then randomly replaced by another colour from the colour 
pool at a random interval of between 0.64 - 0.80 seconds. The participant’s task is to 
press any button on the button box as soon as they detect that the colour of the small 
circle has changed, with participants informed that their performance measure is based 
on both accuracy and speed of their response. 
Three experimental conditions were used in the experiment: a basic PGG as the baseline 
condition (20 trials), a self-comparison PGG (45 trials, 15 trials for better perfomance 
than their own previous efforts, 15 trials for middle performance, 15 trials for worse 
performance), and an interpersonal-comparison PGG (55 trials, 15 trials for top rank 
(#1 out of 5), 15 trials for middle rank (#3 out of 5), 15 trials for bottom rank (#5 out 
of 5), and 5 trials for #2 and #4 positions respectively) leading to a total of 120 trials 
(Figure 3.1). 
In Condition 1 (Basic-PGG, 20 trials) which serves as a baseline for individual cooperation 
rates, participants played the PGG with 4 anonymous other players in each trial. In 
Condition 2 (Self-comparison PGG), on each trial, participants first played the Circle 
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Task and were then provided with feedback based on their personal performance, 
informing them that they had done better (15 trials), worse (15 trials), or the same 
(15 trials) as compared to their prior overall performance. Afterwards, participants 
immediately continued by playing the PGG with 4 other anonymous partners. In each 
trial of Condition 3 (Interpersonal-comparison PGG), participants first played the Circle 
Task with 4 other anonymous partners. Following each trial, a ranking list (feedback) is 
generated based on the performance of all 5 purported players in this trial. Participants 
are ranked from #1 to #5, with higher likelihoods of rank 1 (15 times), 3 (15 times), 
and 5 (15 times) and lower likelihoods of rank 2 (5 times) and 4 (5 times). Following 
this feedback, participants immediately continued by playing the PGG with the 4 other 
anonymous partners. 
Thus, the crucial difference between the self-comparison condition (i.e. Condition 2, 
in which participants are informed that the feedback is relative to their own previous 
performance) and the interpersonal comparison condition (i.e. Condition 3, in which 
the feedback is relative to other players’ performance), is the social factor related to 
being compared to others as opposed to yourself. This feedback (relative performance 
and ranking list) was pre-programmed so that the respective feedback was comparable 
across conditions (i.e. better, average, or worse). Across trials, the feedback type was 
determined randomly, with the exception of the ‘better’ or ‘worse’ feedback in self-
comparison condition (rank 1 or 5 in interpersonal comparison), which was automatically 
assigned if the response time was quicker than 0.05s or slower than 1s, respectively 
(Figure 3.1). 
Condition 1 allows us to measure baseline decision-making in a Public Goods Game, and 
then compare these to other conditions in which comparison information is presented 
immediately before contribution decisions. The latter two conditions thus enable us to 
distinguish between situations where self-comparison affects cooperative decision (self-
comparison condition) or situations in which interpersonal-comparison affects these 
decisions (interpersonal-comparison condition). We used different colours to distinguish 
the three conditions, specifically, white for the cue of basic PGG condition, green for the 
cue of self-comparison PGG condition, and pink for the cue of interpersonal-comparison 
PGG condition. This is implemented to increase the salience of the different situations 
(Figure 3.1) and make participants optimally aware of the different conditions. All 120 
trials were presented in random order for each participant.
Post Experiment Measures
Upon completion of the experiment, participants were asked several questions related 
to the experiment. In the first questionnaire, participants were asked to estimate the 
average percentage they had contributed in each experimental condition and evaluate 
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their relevant emotions. For example, a participant may be presented with the following 
question. “In the interpersonal-comparison PGG, suppose that your ranking after the 
Circle Task is Rank 1, how many tokens (in percentage) did you on average contribute 
in this condition? In the above condition, please rate your emotion (0 represents very 
negative emotion, 5 represents neutral emotion, 9 represents very positive, from 0 
to 9 indicates emotion from negative to positive).” In addition, participants also filled 
out one short questionnaire. The Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure 
(INCOM) (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999) was used to examine individual differences in social 
comparison orientation.
Procedure
Before starting the experiment, each participant was assigned a specific identity 
number (ID). They were informed they would play the experiment with people who had 
previously participated in our study, whose data had been acquired and pre-programmed 
into the task program, and who would be represented in the experiment by a human 
silhouette with respective ID numbers. Participants were told that these previous 
participants had allowed us to use their experimental data to play with other people. 
Therefore, each participant was also asked to give us the permission to use their data to 
play with our following participants. This manipulation was aimed to increase realism so 
that participants believed that they were playing with four of our previous participants. 
However, unbeknownst to the participants, the other players in our database were 
simulated. None of the participants in our study indicated that they did not believe the 
other players’ behavior to be real. 
Prior to scanning, participants went to a behavioural laboratory and were asked to read 
the experimental instructions, and were allowed to ask questions during reading. In the 
instructions, they were also informed of the payment rules, by which they would earn 
25 euro for completing the task as well as an extra bonus based on their performance 
in one selected PGG trial. After having made sure that participants fully understood the 
instruction, participants had the opportunity to practice 9 trials of the Circle Task as well 
as 3 trials for each experimental PGG condition. Experiment stimulus presentation and 
behavioural data acquisition were conducted using PsychToolbox (http://psychtoolbox.
org/) (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) integrated in Matlab (Matlab 2014a, The Mathworks, 
Inc., Natick, MA, USA).
In the scanner, participants practiced one trial of each condition in order to become 
familiar with the button box used. These practice trials are not included in the results. In 
each trial, participants first saw a fixation for 2 seconds, followed by a condition cue for 
2 seconds. Then, participants went through different phases in different conditions (see 
Figure 3.1). In particular, the Decision phase lasts 6 s, which consisted of two separate 
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phases. The first began from the onset of the Decision screen where participants 
were asked to make their decision by using their index and middle fingers to decrease 
and increase the number, respectively. In order to avoid an implicit bias of choices for 
participants, we randomly selected a number in each trial (from 0 to 10) and highlighted 
it as a starting default contribution. Once participants were sure of their choice, they used 
their ring finger to press a button to confirm their decision. Afterwards, participants’ 
final decision (the number participants chose) immediately turned red, and during this 
second phase their final choice was shown until the end of the Decision phase. 
The experimental task consists of three conditions, randomly presented in three runs 
for each participant and in total lasting approx. 50 minutes (Figure 3.1). Between runs, 
participants were questioned in order to make sure they were relaxed and comfortable. 
After participants had finished the task, we collected the anatomical brain images, which 
took around 5 minutes. Following the fMRI scanning session, participants also completed 
questionnaires, and were paid as per the instructions (participation fee and bonus). 
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Figure 3.1 Paradigm for three experimental conditions. (A) A single trial of the basic 
Public Goods Game. In this condition, participants are randomly paired with 4 anonymous 
partners to play the standard Public Goods Game. (B) A single trial of the self-comparison 
Public Goods Game. In this condition, participants are informed whether they had done 
better, worse or equivalent compared to their prior performance after having played the 
Circle task, and then are randomly paired with 4 anonymous partners to play the standard 
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Public Goods Game (C) A single trial of the interpersonal comparison Public Goods 
Game. In this condition, participants are randomly paired with 4 anonymous partners to 
play the Circle Task, after which a ranking list is generated based on the performance of 
the five purported players in the task, which is then shown to the participant, followed by 
the participant playing the standard Public Goods Game with these 4 partners.
fMRI data acquisition 
Imaging parameters
Neuroimaging data were acquired with a 3 Tesla MRI scanner (Skyra, Siemens, Erlangen, 
Germany) in Donders Centre for Cognitive Neuroimaing, Nijmegen, The Netherlands. 
A 32-channel phased array head coil was used to acquire blood oxygen level-dependent 
images using T
2
*-weighted gradient multi-echo echoplannar imaging (EPI) sequences 
(Poser, Versluis, Hoogduin, & Norris, 2006) with the following parameters: repetition 
time (TR) = 2250 ms; echo time (TE) = 9.4, 20.65, 31.9, 43.15 ms; flip angle = 90°; 
matrix size = 64×64; field-of-view (FOV) = 224×224 mm; slice gap = 0.5 mm. 35 
Ascending slices were acquired (slice thickness= 3.0 mm, voxel size = 3.5×3.5×3.0 mm) 
from the whole brain. Moreover, high-resolution anatomical T1-weighted images of the 
whole brain were collected using a Magnetisation-Prepared Rapid Gradient Echo (MP-
RAGE) sequence with the following parameters: 192 slices, TR=2300 ms; TE= 3.03 ms; 
flip angle= 8°; field-of-view (FOV) = 256×256 mm; voxel size = 1×1×1 mm. 
Statistical analysis
Behavioural data 
To examine the level of cooperative behaviour across the three different conditions, we 
computed the proportion of tokens contributed to the common pool on each trial in the 
PGG as the dependent variable (as a continuous variable from 0 to 1). Also, we used 
reaction times as a second dependent variable. 
Our main question of interest in the present study concerns the factors that might 
predict cooperative decision-making, in terms of contribution amount in the PGG. 
Therefore, two mixed effect regressions were conducted including “Contribution” and 
“Response Time” as the dependent variables and “Feedback” (three levels: Top, Middle, 
Bottom), “Conditions” (two levels: Self, Interpersonal), “Endowment” (two levels: 10, 
20) as well as “Runs” (three levels: Run1, Run2, Run3) as predictors. We excluded non-
response trials and the trials with feedback ranks 2 and 4. In total, the behavioural data 
consisted of 36 participants with 3214 observations. Furthermore, we are interested 
in the effects of different contexts on cooperative behaviours. A one-way ANVOA was 
conducted including “Context” as the within-subject factor (three levels: basic-PGG, 
self-comparison PGG, interpersonal-comparison PGG). 
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Behavioural data analyses were performed using the R statistical package (R Core Team, 
2015). Linear mixed-effect models were conducted using the mixed function of the 
“Afex” package for Analysis of Factorial Experiments (Singmann, Bolker, & Westfall, 
2015), which is integrated in the “lme4” package (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 
2015). The “lme4” packages were used for the mixed effect regression with repeated 
measures (Bates, et al., 2015), in which participants were treated as the random effect. 
The regression coefficients (B), standard error (SE), t value, and p-value in the mixed 
model were reported. To account for repeated measures in the mixed effect models, a 
random intercept for participants was included. Significance levels were calculated with 
the Kenward-Roger (KR) correction implemented in the mixed function. All descriptive 
and pairwise comparisons (i.e., least-squares means, 95% confidence intervals [CI]) 
were performed using the lsmeans function from the lsmeans package (Lenth, 2016).
fMRI data 
Pre-processing 
Neuroimaging data were analysed using SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/
software/spm8/) in combination with Matlab (Matlab 2014a, The Mathworks, Inc., 
Natick, MA, USA). Prior to pre-processing, images from multiple echo-time were 
combined via a standard procedure (Poser, et al., 2006). We first performed head 
motion correction on the first echo, in which the interactive rigid-body realignment was 
estimated to minimise the residual sum of squares between the first echo of the first scan 
and the all remaining scans. Then all echoes were realigned to the first echo of the first 
scan by applying the estimated parameters to all the other echoes. Images of each scan 
from the four echoes were combined into one image according to the calculated weighted 
sum for the echo times. Standardised pre-processing procedures were implemented to 
analyse the functional data. This consisted of slice-timing correction, co-registration 
of functional images to the anatomical images, segmentation of the anatomical image, 
normalisation to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space, smoothing (8-mm 
full-width/half-maximum kernel), and filtering (a standard high-pass filter set a 128 s). 
fMRI models 
GLM-based image analysis 
A standard neuroimaging method two-level general linear model (GLM) was applied to 
analyse the functional neuroimaging data, with the first level analyses (individual subject 
effects) providing contrasts for the second level (group effects) analyses. During the 
first level analysis, multiple event-related regressors were defined for each participant 
for each epoch of the time course in a GLM. The regressors modelled the blood oxygen 
level dependent (BOLD) response to the following epoch of fixation, condition-cue, 
jitters, circle-task, performance feedback, and decision in order to include all known 
sources of variance which could potentially account for the signal variance. Furthermore, 
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the feedback stage was split into six regressors corresponding to the six manipulated 
conditions (including top, middle, bottom feedback in the self-comparison PGG, top, 
middle, bottom feedback in the interpersonal-comparison PGG). The decision stage was 
further separated into seven regressors that corresponded to the above six conditions 
plus an extra one for the basic PGG. Regressors were time-locked from the onset of each 
epoch to the offset of the epoch. In particular, the regressors for decisions were time-
locked to the onset of the decision screen with the decision response time as duration 
in order to control the influence of response time on the BOLD signal. This analysis 
uses orthogonalised response time as the duration for different events (Mumford, 
Poline, & Poldrack, 2015). All regressors were modelled by convolving with a canonical 
hemodynamic response function (HRF) (Friston, et al., 1995). To correct for head 
motion artefacts, six rigid body parameters (three translations and three rotations) 
of realignment were included in the design matrix as nuisance regressors. Contrasts of 
interests were defined during the first level analyses for each of the participants.
Second level analyses
Subsequently, all the interesting contrast images were submitted to the random effects 
2nd level analysis. Specifically, a 2 (Context: self, interpersonal)* 3 (Feedback: top, middle, 
bottom) within-subject factorial design was evaluated during the feedback stage. To test 
the main effect of context, a [1 1 1 -1 -1 -1] or [-1 -1 -1 1 1 1] contrast for each subject 
was used for a one-sample t-test at the 2nd-level. To test the main effect of feedback, two 
contrasts [1 -1 0 1 -1 0] and [0 1 -1 0 1 -1] were used per participant and fit into a two-
sample t-test at the 2nd-level by using a [1 0; 0 1] F-contrast. Likewise, we conducted two 
contrasts ([1 -1 0 -1 1 0], [0 1 -1 0 -1 1]) for each participant and ran a two-sample t-test 
at the 2nd-level by using a [1 0; 0 1] F-contrast to test the interaction between context 
and feedback. Additionally, to explore the underlying neural mechanisms that are related 
to cooperative behaviours in the interpersonal-downward comparison (interpersonal 
higher performance) compared to the self-downward comparison (self-relevance 
higher performance), two contrasts (self higher > self lowest and interpersonal higher > 
interpersonal lowest) were conducted per participant on the 1st level. 
For the decision stage, four contrasts were conducted on the 1st level, including 
interpersonal > basic, self > basic, and interpersonal > private, and private > interpersonal. 
All the contrast images were submitted to the 2nd level for a one-sample T test analysis. 
Trial-wise parametric analysis performed during the outcome-decision phase by using 
contribution amount as a parametric modulator. Furthermore, functional regions 
of interest (ROIs) (Poldrack, 2007) were created for brain regions that achieve the 
threshold of the contrasts between the self versus interpersonal context (dmPFC, TPJ 
,Precunes), feedback effect (bilateral putamen) during the feedback stage, and (bilateral 
TPJ and mPFC) during the decision stage. ROIs were defined as spheres with a radius of 
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10 mm centred at the MNI local maxima activation coordinates and extracted for further 
analysis. These analyses were performed using the MarsBaR 0.44 SPM toolbox (http://
marsbar.sourceforge.net/). To avoid so-called ‘double dipping’, no further statistical 
analyses were performed on these extracted parameter estimates (Kriegeskorte, 
Simmons, Bellgowan, & Baker, 2009). 
To correct for multiple comparisons of fMRI results during the feedback stage, z 
statistical maps at the cluster level were projected using a Monte Carlo simulation-based 
estimator (AlphaSim: https://afni.nimh.nih.gov/pub/dist/doc/manual/AlphaSim.pdf) 
(Eklund, Nichols, & Knutsson, 2016). For example, in 10,000 iterated simulations with 
the following parameters (estimated FWHM=16.8 mm × 18.8 mm ×17.1mm, cluster 
connection radius = 5 mm, individual voxel threshold probability= 0.001), a correction 
p<0.05 at the cluster level would be achieved by defining a cluster at the threshold 
of p<0.001 in combination with a minimum cluster size of 62 voxels (Lieberman & 
Cunningham, 2009). We use p<0.001 (unc.) voxel-level and whole-brain family-wise 
correction (FEW) cluster-level p<0.05 for the threshold of results during the decision 
stage. Note that we only mention voxels that reach the threshold of voxel-wise p<0.001 
(unc.), k>30.
Results
Behavioral Results
We found that the factor of “Context” had a marginally significant effect on cooperative 
decision-making, F (70, 35) =3.05, p=0.054. Pair-wise comparisons show that individuals 
contribute significantly more when in the interpersonal comparison context as compared 
to the basic context, t (70) =-2.4, p=0.056) (Figure 3.2 A). Furthermore, mixed effects 
regression results indicated that the factor “Feedback (level: Bottom)” could negatively 
predict participants’ contribution in the PGG (B=-0.24, SE=0.12, t=-1.98, p=0.04). 
Therefore, we averaged the contribution at the factor “Performance outcome (level: Top 
and Middle) as higher in both Self and Interpersonal comparison contexts. A paired t-test 
demonstrated that individuals were more cooperative, in terms of higher contribution 
in the higher feedback condition (M=44.40, SE=4.29) when compared to the lowest 
feedback condition (M=41.02, SE=4.45), particularly in the interpersonal context, t (35) 
= 2.32, p<0.05, but not in the self context (t (35) = -0.66, p>0.05) (Figure 3.2 B). We did 
not find any significant factors to predict the response time. 
The repeated measures ANOVAs regarding emotional feeling (valence: positive to 
negative) yielded a significant main effect of performance outcome (F (2, 70) = 87.62, 
p<0.001) and an interaction between feedback and context (F (2, 70) =4.86, p<0.05) 
(Figure 3.2 C). Further analyses across the different performance outcome conditions 
found that there was a significant linear trend, (F(1,35)=105.27, p<0.001), indicating 
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that as the feedback becomes better (or higher), contribution in both comparison 
contexts PGG  increases proportionally, with the contribution being greater when 
receiving top feedback (M=6.94, SD=0.17)  as compared to middle feedback (M=5.33, 
SD=0.14), which in turn was greater than that when the participant was ranked bottom 
(M=3.76, SD=0.21). For the interaction between feedback and context, pairwise 
comparisons revealed that emotional ratings are higher in the interpersonal context 
than in the self-comparison context, particularly when receiving ‘top’ outcome(F (1, 
35) = 11.15, p<0.05). However, the ANOVAs on ratings of contribution yielded neither a 
significant main effect nor a significant interaction effect (Figure 3.2 D).
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Figure 3.2 Behavioral results. (a) Mean contribution in three contexts; (b) Mean 
contribution across conditions; (c) Mean of percentage of self-reported contribution 
across conditions; (d) Mean of self-reported emotional rating across conditions. 
Abbreviations: SH: self-higher; SL: self-lowest; IH: interpersonal-higher; IL: interpersonal-
lowest; ST: self-top; SM: self-middle; SB: self-bottom; IT: interpersonal-top; IM: 
interpersonal-middle, IB: interpersonal- bottom. Error bars represent the standard error.
fMRI Results
Whole-brain analysis: performance outcome stage
To explore the differences between self- and interpersonal comparison outcome, we 
first searched for whole brain activation during outcome to the Circle Task that was 
modulated by (1) the main effect of context (self vs. interpersonal), (2) the main effect 
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of performance outcome (top, middle, and bottom), (3) and the interaction of these 
two factors. 
Main effect of context 
The interpersonal versus self-comparison feedback context activated a large cluster of 
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), including the rostral anterior cingulate cortex (rACC), 
and extending to the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC). In addition, the right 
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), inferior parietal lobule (IPL) and superior parietal lobule 
(SPL) and bilateral precuneus/ posterior cingulated cortex (PCC), middle occipital 
gyrus, cuneus, calcarine gyrus were also activated. There were no significant voxels 
for the contrast Self > Interpersonal. (Voxel-wise threshold of p<0.001 along with the 
cluster threshold correction p<0.05) (see Table 3.1 for a full list of regions, coordinates, 
and statistics). 
In particular, we were interested in the response of particular regions heavily implicated 
in social cognition – namely, mPFC, TPJ, and the precuneus/PCC (Lieberman, 2007; 
Saxe, 2006). We were interested in how these brain regions were differentially active 
across our experimental contexts. Therefore, the local maxima of functional activation 
of the MNI coordinates of dmPFC (BA 9, MNI: 2, 46, 26), right TPJ (30 -60 46) and left 
precuneus (2,-60, 31) (Figure 3.3 (a), Table 3.1) were extracted and the percentage 
of signal change was plotted for the six feedback conditions (Figure 3.3(b), Table 3.1). 
Main effect of performance outcome 
One other comparison of interest in our experiment is that of the three outcome 
levels in both self and interpersonal comparison contexts. Here, the main effect of 
outcome revealed brain region activations in bilateral caudate (left (-18,10,22), right 
(20,7,22)), bilateral anterior insula (AI, left (-29,21,-8), right (38,24,-2)), right inferior 
parietal lobule (IPL) / supramarginal gyrus (55,-42,28), superior occipital gyrus, middle 
cingulated cortex (MCC) and supplementary motor area (SMA), and bilateral calcarine 
gyrus, left cuneus (voxel-wise threshold of p<0.001 along with the cluster threshold 
correction p<0.05 ) (Figure 3.2, Table 3.1). To further explore how the brain activation 
was related to the different types of performance outcomes in the two different contexts 
respectively, two extra contrasts (between higher outcomes (top and middle) and lower 
(bottom) outcomes in the self-comparison and interpersonal comparison context) were 
conducted separately. Interestingly, the contrast of [interpersonal higher - interpersonal 
lower] revealed brain activation, particularly in the left putamen (-26, 14, -5) (voxel-wise 
threshold of P<0.001, along with the cluster threshold correction P<0.05) as well as the 
right putamen (24, 18, -2) (voxel-wise threshold of P<0.001 (unc.), k=33). However, 
no significant voxels were found in the contrast [self higher – self lower] (voxel-wise 
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Table 3.1. Brain regions associated with main effects and interactions during feedback 
stage
Brodmann 
area
Local 
maxima
MNI coordinates of 
local maxima (mm)
Cluster size
(voxels)
Brain Region Z value x y z
Main effect of context
Interpersonal > self
L superior medial gyrus 32 5.73 2 46 26 791
R superior medial gyrus 10 5.28 6 56 10
R anterior cingulate cortex 32 5.11 10 42 10
R precentral gyrus 44 4.8 44 7 31
R superior frontal gyrus 32 4.61 16 42 37
R middle frontal gyrus 6 4.41 30 4 52
R middle cingulate cortex 32 4.35 6 24 40
R middle frontal gyrus 45 4.17 48 32 22
R middle occipital gyrus 19 6.23 30 -74 25 634
R angular gyrus/ IPS 7 6.09 30 -60 46
R inferior parietal lobule 40 4.73 41 -42 52
R angular gyrus/ IPL 39 4.67 48 -60 25
R postcentral gyrus 2 4.61 48 -32 49
L precuneus/ posterior 
cingulated cortex
31 4.39 2 -60 31
R precuneus/ posterior 
cingulated cortex
7 3.91 6 -63 52
R cuneus 19 3.74 16 -84 25
L middle occipital gyrus 19 4.99 -29 -74 22 128
L inferior parietal lobule/ IPS 7 4.12 -29 -60 49
L superior parietal lobule/ IPS 7 3.84 -22 -63 40
R calcarine gyrus 17 7.49 10 -88 7 453
R lingual gyrus 17 7.03 6 -77 -2
R inferior occipital gyrus 19 5.40 30 -88 -5
R middle occipital gyrus 18 3.69 30 -84 13
Main effects of feedbacks
R calcarine gyrus 18 Inf 13 -74 7 927
L calcarine gyrus 17 Inf -8 -84 4
L cuneus 18 6.15 2 -77 22
R cerebelum 37 3.89 20 -56 -17
L superior occipital gyrus 18 3.72 -15 -74 25
L inferior temporal gyrus 20 5.92 -50 -49 -8 218
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L caudate NA 4.26 -18 10 22 176
R caudate NA 3.48 20 7 22
R insula 47 5.60 38 24 -2 112
L insula 13 4.70 -29 21 -8 60
L precentral gyrus 4 5.14 -36 -18 58 58
R supramarginal gyrus / IPL 48 5.00 55 -42 28 38
L middle cingulate cortex NA 3.6 -5 -7 52 31
L supplementary motor area 6 3.6 -8 7 49
R hippocampus 37 4.2 34 -32 -2 29
Interaction effect of context × 
feedback
R lingual gyrus 18 Inf 13 -77 1 1187
L calcarine gyrus 17 Inf -8 -84 4
R calcarine gyrus 17 Inf 13 -88 10
L lingual gyrus 18 7.38 -15 -66 -5
R middle occipital gyrus 19 6.09 30 -74 22
R precuneus 7 5.49 20 -67 43
R inferior occipital gyrus 19 5.39 34 -74 -8
R supramarginal gyrus /IPL 40 5.26 34 -39 43
R postcentral gyrus 2 5.05 45 -28 43
L cuneus 18 4.73 3 -74 22
L precentral gyrus 4 7.45 -40 -18 52 192
L middle frontal gyrus 6 6.25 -26 -4 52
R middle frontal gyrus 6 6.63 34 -4 52 58
L superior parietal lobule / IPS 7 6.54 -22 -63 40 124
R middle occipital gyrus -26 -74 25
L supplementary motor area 6 6.74 -4 0 52 91
All regions reported survived a voxel level p<0.001 AlphaSim correction for multiple comparison at the cluster 
level, p
 
<0.05. L: left; R: right; IPL: inferior parietal lobule, IPS: intraparietal sulcus. 
threshold of p<0.001, along with the cluster threshold correction p<0.05) (see Figure 
3.4, Table 3.2).
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Figure 3.3 Brain regions activated for a main effect of Context. (Interpersonal feedback 
> Self feedback revealed that stronger activity in the mPFC (includes rACC (10, 42, 
10) extending to dmPFC (BA 9, MNI: 2,46,26), bilateral precuneus, right TPJ (30 -60 
46), see Table 1 for more details.) There were no significant voxels for Context: Self > 
Interpersonal. (b) Parametric estimates from of these regions (dmPFC, right TPJ, left 
precuneus) as a function of Context and Rank. Error bars indicate the standard errors 
of the current sample. To avoid double dipping, no further post-hoc comparisons were 
applied to the extracted data.
Interaction effect of context * outcome 
To test whether some brain structures processed the performance outcome types in 
self and interpersonal context, we further explored the interaction effect between the 
context and outcomes. BOLD Responses in several regions, including the precuneus 
(20,-67, 43), supplementary motor area (-4, 0, 52) (SMA), right supramarginal gyrus 
(34,-39,43) (TPJ/IPL), superior parietal lobule, middle occipital gyrus, inferior occipital 
gyrus, bilateral postcentral gyrus, and bilateral calcarine gyrus, left cuneus were shown 
to be significant in the interaction of both factors of context and outcome. 
57
N
eural m
echanism
s of social com
parison on cooperative decision-m
akingST SM SB IT IM IB
−0.5
0
0.5
Pa
ra
m
et
ric
 es
tim
at
es
L Putaman
 
 
Self
Interpersonal
ST SM SB IT IM IB
−0.5
0
0.5
Pa
ra
m
et
ric
 es
tim
at
es
R Putaman
 
 
Self
Interpersonal
(a)
(b)
Figure 3.4 (a) Brain regions revealed to be activated by [higher outcomes-lower 
outcomes] in interpersonal context. For illustration purpose, here we use voxel-wise 
threshold of p<0.001 (unc.) (b) Parametric estimates from of bilateral putamen (left 
(-26 14 -5), right (24 18 -2)) as a function of Context and Rank. Error bars indicate the 
standard errors of the current sample. ST: self-top, SM: self-middle, SB: self-bottom; IT: 
interpersonal-top, IM: interpersonal-middle, IB: interpersonal-bottom.
Table 3.2 Brain activation of the contrast [interpersonal higher > interpersonal lower] 
during the performance outcome stage
Brodmann 
area
Local 
maxima
MNI coordinates 
of local maxima 
(mm)
Cluster size
(voxels)
Brain Region T value x y z
Interpersonal 
(higher>lower)
L putamen 48 4.91 -26 14 -5 115
R cuneus 18 4.90 10 -88 16 54
R putamen 48 3.79 24 18 -2 33
L middle occipital gyrus 36 4.30 -32 -80 4 36
L precentral gyrus 6 4.11 -43 4 37 34
Note: All regions reported survived at the threshold of voxel-level p<0.001, (k>20). L, left; R, right.
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Figure 3.5 (a) fMRI activation maps of the contrast [interpersonal > self] during the 
decision stage. The activation patterns show a cluster of mPFC (ACC (10, 42, 28) 
extending into MCC (10, 35, 34) and dmPFC (10, 35, 49)). Whole-brain cluster-level 
p
FWE
<0.05. (b) Time series of the right TPJ and mPFC of each condition regressor during 
the decision stage. Time courses were estimated with the impulse response model from 
the onset Decision screen, for a length of 22.5s. A significant difference between self 
and interpersonal context is shown from the time bin 2 (~2.4s after feedback onset). (c) 
Parameter estimates (beta values) of right TPJ, mPFC and left TPJ across conditions. Error 
bars indicate the standard errors of the current sample. ST: self-top, SM: self-middle, SB: 
self-bottom; IT: interpersonal-top, IM: interpersonal-middle, IB: interpersonal-bottom.
59
N
eural m
echanism
s of social com
parison on cooperative decision-m
aking
Table 3.3
Brain activations of the contrast of [Interpersonal > self] during the Decision stage
Brodmann 
area
Local 
maxima
MNI coordinates 
of local maxima 
(mm)
Cluster size
(voxels)
Brain Region T value x y z
Interpersonal >self
R angular gyrus/ TPJ 39 8.54 48 -52 34 127
R inferior parietal lobule 
(IPS)
40 7.86 44 -49 43
R superior medial gyrus 8 6.48 10 35 49 70
R superior frontal gyrus 9 6.09 16 21 55
L superior medial gyrus 9 6.01 2 42 43
R ACC 32 5.67 10 42 28
R MCC 32 5.43 10 35 34
L inferior parietal lobule 
/TPJ
40 6.77 -46 -49 43 23
R ACC 32 6.06 10 42 16 11
Note: Regions listed reach the threshold of p<0.05, cluster-level family-wise corrected of whole-brain. 
Abbreviations: L: left; R, right; IPS, intraparietal sulcus, ACC: anterior cingulate cortex, MCC: medial cingulate 
cortex.
Whole-brain analysis: Decision stage 
In addition to the response to feedback, we were interested in the effect of decision-
making across conditions. by comparing the brain activations in the decision stages for 
the three contexts. Specifically, we used the BOLD response in the basic-Public Goods 
Game as our baseline condition. Three contrasts were conducted in the decision stage, 
including interpersonal > basic, self > basic, and interpersonal > self. The contrast 
interpersonal > self revealed activation of bilateral TPJ (right, 48, -52, 34; left -46,-49, 
43), ACC (10, 42, 28), MCC (10, 35, 34), and mPFC (10, 35, 49) (voxel-wise threshold 
of P<0.001, along with the cluster threshold family-wise (FWE) correction P<0.05 on 
whole brain) (Figure 5 and Table 3). Furthermore, the contrast interpersonal > basic 
showed activation in the region of ACC/mPFC (10, 52,16) (55 voxels) , right TPJ (52,-
52,34) (1 right MTG (middle temporal gyrus) (62,-38,-8)(22 voxels) (voxel-level 
p<0.001(unc.)). However, no significant voxels were found in the contrast self > basic.
Parametric modulation analyses- Decision Phase
Trial-wise parametric analysis performed during the outcome-decision phase by using 
contribution amount as a parametric modulator. In the basic and private PGG, VS were 
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positively correlated with contribution amount in the Basic PGG (Figure 3.6 (a)). ACC, 
PCC, Precunues are positively correlated with the contribution amount in the private 
PGG (Figure 3.6 (b)). Compare to the social context, basic and private context found 
parametric effects in different brain regions. Again, we found the right temporal parietal 
junction and posterior superior temporal sulcus were positively correlated with the 
trial-wise contribution amount in the social context PGG (Figure 3.6 (c)).  Meanwhile, 
left anterior insula and right putamen were also found positively correlated with the 
cooperative decision-making in social context PGG. 
Y= 3 X=0 X = 52 
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 3.6 Results of parametric modulation analyses during the Decision phase. (a) 
Brain regions activations positively correlated with contribution amount in PGG in the 
basic PGG; (b) self-comparison PGG; (c) interpersonal-comparison PGG, voxel-wise 
threshold of p<0.005 (unc.)
Discussion 
The current study’s main aim was to identify the brain mechanisms involved in 
interpersonal comparison prior to cooperative decision-making. To explore this, we 
combined functional brain imaging with a behavioural paradigm that incorporated 
a cognitive task and a subsequent Public Goods Game to directly compare the 
behavioural effects and neural activities underlying cooperative decision-making in 
both an interpersonal comparison context and as well as a self-comparison context. 
The advantage of our paradigm lies in the fact that it allows us to examine the neural 
processing of comparative feedback in different contexts (performance outcome stage) 
as well as this outcome’s relationship to cooperative decision-making (decision stage). 
Understanding the comparative processes in interpersonal contexts involving status 
hierarchies is an important research question, therefore, exploring the brain mechanisms 
that underlie interpersonal comparison and self-comparison can provide useful insights 
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into how relative value evaluation processes in different contexts can have an effect on 
our social cooperation, quantifying individuals’ cooperative choices in different contexts. 
Firstly, our behavioural results showed that individuals tend to be more cooperative 
when they were previously ranked higher in the previous (unrelated) task than when 
they were previously ranked towards the bottom. This was particularly the case for 
the interpersonal comparison context. Interestingly, this pattern was consistent with 
individuals’ self-reported valence of emotions in the conditions. Our results here showed 
that individuals reported positive arousal as their ranking increased, but the emotion 
rating was significantly more positive in the social-winning (interpersonal-top) condition 
than in the self-enhancing condition (self-top). As expected, and in line with previous 
literature on social comparison, these processes evoke social emotions (Dvash, et al., 
2010; Steinbeis & Singer, 2013; Takahashi, et al., 2009), and in turn influence individuals’ 
decision-making (Bault, et al., 2011b; Coricelli, et al., 2005). Specifically, participants 
who had experienced “social winning” have a greater likelihood of contributing more 
money to the public good, thereby showing increased cooperative behaviour. Therefore, 
a ‘winning’ status, may bring about enhanced altruistic concerns, perhaps in the form of 
social pleasure or interpersonal satisfaction. 
In terms of brain activation, we found significant striatal (bilateral putamen) activity 
during the performance outcome stage when comparing higher outcome versus 
lower outcome, specifically in the social interpersonal comparison context. This 
brain activation pattern was not found in the self-comparison context. This result is 
correspondis with our behavioural results, in which individuals contributed significantly 
higher in the higher outcome compared to the lower outcome conditions. In addition, 
the main effect of performance outcome also revealed the brain regions of bilateral 
caudate to be activated. As many studies of reward anticipation in both human and 
non-human primates have shown, the striatum is a brain structure implicated in the 
neural circuitry of reward processing (Schultz, 1997; Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 
1997; Schultz, Tremblay, & Hollerman, 2000). An abundance of studies using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET) have 
revealed that the striatum is related to a wide variety of types of reward processing, 
such as food (McClure, Berns, & Montague, 2003; Pagnoni, Zink, Montague, & Berns, 
2002), sex (Arnow, et al., 2002), money (Delgado, Stenger, & Fiez, 2004; Knutson, 
Adams, Fong, & Hommer, 2001), and social approval (Izuma, et al., 2008; Izuma, et al., 
2010a). Given this previous evidence demonstrating the involvement of ventral striatum 
in reward-processing, we suggest that the bilateral striatum here may encode the social 
satisfaction elicited by higher relative performance when being compared to others in 
an interpersonal context. The current findings also support previous research that has 
shown ventral striatum to be activated in the case of advantageous social comparison, 
which participants have won a lottery compared to counterparts, (Bault, et al., 2011b; 
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Fliessbach, et al., 2007), and positive social comparison related emotions (Dvash, et al., 
2010; Takahashi, et al., 2009). In combination with our behavioral and neural evidence 
for the performance outcome, it is reasonable to link this positive emotional arousal or 
interpersonal satisfaction to the subsequent voluntary cooperative behaviors. Therefore, 
the possible motive for cooperation in a social comparison context may be associated 
with a mechanism termed “warm-glow”, the idea that making a voluntary contribution 
leads to satisfaction or positive emotion for the giving party (Harbaugh, et al., 2007).
Thus far, our results from the performance outcome stage are consistent with earlier 
findings in which brain activity in the striatum tends to be related to “winning” and might 
further increase cooperative behaviours. The advantage of our design is that we can 
extend the implication of comparison processes to a different context (interpersonal-
comparison and self-comparison) as well as to different stages (i.e. performance 
outcome and decision stage). Our behavioural results show a tendency for contributions 
in PGG to be higher in the interpersonal comparison context than in the self-comparison 
and basic context. This effect motivated us to further explore how the brain processes 
the comparison in different contexts and which mechanisms are underlying cooperative 
decisions in this context. The main effect of context (interpersonal versus self-
comparison) during the performance outcome stage revealed higher activation in 
regions of mPFC (starting from the rostral ACC and extending to dmPFC), right TPJ, 
and precuneus. Interestingly, the contrast between interpersonal and self-comparison 
contexts during the decision stage demonstrated activation in the mPFC and bilateral 
TPJ. Therefore, the current study found activation in the mPFC, TPJ and precuneus to be 
selectively dedicated to the interpersonal context.
As is well-known, the mPFC, TPJ and precuneus are recruited across a wide range of 
social cognition tasks, and activity in these regions has bene proposed to refelct 
involvement of theory of mind (mentalising) processing, that is, associated with taking 
others’ thoughts, feelings and welfare into consideration (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Carter 
& Huettel, 2013; Decety & Lamm, 2007; Frith & Frith, 2006; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). 
Notably, participants played the PGG with five paired players in each round, irrespective 
of the context (baseline, self, and interpersonal). However, this metalizing network 
activity was particularly enhanced in the interpersonal comparison context. This finding 
is in accordance with the behavioural results that showed that “social-winning” enhanced 
cooperative decisions in the PGG.
One plausible explanation for our current findings could be that those individuals who 
experience “social winning” in the interpersonal context may engage in more theory 
of mind processing on subsequent Public Goods Game, trying to assess and care more 
about the other’s welfare as part of their effort to optimise the outcomes for the whole 
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group. According to our results, the regions associated with theory of mind were 
most active in the interpersonal-top context compared to interpersonal-middle and 
interpersonal-bottom contexts. This result supports our hypothesis that individuals 
may have intensified their theory of mind processing in the “social winning” context. 
Combined with the behavioural effects, it is reasonable to infer that being compared 
to others in an interpersonal context may shape subsequent behaviour.  However, an 
alternative explanation for the current findings is that the brain regions of mPFC, TPJ 
and precuneus are particularly sensitive to the social context, rather than responding 
distinguishingly to social comparison processes. That is, the interpersonal context itself 
may be sufficient to impact the further behaviours by focusing more on the other’s 
intentions. Notably, the current study found the regions related to theory of mind 
(mPFC, TPJ) selectively involved in the interpersonal context during both the feedback 
and decision stages. These regions, identified as core regions in social cognition, are also 
specifically important for theory of mind processing in a social context. 
In summary, the present research shows that social comparison (induced through 
social rankings) can have a demonstrable subsequent effect on cooperative behaviour. 
Ventral striatum (especially putamen) tracks the rewarding effect of downward 
social comparison processes. In the interpersonal comparison context, motivations to 
cooperate seem to be associated with both reward processing (the so-called ‘warm-
glow’ effect of altruism) as well as with theory of mind mechanisms. This is supported 
by some studies that detected both reward systems as well as theory of mind processing 
to be associated with cooperative social interactions (Bault, Joffily, Rustichini, & Coricelli, 
2011c; Moll, et al., 2006b; Singer, Kiebel, Winston, Dolan, & Frith, 2004a). The current 
findings extend our knowledge of how the brain’s response to social comparison may 
impact future cooperative decision-making.

CHAPTER 4
Neural and Behavioural Effects of 
Reciprocity on Cooperative Decision-Making 
in Gain and Loss Context
4
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Abstract
Reciprocity is one of the most important factors for the establishment and maintenance 
of social relationships. Asking for favours whilst not granting them in return can 
prevent the establishment of stable, long-term cooperative partnerships. Although 
researchers have begun to understand human social cooperation, few studies have 
looked at cooperative decisions in a loss-sharing context. The present study aimed to 
investigate the behavioural effects and neural correlates of prior history of reciprocity 
on cooperative decisions in both gain-sharing and loss-sharing contexts. Thirty-nine 
Chinese adult subjects participated in the study. Participants played a two-session game. 
In the first session they played the Trust Game in the role of trustee. Following this 
behavioural testing session, subjects were scanned using 3T fMRI while they played a 
modified Public Goods Game (PGG) in both gain-sharing and loss-sharing contexts with 
partners of different reciprocity levels. The percentage contributed to the public pool 
was used as an index of cooperative behaviour. Behaviourally, individuals tended to be 
more cooperative following prior interaction with higher reciprocity players as compared 
to lower reciprocity players. This effect was robust, especially in the gain-sharing 
context. Regarding the brain, viewing higher reciprocity players increased activation in 
the insula as compared to when viewing lower reciprocity players. Moreover, making 
cooperative decisions with higher reciprocity others increased activation in bilateral 
striatum as compared to when making cooperative decisions with lower reciprocity 
others. Parametric modulation analyses using a trial-wise percentage of contribution to 
the public pool revealed that prefrontal cortex was also involved in cooperative decision-
making. In summary, we show that partners’ prior reciprocity has a demonstrable but 
different effect on cooperative behaviour in gain and loss contexts. Reward processing 
in the bilateral striatum may act as a neural modulator which reshapes the subsequent 
cooperative decisions. The neural on cooperation may involve the prefrontal-striatal 
loop.
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Introduction 
Cooperation between non-kin individuals is one of the key features of human social 
life, setting us apart from other species (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004a; Rand & Nowak, 
2013). Typically, mutual benefits are achieved through various types of social exchange 
between individuals during social interactions. However, receiving favours from others, 
but not reciprocating in turn, can prevent setting up a stable and long-term cooperative 
partnership. For instance, asking neighbours to help you with receiving a mail delivery 
while telling them that you will not help them move in newly-arrived furniture may 
well lead to very short-lived relationships. Obviously, reciprocity plays a vital role in the 
establishment and maintenance of social relationships. 
Previous studies have attempted to understand how reciprocity fosters cooperation 
through the investigation of the motivations and neural mechanisms underlying both 
individuals’ reciprocal (Chang, et al., 2011b; Delgado, Frank, & Phelps, 2005; King-Casas, 
Tomlin, Anen, & Camerer, 2005a; McCabe, et al., 2001; Rilling, et al., 2002b), as well as 
non-reciprocal behaviours (Baumgartner, Fischbacher, Feierabend, Lutz, & Fehr, 2009b; 
Sanfey, et al., 2003a) during social exchange. According to these studies, reciprocating 
cooperation is associated with the brain’s reward processing system (Delgado, et al., 
2005; Rilling, et al., 2002b; Rilling, Sanfey, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2004b), in 
which the ventral striatum and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) are involved (Rilling, et al., 
2002b). These findings suggest that reward processing when reciprocating another’s 
favour might reinforce further cooperation. Moreover, social emotions (Chang, et al., 
2011b; Sanfey, et al., 2003a) and cognitive control of self-interest (Baumgartner, et al., 
2009a) are also related to reciprocal behaviours. For example, abuse of others’ trust 
increased the activity in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) (Chang, et al., 2011b), 
a brain region potentially related to affective processing (e.g., guilt) (Krajbich, Adolphs, 
Tranel, Denburg, & Camerer, 2009). Moreover, fulfilling self-made promises increased 
the activation of control regions such as anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and dorsal 
lateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). These regions, when disrupted, have been shown to be 
related to a diminished capability to build a social reputation (Knoch, Schneider, Schunk, 
Hohmann, & Fehr, 2009). The aforementioned studies focused on neural processing 
when individuals are reciprocating or defecting in social interactions. However, studies 
have not examined how individuals interact (or more specifically cooperate) with others 
who are labelled with various likelihoods of reciprocity. 
Research has shown that individuals are conditional cooperators (Fehr & Fischbacher, 
2004b; Fischbacher, Gachter, & Fehr, 2001), indicating that most people cooperate on 
the condition that others cooperate too. Although the norm of conditional cooperation is 
supported by some evolutionary models (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Nowak & Sigmund, 
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1993), these results are mostly based on a sharing gains. However, it is just as likely 
for us to be faced with a loss-sharing situation with others, both at the individual and 
societal level. For example, imagine running a company with other partners, and the 
company encounters a large deficit this year. Or, when a country is facing a financial 
crisis or international environmental issues (e.g., global warming). It is clear therefore 
that understanding cooperative decisions and the relevant neural mechanisms in a loss-
sharing context is also useful.
The present study aimed to bridge the gap between these previous findings as well 
as gain insight into the effects (behavioural and neural) of partners’ prior reciprocity 
on individuals’ cooperative decisions in both gain-sharing and loss-sharing contexts. 
To achieve this goal, we adopted a two-session game paradigm. Participants first 
played as Trustee in the single-shot Trust Game, interacting with several investors, 
and then continued to a modified Public Goods Game. There are two advantages of 
this two-session paradigm: (1) Participants are able to experience for themselves the 
role of Trustee and have the opportunity to reciprocate an investor’s trust. (2) A key 
manipulation here is that participants were informed they would play the Public Goods 
Game with other players from a different level of reciprocity group. These players had 
previously participated in the Trust Game and were assigned to different groups as a 
funciton of how they actually reciprocated in the Trust Game. Notably, one novel aspect 
of the current study is that we test cooperative decisions by designing a modified Public 
Goods Game with both gain-sharing and loss-sharing contexts, in which participants 
encounter these two situations together with other randomly selected players. 
By using the aforementioned game paradigm, our study provides the opportunity to 
answer the following three research questions. Firstly, do individuals use partner’s prior 
reciprocity information to guide their subsequent cooperative decisions with these 
players? If so, how does this information affect individuals’ cooperative decisions with 
these partners in a Public Goods Game in both gain-sharing and loss-sharing situations? 
Previous theoretical research on the evolution of human social cooperation highlighted 
the importance of processing the reputation of others (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003b; Nowak, 
2006; Rand & Nowak, 2013). Moreover, studies have shown that social cooperation can 
be affected by knowledge of other’s reputation in an integrated game (King-Casas, 
et al., 2005a; Rilling, et al., 2002b), which might be the motive to drive cooperation 
through indirect reciprocity (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). Therefore, we hypothesise 
that individuals would show more cooperative behaviours in the Public Goods Game 
toward higher reciprocity Trust Game partners in the gain-sharing context. Considering 
individuals’ generally greater sensitivity to losses and the typically exhibited loss aversion 
in financial decisions - especially when there is potential uncertainty about other players’ 
behaviour (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007; Tversky & 
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Kahneman, 1991) - we argue that individuals might have a more conservative attitude 
to the prior information in the loss context. Therefore, prior reciprocity might have less 
influence on subsequent decisions here.
A second fundamental question is whether reciprocity reflects the engagement of 
different neural processes when considering the gain-sharing versus loss-sharing 
context. Previous studies found that ratings of facial expressions of higher (trustworthy) 
as opposed to lower (selfish) social reputation increased brain activity of reward-related 
brain areas, notably the striatum (Izuma, et al., 2008). In addition, processing of facial 
expressions labeled with better moral characteristics, which may be represented in the 
striatum, increased individuals’ likeability ratings towards these individuals (Singer, et al., 
2004a), and the perception of the moral character of others influenced the subsequent 
social interactions through modulation of reward processing in the striatum (Delgado, 
et al., 2005). Further, the striatum was also associated with learning a partner’s social 
reputations through integrated social exchanges (King-Casas, et al., 2005a). Based on 
these findings, we hypothesise that individuals would prefer to cooperate with higher 
reciprocity partners, and this cooperation itself would be a social reward as compared to 
cooperation with lower reciprocity partners.
Finally, we were also interested how the brain processes a partner’s reciprocity 
information before playing a Public Goods Game. As suggested by previous research, 
social reputation (or social approval) is perceived to be a reward (Izuma, et al., 2008; 
Izuma, Saito, & Sadato, 2010b; Izuma, Saito, & Sadato, 2010c). If this holds true, then 
reward circuitry should demonstrate increased activation when seeing higher reciprocity 
players. However, what if individuals know that they are going to make a decision to 
cooperate or not with these players? We therefore asked whether the brain would 
process seeing the higher reciprocity individuals as rewarding, or whether this reward 
reaction might only represent a preparation state for the next step.
Summing up, cooperation is one of the fundamental components of human social 
interaction. Therefore, it is of great importance to examine the factors that could 
potentially affect social cooperation, which helps to better understand the psychological 
and neural processes of cooperative decision-making from different angles. The current 
novel paradigm provides the opportunity to examine the neural and behavioural 
influence of reciprocity on cooperative decision-making in both gain-sharing and loss-
sharing contexts. Evidence here will not only help to better understand underlying neural 
mechanisms of reciprocity on social cooperation, but more broadly can provide new 
insights which may help improve the establishment of cooperative actions in society.
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Methods
Participants
39 Chinese adults (20 males), aged 19 to 29 (mean age ± SD = 21.92 ± 2.45), participated 
in the experiment. They received monetary compensation for their participation. Two 
participants’ data were excluded from analyses because of technical issues; therefore, 
the reported results are based on the statistics of 37 participants’ data. Participants 
are all right-handed, with (corrected-to-)normal vision, and without neurological, 
psychiatric, or cardiovascular disorders, head surgeries or histories of regular drug and 
alcohol use. Written informed consent was obtained from each participant prior to the 
experiment. The study was conducted in accordance with the principle and guideline of 
Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the Institutional Review Board at Beijing 
Normal University (BNU), Beijing, China. 
Materials
30 Chinese (of which 50% male) facial pictures with neutral expressions were selected 
from the Chinese Facial Affective Picture System (CFAPS) (Gong, 2011). These facial 
pictures, well balanced for background, brightness, age, and picture size, were presented 
in the study as the investor (Player 1) in the Trust Game.
Game Paradigm
The experimental game paradigm contained a behavioural testing session using a 
standard Trust Game and a fMRI scanning session using a modified Public Goods Game 
(PGG).
Trust Game
The Trust Game (TG) used in our experiment is played by two players, the INVESTOR 
(Player 1) and the TRUSTEE (Player 2). For each round of the Trust Game, Player 1 is 
endowed with some money from the experimentor (10 Chinese Yuan in our experiment) 
and has to decide the amount of money he/she would like to invest in Player 2, with the 
possible amount varying from zero to the entire endowment. This transferred amount of 
money will be quadrupled, after which Player 2 has the opportunity to honour the trust 
displayed by Player 1 by repaying some money back or, alternatively, abusing the trust 
by keeping all the money. For example, Player 1 is endowed 10 (for example, Chinese 
Yuan) and sends 8 to Player 2. This money will be quadrupled (32) and transferred to 
Player 2. Afterwards, it is Player 2’s turn to make the decision if he/she wants to send 
some money back. If Player 2 decides to send 16 back, following the above example, 
then Player 1 will end up with 18 (16+2), and Player 2 will end up with 16.
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Modified Public Goods Game 
The Public Goods Game (PGG) is typically used to measure cooperation. In each trial of 
a standard PGG, participants are paired with several other partners, therefore creating 
a group of anonymous players who all have been randomly paired with each other. Each 
player starts with an identical endowment at the beginning of each trial, and then must 
decide on the amount of endowment he/she wants to contribute to a public-shared 
account. Whatever they decide not to share, they keep for themselves. Once all the 
players have made their decisions, the Total Contribution Amount (TCA = endowment 
multiplied by the number of group members) to the public-shared account is multiplied 
by a factor of 1.6, and this final amount will be divided equally between all of the players. 
The current experiment used a modified PGG to disentangle individuals’ cooperative 
decisions in gain and loss contexts. In each round, participants are paired with a group 
of four randomly selected players. The group of players would encounter either a 
situation of monetary gain or loss, in which each player would have an identical amount 
of monetary gain (gain 10 or 20 Chinese yuan) or loss (loss 10 or 20 Chinese yuan). 
Therefore, total gain (or total loss) in this group is the identical amount of monetary 
gain or loss multiplied by a factor of five (players). After the gain or loss context has 
been revealed, each player has to decide how much monetary gain or loss they want to 
put into the public-shared account and how much they want to keep for theirselves. The 
crucial manipulation here is that a Threshold of the total contribution amount (TCA) 
from the five players is defined as half of the TCA in both gain and loss context, which is 
an index of increasing or decreasing the TCA in the public-shared account. Specifically, 
in the monetary gain-sharing context, the TCA in the public account would be increased 
(multiplied by 1.6) only when the TCA is larger than half of the total initial positive 
endowment among the five players at the beginning of the trial. Alternatively, in the 
monetary loss-sharing context, the TCA in the public account would be decreased 
(multiplied by 0.6) on the condition that the TCA is smaller than half of the total initial 
negative endowment among the five players. Once all the players have made their 
decisions, the Total Contribution Amount (TCA) to the public-shared account will be 
then increased or decreased according to the above threshold (multiplied by a factor 
of 1.6 or 0.6 respectively), and this final amount will be divided equally between all the 
players (Figure 4.1, Table 4.1).
Table 4.1 The game rule of modified PGG
Start Amount 10 yuan Start Amount 20 yuan
|TCA| >25 |TCA| < = 25 |TCA|>50 |TCA|<=50
Gain-sharing +60% -60% +60% -60%
Loss-sharing +60% -60% +60% -60%
|TCA|: the absolute value of total contribution amount, that is,  the sum that the group of five players 
contributes to the public account. +60%: increase 60% (|TCA| multiplied (1+60%)) ; -60%: decrease 60% 
(|TCA| multiplied by (1-60%)). Note: here we use the absolute value in both contexts, which indicates that 
sharing money gain increased while |TCA| increased, whereas sharing monetary loss increased while |TCA| 
increased.
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Procedure and Design
Participants were first asked to read and sign the informed consent and screening forms 
prior to starting the experiment. To increase the plausibility of playing with real human 
players, they were informed that the Player 1’s they would be interacting with were 
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Figure 4.1. The experimental paradigm of modified Public Goods Game (A) In the gain 
context, each player was endowed with 10 or 20 Chinese yuan. The total contribution 
amount (TCA) would be increased by 60% in case their TCA was more than the threshold 
(25 yuan) and decreased by 60% in case that their TCA equal or less than the threshold. 
(B) In loss context, each player had a negative endowment of 10 or 20 Chinese yuan. 
The absolute vale of the TCA would be increased by 60% on condition that their TCA 
was more than the threshold (25 yuan) and decreased by 60% on condition that their 
absolute value of TCA equal or less than the threshold. In both contexts, the changed 
total contribution amount is then equally divided amongst participants regardless of 
their previous contributions.
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previous participants whose data had been collected and preserved in the computer 
program. Participants were also asked to give us permission to use their data for our 
following participants. In reality, Player 1’s data were preset and manipulated by the 
experimenter. In addition to their show up fee, participants could earn extra money as a 
bonus based on a randomly selected round of the PGG during the experiment. 
First, participants read the instructions of the Trust Game and were encouraged to ask 
questions if they did not understand the task. Afterwards, they played 30 rounds of 
TG as TRUSTEE (Player 2) with 30 different INVESTORS (Player 1) in the behavioural 
laboratory. Specifically, 30 Player 1’s offer amounts with their reported expectations 
of money that would be returned by Player 2 were adapted from one of our previous 
experiments (Figure 4.2 (A) and (B)).  Each Player 1 got assigned an identification 
number together with a facial picture. In our experiment, all participants played in the 
role of Player 2. For each round, they would play with one of the 30 different Player 1’s 
(See timeline in Figure 4.1). Each round begins by showing participants a picture of their 
partner – Player 1. After participants had seen the offer amount, the transferred money 
was then multiplied by a factor of 4 (Total Amount). Then, they decided on the amount 
of money (from zero to the maximum of the Total Amount) they wanted to return to 
Player 1. Notably, participants had the opportunity of returning no money at all. A random 
number between zero and the Total Amount would be shown to participants with the 
instruction that they could press KEY 1 to decrease the number, KEY 2 to increase the 
number, and KEY 3 to input their final decision. After the KEY 3 was pressed, the number 
turned from blue to red, indicating that participants were not able to adjust their choice 
anymore. The trial ended with a summary of the outcome containing the final payment 
on that round for both sides, presented on the screen. Participants were informed that 
each participant’s average percentage of reciprocal decisions (their returned amount/
total amount) would be calculated. 
There were two main reasons for having the behavioural testing TG prior to the scanning 
session. Firstly, we wanted our participants to know how we quantified reciprocity in TG. 
Therefore, by having participants experience the TG themselves, they would be able to 
more clearly understand how we separated the different reciprocal groups. Secondly, 
since we were particularly interested in how individuals’ reciprocity in the TG played 
a role in the subsequent PGG, one of the key manipulations in our fMRI experiment 
was informing participants of the likelihood of their partner’s reciprocal behaviours. 
Following this behavioural testing session, participants went on to read the instructions 
for the modified PGG. They were informed that we categorised the previous participants 
into four groups based on their average percentage of reciprocal behaviours (individual’s 
likelihood of reciprocity) in the TG. Specifically, a high-reciprocity group (HR: average 
percent of return is range between 60%-40%), a middle-reciprocity group (MR: average 
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percent of return is range between 40%-20%), a low-reciprocity group (LR: average 
percent of return ranges between 20%-0%), and a no-information group (NI: the players 
in this group did not participant in the previous TG, therefore, we did not have any 
information about their reciprocal behaviour). 
During the PGG, participants were told that the program randomly selected four players 
from one of the four groups to play with them in each trial of the modified PGG. Therefore, 
participants played a modified PGG with varying levels of reciprocal individuals in gain 
and loss contexts, while their brain was scanned using a 3T scanner. In each trial of the 
PGG, after a fixation cross being presented for a jitter of 1 to 3 seconds, the context 
(gain or loss) would be revealed on the screen for 3 seconds. Following the information 
of the context, participants were shown which reciprocal group the four players came 
from for another 3 seconds. Afterwards, participants would see the amount of monetary 
gain or loss (10 or 20 Chinese yuan) and were asked to make their decision within 6 
seconds. They were told to press KEY 1 using their index finger to decrease the number, 
KEY 2 using middle figure to increase the number, and KEY 3 using ring finger to input 
their final decision. Once the final decision button was pressed, the selected number on 
the screen would turn from blue to red, indicating that the choice was confirmed and 
could no longer be changed.
Importantly, prior to each part of the experiment, participants were asked to answer a 
couple of questions to make sure they understood the task correctly. Also, they were 
allowed to practice three TG and six PGG trials before the actual experiment. These data 
were not included in analyses. During the experiment, participants were encouraged to 
relax and urged to try not to move too much in the scanner. They were also told to try 
and respond relatively quickly, letting their intuition guide them.
The current experiment used a 4×2 within-subject design, including the partner’s 
reciprocity information (four levels: high reciprocal (HR), moderate reciprocal (MR), low 
reciprocal (LR), no information (NI)) and social context (two levels: sharing monetary 
gain, sharing monetary loss) as independent variables. The contribution (the amount 
of monetary gain or loss contribute to the public share account) and response time, as 
well as the brain activity, were our dependent variables. Therefore, the experiment had 8 
experimental conditions. Each condition had 14 trials, in total; the experiment consisted 
of 112 trials, which were separated into two runs. Each run consisted of 56 trials and 420 
scans.
Data acquisition 
Neuroimaging data was acquired with a 3 Tesla MRI scanner (Trio, Siemens, Erlangen, 
Germany) equipped with a 12 channel transmit/receive gradient head coil at BNU’s 
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Figure 4.2 A single trial of the modified PGG. In each trial of the task, participants see 
the context after a jittered fixation in the middle. Then, they are randomly paired with 
four anonymous players from four different reciprocity groups to play the Public Goods 
Game.
Imaging Center for Brain Research. Blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) images 
were acquired using T
2
*-weighted gradient-echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequences with 
parameters as follows: repetition time (TR) = 2000 ms; echo time (TE) = 30 ms; flip angle 
= 90°; matrix size = 64×64; field-of-view (FOV) = 224×224 mm; slice gap = 0.5 mm. 33 
interleaved slices were acquired (slice thickness= 3.3 mm, voxel size = 3.5×3.5×3.5 mm) 
from the whole brain. Moreover, high-resolution anatomical T1-weighted images of the 
whole brain were collected using a Magnetisation-Prepared Rapid Gradient Echo (MP-
RAGE) sequence with the following parameters: 192 slices, TR=2530 ms;TE= 3.39 ms; 
flip angle= 7°; number of slices =144; slices thickness = 1.33mm, matrix size = 256×256; 
field-of-view (FOV) = 256×256 mm. 
Experimental stimulus presentation and behavioural data acquisition were conducted 
using PsychToolbox (http://psychtoolbox.org/) (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) integrated 
into Matlab (Matlab 2014a, The Mathworks, Inc., Natick, MA, USA).
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Data Analysis
Behavioural analysis
For analysis of reciprocity in the Trust Game, each participant’s average return rate was 
calculated using the amount returned divided by the total amount (investment multiplied 
by a factor of 4) across all the trials. For analysis of the cooperative decisions in the PGG, a 
two-way repeated measures ANOVA was implemented, including the social context (two 
levels: gain, loss) and the partner’s reciprocal information (four levels: high, middle, low, 
no information) as within-subject factors and the percentage of contribution amount 
and duration of making decision (i.e. reaction time) as the dependent variable. Further, 
a three-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted in which the start amount was 
included as the third within-subject factor.
fMRI analysis
Neuroimaging data analyses were performed with SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/
spm/spm8/). Standardised preprocessing procedures were implemented to analyse 
the functional data. These procedures consisted of slice-timing correction, realignment 
through rigid-body registration to correct for head motion, co-registration of functional 
images to the anatomical images, segmentation of the anatomical image, normalisation 
to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space, smoothing (8-mm full-width/half-
maximum kernel), and filtering (a standard high-pass filter set a 128 s).
We analysed our neuroimaging data using the standard two-level general linear model 
(GLM) with the first level analyses (individual subject effects) providing contrasts for 
the second level (group effects) analyses. For the first level analyses, we used a GLM 
to define multiple event-related regressors for each epoch of the time course for each 
participant. The regressors modeled the blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) response 
to each epoch of fixation, context, partner’s reciprocal information and decision for the 
purpose of including all known sources of variance which could potentially account for 
the signal variance. Furthermore, the context regressor was split into two regressors 
including the gain and loss context. The partner’s reciprocity information and decision 
were further split into eight regressors, which corresponded to the eight experimental 
condition-combinations (gain-HR, gain-MR,gain-LR,gain-NI; loss-HR,loss-MR,loss-
LR,loss-NI). The regressors of each event were time-locked to the onset of the epoch 
with duration from the onset to the offset of the epoch. Particularly, the regressor of the 
decision was modeled as a variable epoch, which time-locked to the onset of the decision 
screen until the final button press. Therefore, the orthogonalised response time was 
used as the duration of each decision event (Mumford, Davis, & Poldrack, 2014). The 
parametric effects of contribution were added as modulators of the decision regressors. 
The six movement parameters of the realignment were used as nuisance regressors in 
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the model. All contrasts of interest were performed during the first level analyses for 
each participant and then submitted for second level simple T-test analyses.
Functional regions of interest (ROIs) were defined by the group level peak MNI 
coordinates of activation regions. ROI analyses were performed with the MarsBar 0.44 
SPM toolbox (http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/). Reported coordinates conform to the 
Montreal Neurological Institute space. Anatomic labeling of regions was conducted using 
the Anatomical toolbox in SPM8.
Results 
Behavioural Results
As shown in Figure 4.3 (a), the highest average return rate among our participants 
reached 60%. However, 8 of the 37 participants returned nothing, regardless of the 
amount invested by Player 1 (Investors). The other participants’ average return 
percentage was between 0% and 60%.
In the PGG, ANOVA analysis revealed a significant main effect of partner’s prior 
reciprocity information on cooperative decisions, in both contexts F(3,108) = 13.80, 
p<0.001, η
p
2 =0.29. Polynomial contrasts further detected a linear trend of this effect, F 
(1,36) = 17.11, p<0.001, η
p
2 =0.32, which indicated that contribution percentage to the 
public account increased as their partner’s reciprocity level increased. Specifically, the 
percentage of contribution in the three explicit reciprocity information conditions were 
as follows: HR (M=57.64%, SD=2.08%), MR (M=52.63%, SD=1.45%),  LR (M=47.66%, 
SD=2.00%). Interestingly, the percentage of contribution in the NI condition was 
significantly lower than the HR condition, but no significant difference was found 
between the NI and the MR/LR conditions (ps>0.05), which indicated that individuals 
tended to contribute moderate amounts when partner’s reciprocal information was not 
available (Figure 4.3 (b) and (c)).
We did not find a significant main effect of the social context, F(1,36)=0.44, p>0.05, 
η
p
2 =0.01, with an average contribution percentage in the gain and loss contexts of 
53.84% and 50.06% respectively. However, a significant interaction between the two 
factors was found, F(3,108) = 15.64, p<0.001, η
p
2 =0.30. Further simple effect analysis 
revealed a significant linear trend effect of reciprocity information on cooperative 
decision in both gain (F (3,34) =10.12, p<.001, η
p
2=.47) and loss (F (3,24) = 3.65, p=.02, 
η
p
2=.24) situations. These two linear trends were in opposite directions, indicating that 
as partners’ reciprocal level increased, the percentage of contribution in PGG increased 
in the gain context, but decreased proportionately in the loss context. Specifically, 
in the gain context, the contribution percentage in the four reciprocity information 
conditions is as follows: HR (M=69.88%, SD= 3.46%) >MR (M= 57.82, SD=3.16%) 
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>NI (M=48.10%, SD=4.15%)>LR (M=39.56%, SD=4.15%) (ps<0.05); and in the loss 
context,  the percentage of contribution in the four reciprocity information conditions: 
LR>NI>MR>HR. We only found the percentage of contribution in the LR (M=55.76%, 
SD= 4.60%) to be significantly lower than MR (M=47.44%, SD=3.26%)  and HR, but not 
NI (Figure 4.3 (b) and (c)). Lastly, we did not find a main effect of starting amount on 
contribution in PGG, F (1,36) =.97, p=.33. η
p
2 =0.02.
fMRI Results 
Partners’ reciprocity
Firstly, we were interested in the processes underlying partner’s reciprocity information. 
Therefore, several contrasts were compiled using the different partner’s reciprocity 
conditions while participants viewed the selected partners.  Interestingly, viewing high 
versus low reciprocal partners was associated with the activation of bilateral insula (Left 
(-43,14,-1) right (38,25,-1)) (Figure 4.4 b, Table 4.2). Similar activation patterns were 
found in the contrast of high versus other types of reciprocity information. Furthermore, 
parametric estimates were extracted to illustrate the difference in brain activation in the 
four manipulated reciprocity conditions (Figure 4.4 a,c).
Decisions in Gain-sharing and Loss-sharing Context
The above results indicate that the underlying neural correlates of processing a partner’s 
reciprocity information are different for the different information conditions, which 
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Figure 4.3 Behavioural results. (a) Average return rate of each participant in the Trust 
Game; (b) Average percentage of contribution in gain and loss context; (c) Absolute value 
of contribution amount across manipulated different partner’s reciprocal conditions.
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Figure 4.4 Brain regions involved in the processing of partners’ reciprocity information, 
p<0.001, uncorrected. (a) Parameter estimates (mean of beta values) in left insula 
(-43,14,-1) in four levels of partner’s reciprocal conditions. (b) Brain activation when 
seeing the high versus low reciprocal partners (HR>LR). (c) Parameter estimates (mean 
of beta values) in right insular (38,25,-1) in four levels of partner’s reciprocal conditions. 
L= left; R=right.
Table 4.2
Brodmann 
area
Local 
maxima
MNI coordinates 
of local maxima 
(mm)
Cluster size
(voxels)
Brain Region T value x y z
Reciprocity (HR > LR)
L Insula 48 5.18 -43 14 -1 29
R Insula 47 4.19 38 25 -1 30
L ACC 32 4.06 -8 39 24 16
R Temporal Pole 38 4.06 37 7 -19 10
Voxel level p<0.001(uncorrected). L=left; R=right; ACC=anterior cingulate cortex
also raised our next question of interest. Namely, how do individuals react, in terms of 
brain activity, to the different types of partners’ reciprocity information in gain and loss 
contexts, after they have received (or the brain has processed) the information.
Behaviourally, we found that individuals reacted differently towards various partners’ 
reciprocity information in the gain and loss contexts. To mirror the behavioural results, 
two separate contrasts were compiled independently between higher reciprocal and 
lower reciprocal partner in the gain (Gain (HR+MR>LR)) and loss contexts (Loss 
(HR+MR>LR)) during the PGG decision stage. Results showed that making cooperative 
decisions with higher reciprocal partners compared to the low reciprocal partners was 
related to increased brain activity in the bilateral ventral striatum (VS), particularly in 
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the gain-sharing context. However, we did not find this effect in the loss-sharing context 
(Figure 4.5 a, Table 4.3).
To further understand how the brain regions of VS were activated across the manipulated 
conditions (partner’s reciprocal information × context), parametric estimates in the 
activated clusters of both left and right ventral striatum were extracted in the eight 
experimental conditions. Two-way repeated ANOVAs corresponding to our behavioural 
analyses were performed for bilateral VS. The ANOVA analyses of left VS revealed a 
significant main effect of partner’s reciprocity information, F (3,108) = 2.54, p<0.05, 
η
p
2 =0.06. Moreover, a significant linear trend was found for the partner’s reciprocity 
information on the activation of left VS, F(1,36) =5.65, p<0.01, η
p
2 =0.14, which 
indicated that the left VS was more activated when partners were perceived to be more 
reciprocal than when they were perceived to be less reciprocal. Pairwise comparisons 
demonstrated that the beta value in the left VS was significantly higher in the HR 
(M=0.24, SD=0.03) and MR (M=0.23, SD=0.03) condition compared to the LR (M=0.17, 
SD=0.03) condition (p=0.013 and 0.031 repectively). However, we did not detect 
a significant difference between HR and MR, nor a significant beta value difference 
between NI (M=0.20, SD=0.02) and the other three reciprocal conditions. Interestingly 
and, similarly to our behavioural results, a significant interaction effect between the two 
factors was detected, F(3,108) =4.35, p<0.05, η
p
2 =0.10. Further analysis revealed that 
the beta value in left VS in the LR condition in gain context (M=0.27, SE=0.04)  was 
significantly lower than in the loss context (M=0.12, SE=0.02) (p=0.008). We did not find 
the beta value difference between gain and loss context in other reciprocal conditions. 
Also, in the gain context, the beta values in HR (M=0.27, SE=0.04) and MR (M=0.25, 
SE=0.04) were significantly higher than in LR (M=0.12, SE=0.03) (p=0.001 and 0.002 
respectively), but no difference was found between HR and MR (p=0.8). Again, we did 
not find the difference between NI (M=0.19, SE=0.03) and the other three reciprocal 
conditions. These significant effects were not detected in the loss context (ps>0.05). 
We did not find a significant main effect of context (p=0.98). (Figure 4.5, b, c)
Surprisingly, a similar pattern was detected not only between the parametric estimates 
in left VS during the decision stage and the parametric estimates in right VS across 
conditions, but also in our behavioural results. We assume that the activation of Bilateral 
VS activation may be related to cooperative decisions in the PGG, and therefore we 
used parametric estimates of this region to predict the behavioural response in the 
PGG. Interestingly, a significant positive correlation was found between the activation 
of left VS (beta values) and the contribution percentage in the PGG in the gain context 
(R2 = 0,061, p=0.034). However, we found that the percentage of contribution in the 
loss context was negatively correlated with the activation of the left VS (beta values), 
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Figure 4.5 (a) Brain activation when making decisions with more versus less reciprocal 
partners in gain-sharing context PGG, p<0.001, uncorrected. (b) Parametric estimates 
extracted from the cluster of left VS across manipulated conditions. (c) Parametric 
estimates extracted from the cluster of right VS across manipulated conditions. (d) The 
time courses in the gain context were estimated with the finite impulse response model 
from the onset of the fixation, for a length of 20s (10 scans). A significant difference 
between HR and LR was detected in the gain context in time bin 4 (onset of partner’s 
reciprocal information). (e) The time courses in the loss context were estimated with 
the finite impulse response model from the onset of the fixation, for a length of 20s (10 
scans). (f) Correlation between the behavioural responses (percentage of contribution) 
in the PGG and the parametric estimates in the left VS in gain context. (g) Correlation 
between the behavioural response (percentage of contribution) in the PGG and the 
parametric estimates in the left VS in the loss context. 
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Table 4.3 Brain activations of contrast (HR+MR>LR) in gain-sharing context during 
decision
Brodmann 
area
Local 
maxima
MNI coordinates 
of local maxima 
(mm)
Cluster size
(voxels)
Brain Region T value x y z
Gain (HR+MR>LR)
R Caudate 48 5.63 13 18 6 118
R Putamen 48 5.56 17 14 -1
L Putamen 48 4.62 -19 14 -1 134
R Lingual 18 5.25 6 -60 3 264
R Calcarine 18 5.10 20 -81 10
R Cerebellum 18 4.75 13 -56 -12
Voxel level p<0.001 (unc.). L=left; R=right;
(R2=0.195, p=0.008) (Figure 4.5, f, g). Next, we averaged the beta values in left and 
right VS across the time course. (Figure 4.5, d, e)
Cooperative Decision Making
To further explore how individuals made cooperative decisions across gain and loss 
contexts, we did trial-wise analyses by using the contribution percentage from each trial 
as the parametric modulator in gain and loss contexts, respectively. Our results showed 
that cooperative decision-making in the gain context was positively correlated with 
activation of the rostral/ventral anterior cingulate cortex (rACC) extending to the ventral 
medial part of the prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and (mOFC) medial orbital frontal cortex. 
However, we did not find these neural effects in the loss context. (sed Figure 4.6 a, Table 
4.4 for more statistics). Furthermore, we were also interested in the difference between 
the brain regions correlated with the percentage of contribution in gain-sharing and loss-
sharing contexts. As introduced before, higher percentage of contribution in the PGG in 
the gain context indicated more cooperative behaviour, whereas the higher percentage 
of contribution in the loss context indicated more selfish (or competitive) behaviour. 
Therefore, the brain regions detected in the contrast between the two parametric 
results in the two contexts should be positively correlated with the cooperative decisions 
(cooperation in gain > selfish in loss context).  Interestingly, the results showed that the 
cooperative decision in gain context versus non-cooperative decision in loss context was 
associated with the activation in the brain area of the bilateral VS, ACC/vmPFC/mOFC 
(intersection of BA 10/11/32). (Figure 4.6, Table 4.4 b)
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Figure 4.6 Brain regions revealed by the trial-wise parametric modulation analyses, 
p<0.001, uncorrected. (a) Brain regions were positively correlated with the percentage 
of contribution in the gain-sharing context. (b) Brain areas positively correlated with 
participants trial-wise percentage of contribution in gain context (cooperative decisions) 
versus positively correlated with participants trial-wise percentage of contribution in loss 
context (non-cooperative decisions). ACC= anterior cingulate cortex; vmPFC= ventral 
medial prefrontal cortex.
Table 4.4 Brain regions positively correlated with the percentage of contribution in gain-
sharing and loss-sharing context
Brodmann 
area
Local 
maxima
MNI coordinates 
of local maxima 
(mm)
Cluster size
(voxels)
Brain Region T value x y z
Gain-sharing context
L ACC/vmPFC 11 4.74 -8 39 -1 145
R ACC/vmPFC 32 4.57 10 39 10
L ACC/vmPFC 32 4.29 -1 42 10
R ACC/vmPFC 32 4.08 17 46 6
R Lingual 18 7.78 13 -63 -1 258
R Calcarine 18 6.64 17 -77 6
Loss-sharing context
R Calcarine 17 4.75 17 -81 6 26
R Lingual 17 3.25 13 -67 3
Gain-sharing > Loss-
sharing
R ACC/vmPFC 11 5.47 10 35 6 56
R middle orbital gyrus 
(MOFC)
11 4.07 17 49 -5
R ACC 32 3.93 17 46 6
L middle frontal gyrus 46 5.29 -36 52 16 25
L Caudate 48 5.08 3 4 10 24
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L inferior occipital gyrus 19 4.88 -43 -77 -12 38
L middle occipital gyrus 18 4.60 -32 -88 2 37
Voxel level p<0.001 (unc.). L=left; R=right; ACC= anterior cingulate cortex; vmPFC= ventral medial prefrontal 
cotext; MOFC (medial orbital frontal cortex)
Discussion
The present study used a novel game paradigm in which participants played a Public 
Goods Game with other anonymous players who were labelled with a particular degree of 
previous reciprocity behavior, in both a gain-sharing and a loss-sharing context. The goal 
of this study was to identify the behavioural effects of prior reciprocity on cooperative 
decision-making, and the related neural correlates when faced with monetary gain or 
loss contexts. 
As expected, our manipulation of the perception of partner’s reciprocity was evident 
in the behavioural choices, as participants tended to be more likely to cooperate with 
higher reciprocity partners than with lower reciprocity partners in both gain-sharing 
and loss-sharing context. We found higher contribution percentages in the monetary 
gain condition. When comparing this effect between the different contexts, we found 
that partners’ prior reciprocity robustly affected individuals’ cooperative decisions, 
especially in the gain-sharing context. A significant linear effect of reciprocity on 
cooperative decisions was detected in the gain-sharing context, which indicated that 
individuals’ cooperative decisions increased proportionate to their partners’ reciprocity 
levels. Cooperative decisions were more moderately influenced by the partner’s prior 
reciprocity in the loss-sharing context. Further, players about which nothing was known 
were cooperated with more than those with low reciprocity levels, but less than those 
with high reciprocity levels. These results show that reciprocal history affects cooperative 
decisions, but differently in the gain-sharing and loss-sharing context.  
These results are line with previous studies that show that individuals prefer to cooperate 
more with those who have higher levels of reciprocity (Delgado, et al., 2005; King-Casas, 
et al., 2005a; Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). The 
current results also indirectly support the theory of ‘conditional cooperation’, which 
assumes that people cooperate on the condition of others’ cooperation (Fischbacher, 
et al., 2001). Although the better prior reputation of a partner enhanced cooperative 
decisions in both gain-sharing and loss-sharing context, the effects of reciprocity on 
cooperation in the gain-sharing context loom larger than in the loss-sharing context, 
as demonstrated by the contribution being less influenced by partner’s prior reciprocity 
in the loss-sharing context. Prospect theory shows that people are more sensitive to 
monetary gain compared to monetary loss (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky 
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& Kahneman, 1974; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991), and consistent with this account 
we assume that individuals are more sensitive to the social factors that could affect 
their decisions in the loss context as compared the gain context. Our results show a 
conservative attitude towards social cooperation with others in a loss-sharing frame, 
though this is a relatively understudied context in the cooperation literature. Our results 
therefore contribute new empirical evidence to our understanding of loss aversion from 
a new angle, through social interactions.
Based on these behavioural results, we could further explore the underlying neural 
mechanisms of cooperation with various reciprocal players in both gain-sharing and loss-
sharing contexts. Results here demonstrated increased activation in reward-related areas 
(bilateral striatum) in the gain-sharing - but not in the loss-sharing - context. It should 
be noted here that the present of reciprocity on social cooperation are consistent with 
the previous neuroimaging findings both in the processing of higher social reputation 
(Izuma, et al., 2008; Phan, et al., 2010) and processing of social cooperation (Delgado, 
et al., 2005; Harbaugh, et al., 2007; King-Casas, et al., 2005a; Rilling, et al., 2002b), 
which both are associated with reward processing represented in the striatum in the 
brain. 
The current results increase our understanding by providing new evidence that the 
bilateral striatum indexes the partner’s reciprocity information, which plays a role as a 
neural modulator and further reshapes the subsequent cooperative decision-making 
in the Public Goods Game, especially in the gain-sharing context. Our neuroimaging 
findings support this argument in the following three ways. Firstly, the activation pattern 
from the bilateral striatum across conditions mirrored our behavioural effects, which 
further indicated that cooperation with higher reciprocity individuals was ‘rewarding’ 
as compared with the lower ones, especially in the gain-sharing context. This reward 
processing in the bilateral striatum fostered the following cooperative decisions in 
the PGG with players. Secondly, we correlated individuals’ contribution percentage 
and the neural activation of the striatum in the gain-sharing and loss-sharing context 
respectively. Again, our results showed a positive correlation between contribution and 
striatum activation in the gain-sharing context, but a negative correlation between the 
two in the loss-sharing context, which taken together indicate that activation in the 
striatum acts as a modulator to shift the subsequent cooperative decisions in PGG.
It is acknowledged in animal literature that the striatum is a brain structure that is part 
of the reward centre in the brain (Schultz, 1997; Schultz, et al., 1997; Schultz, et al., 
2000). In human neuroimaging studies, the activation of striatum was also found in 
different types of reward processing, from basical physical reward, such as food reward 
(McClure, et al., 2003; Pagnoni, et al., 2002), sexual reward (Arnow, et al., 2002), to 
higher level of psychological reward, for example, monetary reward (Delgado, et al., 
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2004; Knutson, et al., 2001) and social reward (Izuma, et al., 2008; Izuma, et al., 2010a) 
(e.g., social reputation, social approvement). From this view, the striatum is also a 
source of motivation for actions. Therefore, one assumption is that reward processing 
of reciprocity modulates cooperative decisions. This viewpoint is supported by previous 
studies that found reward processing in the striatum to prompt subsequent risk-taking 
behaviours (Bault, et al., 2011b; Losecaat Vermeer, et al., 2014). In conjunction with 
results of previous neuroimaging studies of social cooperation, in which striatum 
activations were observed during mutual cooperation without prior social reputation 
(Rilling, et al., 2002b), our findings further contribute to the understanding of the 
underlying neural mechanisms of human social cooperation.
In addition to the bilateral striatum, trial-wise parametric modulation analyses using the 
percentage of contribution selectively found a region, at the intersection of Brodmann 
10/11/32, positively correlated with cooperative decisions in the gain-sharing context. 
This region is part of the ventral ACC, vmPFC, and mOFC, which are all involved in 
the value system in the brain (Rangel & Hare, 2010). Specifically, mOFC was more 
associated with the stimulus value signals, for example, monetary prizes (Tom, et al., 
2007), and food appetitiveness (Plassmann, O’Doherty, & Rangel, 2010). The ACC was 
found to be related to the cognitive part of processing values, specifically encoded and 
computed action values relative to stimulus values (Rudebeck, et al., 2008; Rushworth & 
Behrens, 2008). The vmPFC, a region often described as an important mediator of socio-
emotional significance, has been in recent years found to perform a more cognitive role 
by reflecting the different types of values in social cognition (Hare, Camerer, Knoepfle, 
& Rangel, 2010; Hare, Camerer, & Rangel, 2009). Furthermore, recent views regarding 
stimulus and action value comparison emphasize the role of OFC-striatal and ACC-striatal 
loops. Therefore, we believe a parsimonious account of our results are that cooperative 
decisions are made by integrating the reciprocity information reflected in the striatum 
and the action value computation reflected in the prefrontal cortex. 
Finally, we observed activation in the insula when comparing viewing high reciprocity 
players to lower reciprocity ones, prior to playing the PGG. Although studies have 
found the insula to be activated in response to a variety of negative social signals in 
social interactions, such as aversive response to free-riding (Rilling, Goldsmith, Glenn, 
& Jairam, 2008), norm violations (Montague & Lohrenz, 2007; Sanfey, et al., 2003a), 
social exclusion by peer group (Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003), and empathy 
other’s painful shock (Singer, Seymour, O’Doherty, Kaube, & Dolan, 2004b), activation 
in insula has been reported in a wide range of imaging studies associated with emotional 
stimuli (Critchley, Mathias, & Dolan, 2001; Phelps, 2001). It has been proposed by 
recent models of emotion and social cognition that the insula maps the conscious 
feeling/emotional state of the body and provides arousal (Adolphs, 2009a; Craig, 2004; 
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Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Ohman, & Dolan, 2004; Dolan, 2002). According to this 
proposal, our results indicate that individuals showed more emotional bonds with higher 
reciprocity players. 
In summary, our behavioural and functional neuroimaging data indicate the salient effect 
of a partner’s perceived reciprocity on cooperative decisions during gain-sharing social 
interactions. These data point to reward processing in the bilateral striatum as a neural 
modulator of this effect. Furthermore, the prefrontal cortex seems to play a vital role in 
computing the action values while making the relevant decision. 

PART II:
SOCIAL NORM AND NORM VIOLATION

CHAPTER 5
Neural mechanisms of promises, and the 
punishment of broken promises
5
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Abstract
Trust is an important social construct, playing a crucial role in almost all human 
relationships. Though a promise is usually only expressed orally and is non-binding in 
nature, it typically promotes trust and enhances cooperative partnerships. Conversely, 
the breach of a promise gives rise to distrust, betrayal, and even punishment, indicating 
the important role of non-enforceable commitment in social interactions. However, very 
few studies have examined the neural mechanisms of non-binding communication in 
relation to trust decisions, and in particular what happens when promises are broken. The 
present study aimed to investigate: 1) the behavioural effects and neural mechanisms of 
processing promises during social interactions; and 2) the neural mechanisms of broken 
promises in particular, and the consequent willingness to punish the betrayer. Forty-two 
participants (22 females) were scanned using 3T fMRI while they played 120 rounds of 
a modified two-stage Trust Game in the role of the Investor. On Stage 1 in each round, 
participants were endowed with 10 tokens and received a message from the Trustee. 
This message took the form of either a strong promise to repay, a weak promise to repay, 
or no promise to repay. Participants then decided how many tokens they wanted to 
invest in that Trustee. In Stage 2, participants were informed as to whether the Trustee 
had repaid their investment or not. They were then endowed with another 10 tokens 
and given the opportunity to punish the respective Trustee. The punishment was both 
effective and costly (each token spent by the Investor reduced the Trustee’s amount by 
4). Behaviourally, we found that promise messages greatly enhanced transfer amounts 
as compared to the control condition in which no promise was made. Importantly, 
breach of promise raised Investors’ motivation to punish their partner, in terms of both 
greater frequency of punishment and also the amount of tokens spent to punish. The 
contrast between promise and neutral messages yielded activation in vmPFC and dlPFC. 
Trial-wise parametric modulation analyses using the transfer amount revealed that the 
TPJ, MTG and IFG were positively correlated with the decision to trust. Moreover, the 
right insula was selectively activated when trust was abused by the Trustee as opposed 
to a neutral message delivery. Finally, dorsal ACC and midbrain were associated with 
costly punishment of the promiser. In summary, the present research shows that non-
binding promise messages have a demonstrable effect on individuals’ trust decisions. 
The results also suggest that the breach of a promise motivates players to punish, even 
at a personal cost. Keeping one’s promise is an important social norm that plays a vital 
role in modifying interpersonal trust decisions through linking social value to the norm 
itself. Moreover, breaking a promise can induce negative affective experiences that 
might prompt following costly punishment towards the promise-breaker in order to 
achieve emotional relief or interpersonal satisfaction. Furthermore, deciding to punish 
the promise-breaker at personal cost was potentially related to conflict processes inside 
the brain. The present findings provide novel empirical evidence to understand why 
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cheap talk is nevertheless effective, which is an issue of considerable importance for 
efficiency and social welfare.
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Introduction 
Human cooperation, existing on a large scale between non-kin individuals, is a particularly 
human trait. One of the potential reasons for this is that humans are capable of establishing 
and enforcing social norms that can typically foster and ensure social cooperation (Fehr 
& Fischbacher, 2003b). One norm that may be especially relevant for this is that of trust, 
an important social construct often seen as a prerequisite for cooperative partnerships 
(Fehr, 2009). For example, family members trust each other; friends support each other, 
buyers believe sellers’ promises, investors trust bankers, citizens (largely) trust their 
government. Trust is therefore a vital social process, permeating every part of our daily 
life, from personal to societal levels. 
A promise, although often regarded as cheap talk (Farrell & Rabin, 1996), can enhance 
trust and cooperative partnerships (Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006; Charness & 
Grosskopf, 2004). Although a promise is typically delivered orally and is non-binding 
in nature, it has long provided an informal guarantee to interactive partners, and is 
extremely useful in social exchange. Keeping a promise is an effective means of conveying 
trustworthiness, and therefore breaking a promise is not only a breach of trust, but also a 
violation of one of the more fundamental societal norms (Fehr, Fischbacher, & Gachter, 
2002). As a result, breaking a promise increases feelings of betrayal and willingness to 
punish the betrayer (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004c). 
Previous literature has focused on investigating the neural mechanisms underlying social 
cooperation primarily from the following perspectives: mutual cooperation or defection 
towards the goal of higher monetary payoffs (Delgado, et al., 2005; King-Casas, Sharp, 
Lomax-Bream, & Lohrenz, 2008; King-Casas, et al., 2005a; Rilling, et al., 2007; Rilling, 
et al., 2002b); norm violations and social punishment (Buckholtz, Asplund, Dux, Zald, 
& Gore, 2008a; de Quervain, et al., 2004a; Knoch, Pascual-Leone, Meyer, Treyer, & 
Fehr, 2006; Sanfey, et al., 2003a; Xiang, Lohrenz, & Montague, 2013), trust (Aimone, 
et al., 2014; Krueger, et al., 2007; McCabe, et al., 2001) and reciprocity (Chang, et al., 
2011b; van den Bos, van Dijk, Westenberg, Rombouts, & Crone, 2009), social norm 
compliance (Ruff, Ugazio, & Fehr, 2013; Spitzer, Fischbacher, Herrnberger, Groen, & 
Fehr, 2007), empathy and social pain (Decety, Jackson, Sommerville, & Chaminade, 2004; 
Eisenberger, et al., 2003; Singer, et al., 2006), as well as social comparison (Fliessbach, et 
al., 2007; Zink, et al., 2008a). Though non-binding promises underlie a large proportion 
of our daily social, few studies have explored the neural processing underlying non-
enforceable promises and the subsequent consequences of a broken promises. One 
recent study addressed the neural underpinnings of keeping or breaking a self-made 
promise, with the latter action associated with greater activation in the dlPFC (dorsal 
lateral prefrontal cortex), ACC (anterior cingulate cortex), and amygdala. The authors 
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suggest that conflict and emotional arousal are involved in dishonest behaviours due to 
suppression of honest acts (Baumgartner, et al., 2009a). These findings have enhanced 
our understanding of the potential neural processing on the promiser’s side. However, 
perhaps the more relevant role of promises is to enhance trust and cooperation during 
social interactions; therefore, exploring the underlying brain processing of promises 
from the receiver’s perspective is an interesting (and largely unexplored) question, as is 
subsequent behavior and its neural underpinnings.
To bridge this gap and gain insight in the neural system involved in non-binding 
cooperative agreements, we designed a two-stage Trust Game paradigm (termed here 
the ‘Investment Game’). Participants played as the Investor (the promise recipient) in 
the Trust Game while being scanned in a 3T scanner. In the first stage of the game, 
participants were endowed with an amount of tokens they could use for investment 
purposes. After that, they received messages (either containing promise or non-promise 
information) from their partner in that trial, and then had the opportunity to invest any 
number of their tokens with that partner. This investment was then multiplied by the 
experimenters before reaching the Trustee, who then could choose to repay either half 
of the transferred money or none at all. 
After they completed the entire first stage, that is, make a succession of investment 
decisions in the presence of promises or non-promises, the Trustee’s (i.e. the promise 
maker) decision either to repay or not repay the Investor’s trust was revealed. 
Immediately thereafter, participants were endowed another amount of tokens and were 
given the opportunity to punish their partner by spending some of these tokens. Their 
punishment is thus costly and effective, as each token they spend to punish reduced 
their partner’s balance by four tokens. 
There are two strengths to our novel game paradigm. Firstly, participants actually 
experience receiving a message from others, making a trust decision, and have the 
opportunity for punishing others all in one task. In other words, we can examine how 
trust decisions and relevant brain activity are affected by a commonly performed social 
behavior (a promise from others), and the subsequent reactions, both behavioural and 
neural, when that a social norm is violated (i.e. a promise is broken). Secondly, compared 
to previous research that has used categorical promises (e.g., always, sometimes), the 
current study used 120 messages with specific content. Moreover, we quantify the trust 
decisions themselves using a continuous measure. 
By employing this game paradigm, there were several questions of immediate interest. 
Firstly, what are the neural mechanisms of processing non-binding messages (promises) 
during social interactions? And importantly, how do these mechanisms predict 
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subsequent decisions to trust the promiser? In terms of the role of promises in enhancing 
trust decisions (Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006), we hypothesised that promises to 
reciprocate made by the Trustee would increase the Investor’s trust. As outlined above, 
promises are non-enforceable messages that do not necessarily guarantee the promised 
acts. Why then do these non-binding messages influence our social choices and related 
neural activity? Based on the models of social values in decision-making (Rilling & 
Sanfey, 2011a; Ruff & Fehr, 2014), we argue that promise messages may represent 
social values (Loewenstein, et al., 1989), which in turn plays a vital role in helping and 
motivating individuals to make decisions in interpersonal interactions, often necessarily 
suppressing self-interest. Previous literature converges on the areas of ventral medial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) for social value evaluation (Hare, et al., 2010; Hare, et al., 
2009) and ventral striatum (VS) for social reward processing (Izuma, et al., 2008), with 
the dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) both 
involved in inhibition control (MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000). Therefore, 
we hypothesise that the neural correlates of processing promises are associated with 
both the social valuation system, consisting of regions such as vmPFC, and the cognitive 
control regions (dlPFC and ACC).
A second important question to address is what neural mechanisms are engaged when 
promises are broken. How do these mechanisms then predict the willingness to punish 
(at a cost) the source of a broken promise? According to a cooperative social norm, the 
Trustee should be willing to repay some of the investor’s money, often half. A promise to 
this effect which is then broken should be interpreted as a norm violation by the Investor, 
and therefore, we predict that this would induce a higher desire to punish the Investor, 
even at a personal cost. Research has found that affective processing regions, such as the 
anterior insula (Sanfey, et al., 2003a; Xiang, et al., 2013) and amygdala (Baumgartner, 
et al., 2009a; Gospic, et al., 2011), are related to norm violations. Therefore, it seems 
reasonable to assume that these regions might generate a negative emotional arousal 
signal based on the magnitude of psychological ‘harm’ from the interaction, and may 
thus motivate subsequent costly punishment decisions (Buckholtz, et al., 2008b). Costly 
punishment can engage brain reward systems (de Quervain, et al., 2004a; Seymour, 
Singer, & Dolan, 2007), associated with regions such as the nucleus accumbens (NACC) 
and the caudate nucleus. 
In summary, social cooperation between non-kin individuals is an important characteristic 
of the human society, and promises play a vital role in facilitating social cooperative 
partnerships. The current study examined the brain systems responsible for encoding 
non-enforceable promises, and also aimed to provide new evidence of how these neural 
representations impact the cooperative partnerships by enhancing trust in the receiver 
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of the promise. Further, we were interested in the neural processing of broken promises 
specifically, and the actions that often follow from them (e.g. punishment). 
Methods 
Participants
Forty adults participated in this study. None had a history of any neurological, psychiatric, 
cardiovascular disorders, head surgeries or regular use of drugs. Participants received 
financial compensation of 30 euros for participating in the experiment, plus an additional 
bonus (maximum of 10 euro) earned during the two-stage investment game (see game 
paradigm below). The study protocol was approved by the local ethics committee (CMO 
region Arnhem-Nijmegen, The Netherlands) under the general ethical approval (CMO 
2014/288), and all the experimental methods were conducted in accordance with these 
guidelines. All participants provided written informed consent in accordance with the 
Declaration of Helsinki and the guidelines of the local ethics committee.
Materials
200 messages (in Dutch) were constructed by a Dutch native speaker. These consisted 
of 120 promise messages and 80 non-promise, control, messages. These messages were 
all balanced in sentence length (around 6-9 words), difficulty, and readability to avoid 
confounding factors. Following this, six independent raters were invited to evaluate 
whether or not, and also to what extent, the messages conveyed a promise. A 5 point 
Likert scale was used, ranging from ‘1-No promise’ to ‘5-Strong promise’. The mean 
scores of the ratings were consistent with the promise and non-promise division, such that 
non-promise messages were rated as not conveying a promise at all. For the non-promise 
messages, 40 were randomly selected to serve as experimental control messages (no 
promise). The average scores of the 120 promise messages were sorted from highest to 
lowest and split into three subgroups. The top one-third (40 messages with the highest 
mean rating scores, defined as strong promise messages) and the bottom one-third (40 
messages with the lowest rating mean scores, defined as general promise messages) were 
selected. In total, therefore, there were three groups of messages (strong promise, weak 
promise, and no promise), each containing containing 40 messages. One-way ANOVA 
showed that the three message groups significantly differed in promise-intensity, 
F (2, 117) = 2053.87, P<.001. The strong promises (M=4.15, SD=0.27) conveyed 
significant stronger promise information than the weak promises (M=2.82, SD=0.27) 
and the neutral messages (M=1.00, SD=0), Ps<.001. Participants were informed that 
these messages were collected from one of our previous experiments. These previous 
participants were asked to send a message to their partner under variable instructions, 
in which some were allowed to send an intentional informative message to their partner, 
and some were asked to send their partner a message that was not related to the game 
task.
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Two-stage Investment Game Paradigm
In this Investment Game, there are two players, A (Investor) and B (Trustee). Player 
A begins with an endowment of 10 tokens, and can choose to send any amount to B, 
retaining the remainder. B starts with 0 tokens. The amount that A sends to B is multiplied 
by 4. For example, if A decides to send B 5 tokens from the initial 10 (and keeps 5 for 
himself), then B receives a total investment of 20 tokens (5 tokens x 4 multiplier). Next, 
B then decides whether or not he/she wants to repay half of A’s total investment (i.e. A’s 
investment multiplied by a factor of 4). To continue with the example, B might choose 
to repay half of A’s total investment (20/2 =10 tokens). This game would end with A 
having 15 tokens (kept: 5 + returned by B: 10) and B having 10 tokens. However, if B 
decides not to repay, the game will end with A having 5 tokens and B having 20 tokens.
The Investment Game used in the current study is a two-stage paradigm. In the first 
stage, before each round of the game, B has an opportunity to send A a message. After A 
has received this message, A makes a decision on how many tokens he/she want to send 
to B (Figure 5.1, a). In the second stage, the outcome of each interaction is revealed: 
A is shown whether or not B elected to repay half of the total investment or not. 
Subsequently, A is endowed with another 10 tokens and has an opportunity to punish B 
by using these tokens. The punishment is effective, such that for each token they opt to 
spend, B’s balance will be reduced by 4 tokens (Figure 5.1, b).
B  sends a message to 
A: “Trust me, I will send 
back money.” 
A B 
A  starts with 10 tokens, 
then decides transfer 8 
tokens out of 10  to B 
A B 
B  decides repay or not 
repay half of the total 
amount  
A B 
A’s transfer multiplied 
by a factor of 4  (total 
amount = 32 tokens), 
then sends to B 
A B 
B  sends message to A 
A transfers 8 tokens to 
B, which becomes to be 
32 tokens 
 
A B 
B decides not repay half 
total amount (32/2=16) 
to A, A gets 2 tokens, B 
gets 32 tokens 
A B A B 
A endows another 10 
tokens 
A B 
A decides to spend 8 
tokens to punish B. This 
punishment reduce 32 
tokens of B. 
  
(a) 
(b) 
Figure 5.1 The Game Paradigm. (a) The example game paradigm during the first stage 
(promise and trust decision). (b) The example game paradigm during the second stage 
(outcome revealed and punishment)
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During the first stage of the experiment, three experimental conditions were used 
measured (strong promise messages, general promise messages, and neutral, no 
promise, messages). Each condition consisted of 40 Investment Game rounds, for a total 
of 120 rounds. These 120 rounds were intermixed and presented in a different random 
order for each participant, with two runs of 60 rounds each. After all the trust decisions 
were made, the second stage began. Here, participants reviewed the outcome of the 
first stage rounds sequentially in two separate runs, each containing 60 rounds. For 
each of the three experimental conditions, participants experienced 25 trials in which 
they got ‘no repay’ feedback and 15 trials in which they get ‘repay’ feedback from their 
partners. Therefore, in total, participant encountered six experimental conditions during 
the second stage, namely: strong promise-repay, strong promise-not repay, general 
promise-repay, general promise-not repay, no promise-repay, no promise-not repay.
Procedure
Participants first were given an experimental instruction booklet to read at the behavioural 
laboratory. They were informed they would be playing a simple economic game, using 
data provided by our previous participants. We asked each participant to give us 
permission to use their choice data in a similar way for other following participants. Each 
player in the experiment was assigned a player ID number, so the identity of all players 
would remain anonymous to each other. In reality, all other players were simulated by 
the experimenters. 
Participants were informed they would be playing as Player A in the Investment Game. 
They would play multiple rounds of this game, each round with a different Player B; 
therefore, they would never play with the same player twice. Each round of the first 
stage consists first of a fixation cross presented in the middle of the screen second, then 
the participant would see their partner for that round (presented as a human silhouette 
with their ID number) and the message that partner had sent. Then they would see 
their 10 token endowment and had to decide how many tokens they wanted to send to 
this partner. To enter their response, participants pressed Button 1 by using their index 
finger to decrease and Button 2 by using the middle finger to increase the amount. The 
initial highlighted amount of the tokens (displayed in blue) was a random number from 0 
to 10 (Figure 5.2 a). After they had made their decision, they pressed Button 3 by using 
their ring finger to enter this final decision, and the chosen number subsequently turned 
red. Participants had a maximum of 5 seconds to make their decision (including the 
time to validate their choice). Two check questions were provided to ensure participants 
understood the task clearly prior to starting the experiment. After the participant 
indicate they understood the task for the first stage, they had the opportunity to practice 
three rounds to get used to playing the game. Participants were told they would receive 
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messages from one of the experimenters in the practice rounds; therefore, they would 
not be paid for these rounds.
After participants had completed the first stage, they continued reading the instruction 
of the second stage, while inside the scanner. During this second stage, they were shown 
the outcome of each round in the first stage. Firstly, after a fixation cross in the middle 
of the screen, an on-screen reminder showed participants the message their partner had 
sent them, the amount of the tokens they had forwarded to this partner, and the total 
investment this partner had received in that round. After, a jittered interval was presented, 
purportedly as the computer was calculating the outcome of the round. Subsequently, 
the partner’s decision (repay or not repay) was revealed, as well as the amount of 
tokens the participant and their partner actually received in this round. Subsequent to 
another jittered interval, participants were endowed with another 10 tokens and had the 
opportunity to punish their partner on that round. They had a maximum of 4 seconds to 
respond if they wanted to punish this partner (by pressing Button 1) or not  (by pressing 
Button 2). If they decided to punish their partner, they chose the amount of tokens they 
wanted to spend to punish, ranging from 1 to 10. To make a response, participants used 
Button 1 to decrease this number and Button 2 to increase this number. After they had 
made their decision, they were asked to press Button 3 to input their final choice (Figure 
5.2 b).
  1-3s 
5s 
5s 
  1s 
 
 
    
+ 
Timeline 
 
 
 
ID: 12 
Messaged you: 
 
I strongly promise 
I will reciprocate.  
 
 
    
 
You are endowed 10 tokens. 
How many tokens you want to send to this 
partner? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
You are endowed 10 tokens. 
How many tokens you want to send to this 
partner? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1-3s 
5s 
4s 
5s 
  1s 
 
 
   + 
 
 
    
Outcome calculating … 
 
 
 
Player  12 sent you 
I strongly promise I will reciprocate. 
 
You sent 5 tokens (×4) 
Partner got 20 tokens 
 
“I strongly promise I will reciprocate.” 
This partner did not reciprocate. 
You  final   5 tokens 
Partner final   20 tokens 
 
 
1-3s 
 
 
 
 
You now get another 10 tokens, do you 
decide to: 
 
Punish     Not-Punish 
 
 
 
How  many tokens do you want to spend 
to punish? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
5s 
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.2 Timeline of a single trial of the experimental task. (a) Stage 1: Promise and 
trust decision-making. (b) Stage 2: Outcome revealed and punishment decision-making
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Post-experiment questionnaires 
Participants were asked to fill out several questionnaires after completing the experiment. 
Firstly, participants were asked to evaluate the intensity of the promise messages received 
in the experiment, and their expectation that a partner would repay after receiving these 
messages. For example, if B sent the message ‘I feel like reciprocating today,’ they would 
indicate their opinion of this promise on a 1-5 scale where 1 represents no promise at 
all, 3 represents a weak promise and 5 represents a strong promise. Theyn would also 
indicate their expectation of repayment after each message on a 1-7 scale, where 1 
represents no expectation at all, 5 represents a moderate expectation, and 7 represents 
a very high expectation. Secondly, we were interested in how each different interaction 
affected participants’ emotional arousal. Therefore, 18 scenarios were selected from 
the experiment, containing all of our experimental conditions, and participants were 
asked to rate emotions for each scenario on a 1-7 scale for both pleasantness and anger. 
Thirdly, participants also completed the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11) (Patton, 
1995), and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis, 1983).
Data acquisition
Neuroimaging data were acquired using a 3 Tesla MRI scanner (Prisma, Siemens, 
Erlangen, Germany) at the Donders Centre for Cognitive Neuroimaging, Nijmegen, The 
Netherlands. A 32-channel phased array head coil was equipped in the scanner while 
blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) images were collected using  T
2
*-weighted 
gradient multi-echo echoplanar imaging (EPI) sequences (Poser, et al., 2006) with the 
following parameters: repetition time (TR) = 2250 ms; echo time (TE) = 9.4, 20.65, 31.9, 
43.15 ms; flip angle = 90°; matrix size = 64×64; field-of-view (FOV) = 224×224 mm; 
slice gap = 0.5 mm. 35 ascending slices were acquired (slice thickness= 3.0 mm, voxel 
size = 3.5×3.5×3.0 mm) from the whole brain. Moreover, a high-resolution anatomical 
T1-weighted image of the whole brain was collected using a Magnetisation-Prepared 
Rapid Gradient Echo (MP-RAGE) sequence with the following parameters (192 slices, 
TR=2300 ms; TE= 3.03 ms; flip angle= 8°; field-of-view (FOV) = 256×256 mm; voxel 
size = 1×1×1 mm). 
Psychtoolbox (http://psychtoolbox.org/), integrated into Matlab (Matlab 2014a, The 
Mathworks, Inc., Natick, MA, USA), was used for stimulus presentation and behavioural 
data collection (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997).
Data analysis
Behavioural data 
We used the amount of tokens participants transferred to their partner to quantify their 
trust under different types of promise messages. Therefore, a generalised linear mixed 
effect model was performed, which contained the ‘promise type’ (three levels: strong, 
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general, and non-promise) as the within-subject factor and the transferred amount and 
the response time as the dependent variables. Non-response trials were excluded from 
our analysis. In total, 4992 observations were obtained from 42 participants. 
In the second stage, we were particularly interested in the participants’ punishment 
decisions, in terms of both frequency and the amount of tokens spent to punish. We 
assessed the percentage of punish-decisions for each condition, and also the amount 
spent on punishment as continuous dependent measures. Linear mixed effect models 
contained within-participant factors of promise type (three levels: strong, general, non-
promise) and partner’s reciprocity (two levels: repay, not repay) to predict participants’ 
punishment decisions. Non-response trials were excluded from analysis. 
To analyse the debriefing questions, linear mixed effect models were performed with 
promise type as a within-subject factor, and the message rating score, the degree of 
expectation of repayment, as well as the amount of tokens transferred as dependent 
variables.
Behavioural data analyses were performed using R statistical package (R Core Team, 
2015). Linear mixed-effect models were conducted using the mixed function of the 
“Afex” package for Analysis of Factorial Experiments (Singmann, et al., 2015), which 
is integrated into the “lme4” package (Bates, et al., 2015). To account for repeated 
measures, a random intercept was included for participants. Significance levels were 
calculated with the Kenward-Roger (KR) correction implemented in the mixed function. 
All descriptive and pairwise comparisons (i.e., least- squares means, 95% confidence 
intervals [CI] were performed using the lsmeans function from the “lsmeans” package 
(Lenth, 2016). 
fMRI data 
Pre-processing 
Neuroimaging data were analysed using SPM12 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/
software/spm12/) in combination with Matlab (Matlab 2014a, The Mathworks, Inc., 
Natick, MA, USA). Prior to pre-processing, images from multiple echo-time were combined 
via a standard procedure (Poser, et al., 2006). We performed head motion correction on 
the first echo, in which the interactive rigid-body realignment was estimated to minimise 
the residual sum of squares between the first echo of the first scan and the all remaining 
scans. Then, all echoes were realigned to the first echo of the first scan by applying 
the estimated parameters to all the other echoes. Images of each scan from the four 
echoes were combined into one image according to the calculated weighted sum of the 
echo times. Standardised preprocessing procedures were implemented to analyse the 
functional data  These procedures consisted of slice-timing correction, co-registration 
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of functional images to the anatomical images, segmentation of the anatomical image, 
normalisation to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space, smoothing (8-mm 
full-width/half-maximum kernel), and filtering (a standard high-pass filter set a 128 s). 
fMRI models 
We used a two-level general linear model (GLM) to analyse the functional neuroimaging 
data, with the first level analyses (individual participant effects) providing contrasts for 
the second level (group effects) analyses. During the first level analysis, multiple event-
related regressors were defined for each participant for each epoch of the time course 
of the two-stages in separate GLM. For the analyses of stage 1, the regressors modelled 
the blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) response to the epoch of fixation, promise 
messages, jitters, and trust decision in order to include all known sources of variance 
which potentially could account for the signal variance. Promise messages were split 
into three regressors corresponding to the three types of messages (three levels: strong, 
general, no promise). During the second stage of the game, regressors of interest came 
from the following epochs: review the previous interaction, reveal outcome, punish 
decision. Moreover, the review of previous interactions was further separated into three 
regressors corresponding to the three types of promises. For the review of previous 
interactions, regressors were further split into four regressors (promise-repay, promise-
not repay, neutral message-repay, neutral message-not repay). Punishment decisions 
were also separated into four regressors, but only for not-repay trials (promise-not 
repay-punish, promise-not repay-not punish, neutral message-not repay-punish, neutral 
message-not repay-not punish). 
Regressors were time-locked from the onset of each epoch to the offset of the epoch in 
both stages. Linear contrasts were used to obtain participant-specific estimates for each 
regressor. In particular, the regressors of the decision were time-locked to the onset 
of the decision screen with the decision response time as duration, to control for the 
influence of response time on the BOLD signal. This analysis is according to the method 
that uses orthogonalised response time as the duration of different events (Mumford, et 
al., 2015). All regressors were modelled by convolution with a canonical hemodynamic 
response function (HRF) (Friston, et al., 1995). To correct for the head motion, six 
movement parameters (three translations, three rotations) of realignment were included 
in the design matrix as nuisance regressors. Subsequently, for each participant, contrast 
images of interest were created and compared to baseline. These contrast images were 
submitted to the random effects second-level analyses. 
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Results
Behavioural results 
Promise information greatly enhanced trust decisions, F (2, 82) = 50.09, p<0.0001. 
There was a linear trend of promise messages on trust decisions, t (82) = -9.67, P<0.001, 
with greater trust being placed the stronger the message was. Pair-wise comparison 
analysis with the Holm correction revealed that participants transferred highest amount 
M= 6.44, CI = [5.75, 7.12] to the Investors in the Trust Game when they received strong 
promises compared to when they received general promise messages (t (82) = 2.59, 
p=0.01)). In turn, general promise messages prompted an increase in transferred amount 
(M= 5.86, CI = [5.17, 6.54]) as well, compared to non-promise messages (M=4.26, CI = 
[3.58, 4.95], t (82) =7.08, p<0.001). However, no significant effect was found regarding 
the duration of making decisions in different promise type conditions, F (2, 82) =0.59, 
p>0.05 (Figure 5.3 a).
For analysis of the punishment decisions in the second stage, we examined the 
percentage of punishment in each of the experimental conditions. A two-way repeated 
measures ANOVA was performed, with partner reciprocity (two levels: repay, not repay) 
and promise type (three levels: strong, general, non-promise) as the within-subject 
factors. Firstly, we found a significant main effect of promise messages on punishment 
decision (F (2, 82) =19.98, p<0.0001) with a significant linear trend effect (F (1, 41) 
=22.49, p<0.0001), indicating that individuals punish more often when their trust was 
abused by a strong promiser (M= 38.6, SE=2.6%) than when when their trust was 
abused by a general promiser (M=35.5%, SE=2.5%) or a non-promiser (M=25.9%, 
SE=3.1%). Secondly, a partner’s reciprocity significantly affected individuals punish 
decision, F (1, 41) = 131.63, p<0.0001). Further pair-wise comparisons found that 
frequency of punishment decisions intensified when the trust was abused (partner did 
not repay) (M=63.4, SE=4.7) compared to when trust was reciprocated (partner did 
repay) (M=3.2%, SE=1.9%). Thirdly, a significant interaction between the two factors 
was detected, F (2, 82) =20.18, p<0.0001, indicating the effect of promise on the 
punishment decision only occurred when the partner did not repay any money. Pair-
wise comparisons revealed that breaking a strong promise led to the highest frequency 
of punishment decisions (M=74.5%, SE= 5.1%) compared to general promises and 
non-promise messages. In turn, when a general promise was broken, it led to higher 
punishment decisions (M=67.2%, SE=4.9%) compared to non-promise messages 
(M=48.6%, SE=5.9%) (ps <0.0001) (Figure 5.3 b).
As participants typically did not punish when their partners repaid, we only included 
the trials when partner did not repay for analysis of the amount of tokens spent to 
punish. Therefore, for this analysis 1961 observations were used from 42 participants. 
Furthermore, as expected, the amount of tokens spent to punish the non-reciprocating 
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partner were significantly influenced by the promise information, F (2, 62) = 20.46, 
p<0.0001. Polynomial contrasts revealed a significant linear effect of promise 
information on the amount of tokens spent to punish, t (67) = -6.33, p<0.0001. Pair-
wise comparison analysis further indicated that participants spent the highest amount 
to punish their partners when they broke a strong promise message (M= 5.80, CI= [5.13, 
6.47]) compared to when they broke a general promise and when it concerned a non-
promise message. In turn, the breach of a general promise message incurred a higher 
amount of punishment (M=5.41, CI= 4.74, 6.07) compared to breaking a non-promise 
message (M= 4.24, CI= [3.57, 4.92]) (Figure 5.3 c).
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Figure 5.3 Behavioural results. (a) Trust decision. Mean transferred tokens in the 
three different promise conditions; (b) Punishment decision. Mean percentage of the 
frequency of making a punishment decision in Not-repay trials under three different 
promise types; (c) Punishment decision amount. The mean amount of tokens spent to 
punish in Not-repay trials under three different promise types. SP: strong promise; GP: 
general promise; NP: no promise (or neutral message); SPN: strong promise but not 
repay; GPN: general promise but not repay; NPN: no promise but not repay; Error bar 
indicate standard errors.
The results of the debriefing questions were consistent with our behavioural results. A 
significant main effect of message rating indicated that our manipulation of promise type 
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was successful, F (2, 80) = 106, p<0.001. Further analyses revealed that participants 
perceived the strong promise messages (M=3.93, CI= [3.65, 4.21] as containing a higher 
degree of promise as compared to the general promise messages (M=2.49, CI= [2.21, 
2.77], t (80) = 7.87, p<0.001), while the neutral messages (M=1.27, CI=[0.99, 1.54]) 
delivered less sense of promise than general promise messages (t (80) =6.68, p<0.001) 
and strong promise messages (t (80) =14.55, p<0.001). Interestingly, this linear trend 
was also observed in both the expectation of repayment (F (2, 80) = 35.89, p<0.001) 
and debriefed amound of tokens they would like to transfer (F (2, 80) = 50.04, p<0.001) 
(Figure 5.4, a, b).
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Figure 5.4 Results of debriefing questions. (a) Participants perceived intensity of the 
promise messages; (b) Participants’ repayment expectations from their partner across 
message types; (c) Participants’ self-reported pleasant emotion across experimental 
conditions; (d) Participants’ self-reported anger emotion across experimental conditions. 
HI=high investment (10 tokens), MI=middle investment (5 tokens), LI=low investment 
(2 tokens)
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fMRI results
Promise messages and Trust Decisions 
As expected, the contrast examining the processing of promise messages [promise 
message (strong + general) > neutral message], revealed brain activations in the ACC, 
extending into vmPFC (1, 32, -4) and dlPFC (BA 8/9, MNI: -10, 32 46) (Figure 5.5 a, 
Table 5.1). 
We then extracted the regional parameter estimates of these two brain regions at the 
peak MNI coordinates in the three types of promise messages. For the ACC/vmPFC, 
ANOVA analysis of beta values revealed a significant main effect of promise type on 
activity in this region (F (2, 82) =7.97, p<0.001). Polynomial contrasts detected a 
significant linear trend (t (82) =-3.48, p<0.001), which indicated that the stronger 
the promise information delivered to the participants, the higher the activation was in 
this region. Further pairwise comparison showed that promise messages (both strong 
promise messages (M=0.023, CI= [-0.0009, 0.047]) and general promise messages 
(M=0.022, CI= [-0.0015, 0.046])) significantly intensified the activity in this region 
compared to neutral messages (M=-0.017, CI= [-0.041, 0.007]) (ps=0.0024)). However, 
we did not find the significant difference in effect between strong and general promises 
on activation in this region, t (82) =0.049, p=0.96 (Figure 5.5, c, d). 
Interestingly, a similar activation pattern was found in dlPFC, F (2, 82) = 8.29, p<0.001. A 
significant linear trend (t (82) =-3.76, p<0.001) showed that stronger promise messages 
intensified the brain activation in the dlPFC. No significant difference was found between 
the strong promise message (M= 0.020, CI= [-0.003, 0.043]) and general promise 
message (M=0.015, CI= [-0.008, 0.039], p=0.59). Both types of promise messages were 
related to higher activation in this region compared to neutral messages (M=-0.001, CI= 
[-0.035, 0.011], t (82) = 3.76 and 3.23 respectively, ps<0.05. (Figure 5.5, b, d). These 
patterns mirrored our behavioural results in the trust decision. 
For the decision of Trust, trial-wise parametric modulation analyses were performed 
during the Trust Decision (Decision of the amount to transfer to partner), using the 
amount transferred to the partner as the modulator, revealed the brain regions TPJ 
(temporoparietal junction, specific Angular gyrus, MNI [-48 -56 25]), MTG (middle 
temporal gyrus, MNI [-52, -39,-4] ), and IFG (inferior frontal gyrus, MNI [-59 21 7]) 
(Figure 5.6 a).
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Figure 5.5. fMRI activation of processing promise messages. (a) Promise message > 
neutral message revealed stronger activation in the dlPFC (BA 9, -10 32 46) and ACC/
vmPFC (1, 32, -4), see Table 5.1 for more details. There were no significant voxels for 
the neutral message>promise message; (b) Parameter estimates (beta values) of dlPFC 
for three promise types (strong promise, general promise, and neutral message); (c) 
Parameter estimates (beta values) of ACC/vmPFC for three promise types (strong 
promise, general promise, and neutral message); (d) Time series of dlPFC of each 
regressor for the three promise type; (e) Time series of ACC/vmPFC of each regressor 
for the three promise types. For (d) and (e), the time course was estimated with the 
finite impulse response model from the onset of delivery of the promised message, for a 
length of 22.5s. Error bars show ± SE. Thresholds are at p<0.001 (unc.)
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Table 5.1
Brodmann 
area
Local 
maxima
MNI coordinates of 
local maxima (mm)
Cluster size
(voxels)
Brain Region T value x y z
promise> neutral message
Frontal_Sup_Medial (dlPFC) 9 4.31 -10 32 46 62
ACC/vmPFC 32/11 3.63 1 32 -4 12
Trust Decision ( parametric 
modulation)
IFG 48 4.33 -59 21 7 88
MTG 21 4.13 -52 -39 -4 28
TPJ (Angular Gyrus) 39 3.64 -48 -56 25 29
Voxel level p<0.001 (unc.). L=left; R=right; ACC= anterior cingulate cortex; vmPFC= ventral medial prefrontal 
cotext; dlPFC (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex); IFG (inferior frontal gyrus); MTG (middle temporal gyrus); TPJ 
(temporoparietal junction).
Broken promises and punishment decisions
During the second stage of our task, we were particularly interested in answering two 
questions. One, brain response when promises were broken, and two, the neural activity 
in relation to the willingness to punish (at a cost) the source of the broken promise. 
Therefore, our imaging analyses during the second stage were mainly focused on the 
screen when outcomes were revealed and the punishment decision were made. 
Firstly, two contrasts were performed, [repay > not repay] and [not repay > repay], when 
the outcome was revealed, across all the conditions. No significant voxels were found 
(p<0.001, unc). Since we were particularly interested in the brain responses to a broken 
promise as compared to non-promises, contrasts of [not repay > repay] were created 
separately in the promise message conditions as well as the neutral message condition. 
Again, no significant voxels were detected in the non-promise [not repay > repay] 
contrast (voxel level p<0.001, unc). However, right insula [MNI: 36 21 -14] extending to 
inferior frontal gyrus [MNI: 40 39 -7] was selectively activated in the promise message 
conditions (Figure 5.6, b, Table 5.2)
Secondly, during the time of making punishment decisions, we were interested how the 
brain responded differently between punishment and non-punishment. Therefore, two 
contrasts, [punish > non-punish] and [non-punish > punish], were performed. However, 
no significant brain activations were detected in either contrast (voxel level p<0.001, 
unc). Our behavioural results indicated that individuals tend to punish more frequently, 
as well as spend more money to punish, partners who had sent a promise as compared to 
partners who sent neutral messages. Hence, we were also interested in brain activation 
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differences between punishment decisions towards the partners who had given promises 
compared to those who had not. For this, we applied the contrast [punish promiser > 
punish non-promiser], which revealed activation in the ACC and midbrain (voxel level 
p<0.001, unc.) (Figure 5.6, c).
X=51 Y=51 X=8 
Midbrain 
ACC 
Insula/ IFG 
 IFG 
MTG 
TPJ 
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 5.6 fMRI activation during trust decisions and punishment decisions. (a) Trust 
Decision, trial-wise parametric modulation analyses using the amount transferred to the 
partner as the modulator revealed the regions of IFG (BA 48, -59, 21, 7), TPJ (BA 39, -48 
-56 25) and MTG (BA 21, -52 -39 -4); See Table 5.1 for more details; (b) Brain regions 
(insula/IFG, BA 47, 40 39 -7) revealed by [not repay > repay] in the promise message 
condition; there were no significant voxels for the [not repay > repay] in the neutral 
message condition; See Table 5.2 for more details; (c) Contrast of punish promiser > 
punish non-promiser revealed brain activation in the regions of ACC and Midbrain. See 
Table 5.2 for more details; Thresholds are at p<0.001 (unc.)
Table 5.2 
Brodmann 
area
Local 
maxima
MNI coordinates of 
local maxima (mm)
Cluster size
(voxels)
Brain Region T value x y z
Promise (Not repay> repay)
Insula/IFG (R) 47/38 3.65 40 39 -7 75
Putamen (R) 25 3.69 15 11 -7 89
Punish promiser > punish 
non-promiser
ACC (R) 24 4.43 8 25 21 24
Midbrain
Voxel level p<0.001 (unc.). L=left; R=right; IFG (inferior frontal gyrus); ACC= anterior cingulate cortex; 
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Discussion
In the present study, we designed a two-stage Trust Game paradigm combined with 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine the neural processing of 
non-binding promise messages and their influence on interpersonal trust. Moreover, 
our novel experimental paradigm also provides an opportunity to further explore the 
behavioural and neural responses when a promise is broken, particularly when it comes 
to punishment decisions. Although promises are typically informally expressed, and 
the promiser’s acts are not guaranteed, many social contracts and agreements rely 
on these messages. Therefore, it is of great importance to understand the underlying 
psychological processes and neural mechanisms of non-enforceable promises and the 
relevant effects on subsequent social decisions.
Behaviourally, and as hypothesized, results showed that promise messages greatly 
enhanced interpersonal trust as compared to neutral messages of comparable length 
and complexity. Although individuals transferred slightly more tokens when receiving 
a strong compared to a general promise message, no significant differences were 
detected here. Moreover, having a promise being broken by a partner motivated higher 
punishment decisions compared to when receiving a neutral message, both in terms of 
frequency of punishment decisions as well as the amount of tokens spent to punish. 
These results support the notion that a well-understood and important social norm (i.e. 
a promise is expected to be fulfilled) plays a vital role in shaping interpersonal decisions, 
and that subsequent norm violation can prompt costly punishment, presumably to 
achieve satisfaction. 
Firstly, our results showed that non-enforceable messages – although merely ‘cheap talk’ 
– do affect behaviour. Specifically, they enhance the trust of the promise receiver and also 
intensifies their subsequent punishment decisions if the promise is broken. Secondly, the 
results of the debriefing questions showed that promise messages increased individuals’ 
self-reported trust, increased the amount of tokens transferred to the promiser and 
increased the expectation of repayment from their partner. Thirdly, when the trust 
was reciprocated, our participants reported higher pleasant emotional experience. If 
the trust was abused, however, and the promise was not fulfilled, this elicited higher 
negative emotional arousal, such as anger. 
In line with our expectations, neuroimaging results showed that comparing promise and 
neutral message revealed increased activation of dlPFC (BA 9) and vmPFC. Parameter 
estimates extracted from both regions were significantly higher when processing 
promise message compared to when processing neutral messages. This suggests that 
cognitive control and valuations systems in the brain may be involved when processing 
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promise messages. Based on these neural findings and the behavioural results, we argue 
that promise enhances interpersonal trust by bestowing a social value on the promise 
message which is then integrated into a social utility function, and by simultaneously 
inhibiting self-interest. 
Classical economic models propose that altruistic decisions are guided by the motivation 
of maximising self-interests (Fehr & Camerer, 2007a; Fehr, Naef, & Schmidt, 2006), 
therefore, minimising personal negative social outcomes (Loewenstein, et al., 1989), 
such as negative social emotion experiences (e.g., guilt) (Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 
2007a; Chang, et al., 2011b) and aversion to violations of social norms (Fehr & Schmidt, 
1999). Moreover, the dlPFC is generally involved in effortful, high-level cognitive control 
and plays a role in inhibiting self-interest tendencies, overriding selfish impulses (Frith, 
2000), and maintaining self-control processes (Lieberman, 2010). Recently, dlPFC 
was also found to be active while suppressing self-interest in social exchange games. 
For example, in temporal discounting, one has to overcome the temptation to attain 
a reward immediately (Figner, et al., 2010; Kable & Glimcher, 2007), and willpower is 
needed (Crockett, Braams, Clark, & Tobler, 2013). Damages of dlPFC in lesion patients 
tended to diminish their concerns for social norms (or social values) such as decreased 
reciprocal fairness (Knoch, et al., 2006), and reduced ability to build a social reputation 
(Knoch, et al., 2009). A recent study also supports this viewpoint since their results 
showed that dlPFC damage decreased the effect of concern with honesty on behaviours 
that pit honesty motives against self-interest (Zhu, et al., 2014).
A large amount of recent work has suggested that human social preferences, which 
have inherent social value that can be integrated into individuals’ utility functions, drives 
prosocial behaviour (Fehr & Camerer, 2007a; Ruff & Fehr, 2014). Previous neuroeconomic 
studies have converged to suggest that the activity in vmPFC was associated with the 
value of stimuli when making a choice (Hare, et al., 2009; Hare, O’Doherty, Camerer, 
Schultz, & Rangel, 2008; Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Losecaat Vermeer, et al., 2014; 
Plassmann, O’Doherty, & Rangel, 2007). Furthermore, recently, activity in vmPFC has 
also been related to the computation of stimulus values while making social choices (Gu, 
et al., 2015; Hare, et al., 2010; Hsu, Anen, & Quartz, 2008; Moll, et al., 2006a; Tricomi, 
Rangel, Camerer, & O’Doherty, 2010). Combining the previous findings and the current 
results, we presume that coding and computing the values of promise messages takes 
place in the vmPFC. This process also involves the dlPFC, given its function of controlling 
self-interest. 
Although the aforementioned regions are involved in processing messages, our parametric 
modulation analyses using the trial-wise amount of investment as the modulator revealed 
that making trust decisions was positively correlated with activation in the TPJ and MTG. 
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These regions have consistently been found to be involved in the mentalising network 
in the brain (Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Frith & Frith, 2003; Mitchell, 2008; Saxe & 
Kanwisher, 2003), which is commonly thought to play a role in processing theory of mind 
(Frith & Frith, 2005; Gallagher & Frith, 2003a) (i.e. perspective taking; understanding 
of others needs, minds, and values; and shifting attention to others). Recent research 
has also indicated that these regions may play a role in altruistic behaviour through 
shifting attention from focusing on one’s own self-interests to another’s value and 
needs (Baumgartner, Gotte, Gugler, & Fehr, 2012b; Fett, Gromann, Giampietro, Shergill, 
& Krabbendam, 2014; van den Bos, et al., 2009). One plausible interpretation of our 
results is therefore that the theory of mind mechanisms are integrated into the value 
computation processes and that they are both involved in making a social choice.
One additional interesting research question addressed here is how the brain reacts when 
a promise was broken. Here, we found that the right insula was particularly activated 
in the promise condition when participants’ trust was abused and promises were not 
fulfilled by partners, but in the neutral message condition. These results support our 
viewpoint that norm violation in the form of broken promises leads to negative emotional 
processing in those whose trust has been abused. Previous neuroimaging investigations 
have previously indicated that the anterior insular cortex plays a prominent role in basic 
emotional processing (Kober, et al., 2008), and is also related to social emotions during 
social cooperation and fairness perception (Lamm & Singer, 2010). Our findings are also 
in line with previous studies that found that the right anterior insula showed increased 
activation when a social norm was violated (Baumgartner, Gianotti, & Knoch, 2013; 
Sanfey, et al., 2003a). Moreover, a recent study showed that the insula demonstrated 
increased activation when one is making decisions that may result in betrayal, which 
suggested that the insula may be involved in betrayal aversion by indexing the potential 
negative emotions associated with knowing one has been betrayed (Aimone, et al., 
2014). 
Noticeably, our behavioural results showed that participants had a stronger desire to 
punish when the promise was not fulfilled by a promiser, compared to a neutral message, 
even if punishing would come at a personal cost. Our corresponding neuroimaging results 
revealed that the decision to punish a promiser showed increased activity in the midbrain 
and the dorsal ACC (dACC). Our interpretation of these results is that higher punishment 
towards the promiser might be motivated by the negative emotional experiences or 
social pain one feels when the social norm is violated, and one’s trust is abused. Thus, the 
decision to punish could represent emotional relief or social satisfaction when justice is 
reestablished, and norm violators have been punished. Stronger activation in the striatum 
(caudate and nucleus) has been previously observed during costly punishment of a norm 
violator, indicating that the desire to incur a greater punishment was associated with 
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stronger striatum activation (de Quervain, et al., 2004a), a region commonly found 
in reward processing circuitry. Moreover, the dopamine neuron projections from the 
midbrain that are implicated in reward processing and prediction error (Schultz, 1997), 
have been indicated to play a role in mediating the altruistic punishment (Buckholtz 
& Marois, 2012). Furthermore, the dACC was reported to be associated with pain 
experiences during social interactions (Eisenberger, et al., 2003).
Another possible interpretation here is that a conflict process could be involved in the 
decision to punish at personal cost. The ACC has shown to be active when receiving 
unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game (Sanfey, et al., 2003a), and the authors here suggest 
that activation of ACC could be associated with a cognitive-affective conflict process in 
the brain. It is acknowledged that ACC plays a role in monitoring conflict information 
processes and contributing to adjustments in cognitive control (Botvinick, Cohen, & 
Carter, 2004; MacDonald, et al., 2000). The costly punishment decision could therefore 
lead to a balancing act, going back and forth between self-interest and the affective 
pleasure of punishing a violator. On the other hand, this conflict process could also 
suggest a cost-benefit analysis in the brain during costly punishment decisions. dACC 
and striatum were observed to display increased activity with respect to net value of an 
outcome, which suggests that the ACC plays a role in integrating information about cost 
and reward (Croxson, Walton, O’Reilly, Behrens, & Rushworth, 2009). 
In summary, the present study investigated the neural basis of processing non-binding 
promise messages and their role in enhancing interpersonal trust and fostering 
cooperative partnerships through motivating subsequent costly-punishment when 
the promise is broken. We demonstrated that Investors transferred more tokens after 
receiving promise messages, and also punished the Trustee more a promise is broken. 
In terms of neural activation, dlPFC and vmPFC were active when processing promises 
compared to neutral messages. Stronger trust was positively associated with the 
increased activation in regions of the TPJ, MTG, and IFG. Moreover, BOLD signal changes 
in right insula were detected when the promise was broken by the promiser but not 
when it was broken by the sender of a neutral message. Subsequent costly-punishment 
increased activation in the regions of the dorsal ACC and the midbrain. In combination 
with the previous findings, we suggest that keeping one’s promise is an important social 
norm that plays a vital role in modifying individual’s interpersonal trust decisions through 
endowing a social value to the norm while controlling self-interests. Breaking a promise 
can induce negative affective experiences that prompt costly punishment. Although 
non-enforceable messages play an important role in fostering social cooperation and in 
many economic social interactions, the underlying mechanisms have largely remained 
unexplored. The present findings provide novel empirical evidence to understand why 
cheap talk is effective, an issue of considerable importance for efficiency and social 
welfare. 
PART III:
APPLICATION TO PSYCHIATRIC POPULATION

CHAPTER 6
Psychopathy: Less Guilt Sensitivity 
and Less Trustworthiness
6
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Abstract
Psychopathy is a personality disorder characterised by amoral and socially unexpected 
behaviours, thought to be due to deficits in emotional processing. Based on these observed 
idiosyncrasies, debate has arisen as to whether or not individuals with psychopathic 
traits are capable of acquiring knowledge about the social expectations of others, and 
to what extent not meeting these expectations can elicit guilt. The present study aimed 
to answer these questions by investigating both trustworthiness and associated guilt 
sensitivity in adults with psychopathic traits. Sixty-three adult participants completed 
the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI) and Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (SRP), 
followed by a modified Trust Game in the role of the Trustee. This examines the degree 
to which the participant reciprocates trust that had been previously placed in them. 
Non-reciprocation typically leads to higher financial pay-offs, but greater potential 
feelings of guilt. Mixed effect regressions were conducted to examine participants’ 
beliefs about their game partner’s expectations and how these beliefs affected decisions 
about reciprocity. Furthermore, a novel computational model of reciprocity was used 
to estimate individual guilt sensitivity parameters. Self-reported counterfactual guilt 
scores were also used to index participants’ guilt sensitivity, and correlations were 
computed to examine the relationships between the guilt sensitivity indices and the PPI/
SRP scores. Finally, a LASSO variable selection procedure was used to identify the key 
trait(s) that could explain decision-making in this task. Participants’ self-reported beliefs 
about their partner’s expectations were largely predictive of the amount of money they 
actually returned in the task. These decisions in turn were negatively correlated with 
the PPI total and PPI-I scores. Furthermore, participants’ guilt sensitivity parameter 
values obtained from the guilt-aversion model, as well as participants’ self-reported 
counterfactual guilt, were significantly negatively correlated with the PPI total scores. 
Finally, the variable selection procedure identified that Machiavellian Egocentricity was 
the key trait associated with the observed attenuated guilt sensitivity and decreased 
reciprocal behaviours among the higher psychopathic traits individuals. Our findings 
suggest that individuals with higher psychopathic trait scores are indeed capable of 
understanding the expectations of others. However, they do not seem to utilise this 
knowledge in their decision-making, as demonstrated by decreased reciprocity in the 
Trust Game. We hypothesize that this is due to attenuated guilt sensitivity, and we find 
that Machiavellian Egocentricity is the key trait associated with this behavioural pattern. 
The present study provides empirical evidence of intact social knowledge coupled with 
decreased reciprocal behaviour and diminished guilt sensitivity amongst individuals with 
stronger psychopathic traits. 
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Introduction 
Psychopathy is a personality disorder associated with persistent violations of moral norms 
and severe antisocial behaviour (Blair, 2007; Hare, 2001). Individuals with psychopathy 
are characterized by impaired social emotional processing combined with a tendency 
to display disruptive and antisocial behaviors (Hare, 2003). The interpersonal-affective 
disturbances that lie at the core of psychopathy encompass a lack of empathy, guilt, 
and remorse (Blair, 1995; Blair, Sellars, Strickland, & Clark, 1995; Hare, Hart, & Harpur, 
1991), and are considered to be unique to psychopathy. Importantly, psychopathy is 
currently seen as a dimensional construct, implying the traits are also present among 
the general population (Neumann, Schmitt, Carter, Embley, & Hare, 2012). These traits 
can be measured using self-reports questionnaires, such as the Psychopathic Personality 
Inventory (PPI; (Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996)) and the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale 
(SRP; Paulhus et al, 2016). 
The interpersonal-affective impairments have repeatedly been linked to poor social 
decision-making due to a diminished capability for moral reasoning (Blair, 2007; Harenski, 
Harenski, & Shane, 2010; Koenigs, Kruepke, Zeier, & Newman, 2012), but impaired social 
functioning in psychopathy has also been related to a tendency to maximize own gains, 
often at the expence of others (Brazil, et al., 2013; Koenigs, et al., 2012). This tendency 
to be excessively utilitarian has been studied before in relation to psychopathy in both 
offenders and non-offenders (Vieira, 2014). 
The use of economic games emerging from game theory, initially used to measure social 
decision-making between individuals, has now developed to test the interpersonal and 
affective responses in psychopathy (Ermer & Kiehl, 2010; Koenigs, Kruepke, & Newman, 
2010; Mokros, et al., 2008; Osumi, et al., 2012; Osumi & Ohira, 2010; Rilling, et al., 2007; 
Vieira, et al., 2014). In general, higher levels of psychopathy were associated with a more 
selfish pattern of cooperation with others in the prisoner’s dilemma game (Mokros, et 
al., 2008; Rilling, et al., 2007). Moreover, psychopaths showed deficits in reasoning about 
social rules and disturbances in social exchange (Ermer & Kiehl, 2010), showed higher 
altruistic punishment (Masui, Iriguchi, Nomura, & Ura, 2011), as well as demonstrating 
sub-optimal simultaneous learning of reward-based and social information (Brazil, et al., 
2013). 
However, the true nature of this disorder lies not only in abnormal emotional and moral 
processing, but also in how this deficiency leads to disturbances in social behaviour, 
for example refusal to reciprocate trust. In terms of decisions about trust and its 
subsequent reciprocation, it is unclear to which extent individuals with elevated levels 
psychopathy possess the capacity to make the social inferences required to undergo a 
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mutually satisfactory exchange, or whether they have the necessary knowledge of the 
expectations of their interaction partner, but are simply immune to this social knowledge. 
To date, there has not been a direct quantification of the sensitivity of individuals with 
elevated levels of psychopathic traits to the associated negative emotional experiences 
(e.g., guilt) toward their non-normative social behaviours (e.g., trustworthiness). 
The current experiment aims to bridge the gap between previous findings as well as to 
obtain insight into the underlying mechanisms of social behaviours among the individuals 
with elevated levels of psychopathic traits. To achieve this, we address the following 
three research questions. Firstly, we investigate whether the normative violation and 
socially inappropriate behaviours amongst the psychopathic populations are primarily 
due to the fact that they have trouble understanding social norms and expectations, or 
whether they simply fail to take these norms and expectations into their consideration 
in their decision-making. We answer this question by quantifying the participants’ 
beliefs about their partner’s expectations, and illustrate how they use (or do not use) 
these beliefs to guide their social (i.e., reciprocal) behaviour. Secondly, we explore 
the relationship between guilt sensitivity and normative social choice by computing a 
guilt sensitivity parameter per participant, as well as their self-reported counterfactual 
guilt. The guilt sensitivity parameter is derived from a computational model which has 
proposed that the anticipation of guilt may lie at the root of individuals’ decision to 
reciprocate with their social partners (Chang, et al., 2011b). Given high psychopathic 
individuals’ typically utilitarian moral decision-making pattern, it is important to explore 
the reciprocal behaviours among these individuals. Finally, we aim to isolate the key 
psychopathic personality traits related to guilt (in)sensitivity and trustworthiness, 
by detecting the specific trait(s) assessed by subscales of Psychopathic Personality 
Inventory (PPI; Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996). 
To answer these questions, a modified Trust Game with a computational model (guilt-
aversion model) was used. In this game, a player (Player 1, the Investor) is endowed 
with a sum of money and has to decide how much to transfer to their partner (Player 2, 
the Trustee), a decision usually interpreted as a quantification of trust (Figure 6.1). The 
selected amount is then multiplied by 4 by the experimenter, and transferred to Player 
2. Then, Player 2 makes a move, either honouring Player 1’s trust by returning some 
money, or abusing the trust by keeping all of it. If Player 2 decides to keep all the money, 
the game ends with a loss on Player 1’s side. Standard economic models predict that a 
rational Player 1 should never trust Player 2 by transferring any amount of money, as a 
selfish Player 2 would never return the favour. However, empirical evidence shows the 
limitations of these classical models (Camerer, 2003b), and a multitude of experiments 
has shown that people do in fact care about others’ payoffs, and usually reciprocate 
trust even when they do not have to. The guilt aversion model (Equation 6.1), derived 
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from Psychological Game Theory (PGT) (Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2009), assumes that 
a rational Player 2 optimises their total utility through both maximising own financial 
payoff ( ) and minimising their anticipated negative emotional experiences (e.g., 
guilt). This model provides a mathematical framework to quantify the utility functions 
involving individuals’ beliefs that are crucial for modelling emotions. According to this 
model, player 2’s anticipated guilt is based on their belief of the other player’s social 
expectation. The relative weight placed on the financial income and the anticipated guilt 
is balanced by a free parameter , which measures guilt sensitivity during reciprocal 
decisions. 
The Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI, Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996) and Self-
Report Psychopathy Scale (SRP, Hare, 1985) were used to measure psychopathic traits. 
The PPI was specifically designed to assess psychopathic personality traits among the 
non-clinical population, discerning eight specific constituent traits and providing a 
continuum measurement of each trait. The Self-Report Psychopathy Scale, derived from 
the PCL-R, is mainly used for estimating the maladaptive behaviours among the clinical 
psychopathic population, and will be used here as a supplemental measure.
Given the absence of behavioural differences between high and low psychopathic 
individuals in some studies (Cima, Tonnaer, & Hauser, 2010; Osumi, et al., 2012; Osumi 
& Ohira, 2010), we hypothesise that individuals scoring relatively high psychopathy-
related traits are likely capable of acquiring knowledge of social expectations from others, 
but nevertheless will choose to ignore this social information when making reciprocal 
decisions. Furthermore, considering that these individuals are more likely to engage in 
non-normative social behaviours and be blunt in their approach to others’ emotions or 
welfare, we hypothesised that individuals scoring higher on psychopathic traits would 
be less sensitive to anticipated guilt and would show less reciprocal behaviours in the 
Trust Game. Finally, a formal variable selection was applied to identify the key traits and 
explain the different indexes. Considering the highly predictable relationship between 
the Machiavellianism scale and trustworthiness behaviours (Gunnthorsdottir, McCabe, 
& Smith, 2002), we hypothesize that Machiavellian Egocentricity might be crucial in 
predicting the indices. 
Methods 
Participants
Sixty-six participants were recruited at Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands. 
They received either monetary compensation (16 Euros) or course credits (3 points) 
for completing the task. Additionally, participants had the opportunity to receive a 
monetary bonus dependent on task performance (maximum 10 Euros). All participants 
provided written consent, and the study was approved by the local ethics committee. 
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Three participants were excluded from the statistical analyses; two did not finish the 
experiment in time, and the third because they did not complete the PPI and SRP 
questionnaires. Therefore, analyses were performed on 63 participants (51 females), 
with age ranging from 18 to 40 (M = 22.28, SD =4.03).
Tasks
Measure of Psychopathy-Related Traits
Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI)
Psychopathic traits were assessed using a Dutch translation of the PPI (Jelicic, 2004; 
Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996). The PPI is a comprehensive self-report instrument which 
estimates psychopathic personality characteristics in non-clinical samples. The PPI 
consists of 187 items, measuring traits on 8 subscales. Each item is evaluated on a 4-point 
Likert-scale, ranging from 1 (false) to 4 (true). Higher PPI total scores correspond to 
higher degrees of psychopathy tendencies. Factor analysis have found that the scales 
of the PPI load on super-ordinate factors, known as the PPI-I (Fearless Dominance) and 
the PPI-II (Antisocial impulsivity)(Benning, Patrick, Hicks, Blonigen, & Krueger, 2003). 
Three subscales, namely Social Potency, Fearlessness, and Stress Immunity, are clustered 
into the PPI-I Factor; while four other subscales - Machiavellian Egocentricity, Blame 
Externalisation, Carefree Non-planfulness, and Impulsive Nonconformity - comprise the 
PPI-II Factor. A third factor consists of the subscale Coldheartedness. The total PPI score 
is usually regarded as a global index of the psychopathy, with strong internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alpha 0.89) (Blonigen, Carlson, Krueger, & Patrick, 2003). 
Self-Report Psychopathy scale - short form (SRP-SF)
The Dutch version of Hare’s Self-Report Psychopathy scale was also used to assess 
psychopathy-related traits (Hare, 1985). The SRP is directly derived from the Psychopathy 
Checklist-Revised (Hare 2003), a semi-structured clinical interview that is considered to 
be the golden standard for assessing psychopathy. The SRP differs from the PPI in that 
it measures maladaptive behaviours and traits instead of general personality traits. The 
SRP consists of 29 items that measure 4 facets of psychopathy; Interpersonal (Facet 1) 
and affective disturbances (Facet 2), antisociality (Facet 3) and deviant lifestyles (Facet 
4). Facets 1 and 2 can be clustered into a higher-order factor measuring interpersonal-
affective impairments (SRP-F1) and facets 3 and 4 can be combined into an antisocial-
lifestyle factor (SRP-F2). The two-factor model has been the most prominent in the 
literature. The SRP has excellent psychometric properties (Neumann et al 2012)..
Experimental Task: The Trust Game
The Trust Game is played by two players, with Player 1 termed the INVESTOR and Player 
2 the TRUSTEE. Player 1 is first endowed with a sum of money by the experimenter 
(€10 in our experiment). Player 1 then decides about the amount of money he/she 
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Table 6.1 | Mean scores of PPI and SRP (scale and subscale) (n=63)
Variable Mean (SD)
Age
Total PPI scores a 
PPI-I (or Fearless Dominance) a           
PPI-II (or Antisocial impulsivity) a
Stress immunity a
Social potency a
Fearlessness a
Cold-heartedness a
Blame externalisation a
Carefree non-planfulness a
Machiavellian egocentricity a
Impulsive nonconformity a
Total SRP scores b
SRP-F1 b
SRP-F2 b
SRP-Interpersonal b
SRP-Affective b
SRP-Lifestyle b
SPR-Antisocial b
22.28 (4.03)
335.25 (58.33)
126.00 (20.37)
167.32 (23.80)
26.06 (6.21)
58.92 (11.11)
41.02 (8.48)
43.21 (8.01)
33.51 (8.50)
39.75 (6.07)
58.40 (12.12)
35.67 (7.25)
46.10 (14.97)
23.32 (8.70)
24.19 (8.01)
12.30 (5.64)
11.14 (3.81)
13.86 (4.26)
10.06 (4.51)
Values are present as a mean (SD). 
a PPI (Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996) b SRP-SF (Hare, 1985)
wants to invest with Player 2, in 1 Euro increments ranging from zero to the entire 
endowment.  Once an amount has been selected by the Investor, this is multiplied by 
4, and this new amount is transferred to the Trustee. Importantly, both players know in 
advance about the nature of the transfer (i.e. the multiplier). Following the transfer, the 
Trustee now has the opportunity to return some of this transferred money back to the 
Investor, but is not obligated to. The current study adopted a modified Trust Game from 
Chang et al. (2011a) to explore reciprocity as well as guilt sensitivity among individuals 
with different psychopathic traits. For each round of the Trust Game, Trustees were also 
asked to estimate how much they believed their partner (i.e. Player 1) would invest and 
how much they believed their partner expected them to return. 
Guilt-aversion Model 
We fit the data with an adapted guilt-aversion model (Chang, et al., 2011a) to estimate 
individuals’ guilt sensitivity. This model proposes that the utility of Player 2 in the 
Trust Game could be divided into two parts: financial utility ( ) and anticipated guilt 
emotion (or guilt utility). A rational Player 2 is interested in balancing both parts through 
M2
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maximising monetary income and minimising anticipated guilt. In our task, anticipated 
guilt can be considered as the nonnegative difference between the amount of money 
Player 1 expects Player 2 to return ( ) and the amount of money Player 2 actually 
returns ( ). Since Player 2 does not know Player 1’s expectations (the money Player 
1 expects them to return, 1st order belief), the model uses Player 2’s belief of Player 1’s 
expectation (2nd order belief, ) as a substitute input. 
The mathematical role of these parameters is described as equation (1). Player 2’s total 
utility in trial  is , which can be defined as
According to the above model, the relative weight placed on the financial payoff ( ) 
and the anticipated guilt  in the utility function is modulated by a guilt 
sensitivity parameter ( , which can vary for each Player 1 that Player 2 meets. This 
guilt sensitivity term is scaled by a free parameter, which is constrained in the range of 
( ). We hypothesise that balancing the weights of finacial income (self-
interest) and the participants’ beliefs about Player 1’s expectation (2nd order belief) 
plays a decisive role in guiding their decisions in the Trust Game. 
Choice Rule
We extended the above model to allow for stochasticity by applying to a probabilistic 
choice function. A free parameter  was used to capture the stochasticity in the action 
selection. The probability  of making a decision  was computed by placing the utility 
values for each decision into the following softmax function
in which  denotes the probability that in trial  Player 2 chooses  (with  standing for 
the maximum amount of money in that trial they could return) to return to Player 1. The 
free parameter  is used to capture the sensitivities of choice  to different utilities. If 
 = 0, choices are random, while if   = Infinity, utility is maximised.
Parameter estimation
Participant-specific best-fitting parameters  and  were estimated using nonlinear 
parameter optimisation, which where then implemented in the MATLAB fmincon 
function (Nelder & Mead, 1965) for trial-wise maximum log likelihood estimation. The 
estimation was run separately for each individual. Thus, we obtained the best fitting 
parameters  and  for each of our participants. 
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The mathematical role of these parameters is described as equation (1). 
Player 2’s total utility in trial 𝑖𝑖 is 𝑈𝑈2𝑖𝑖, which can be defined as 
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ing to the above mod l, the relative weight placed on the financial 
payoff (𝑀𝑀2) and the anticipated guilt (𝐸𝐸2𝐸𝐸1𝑆𝑆2 − 𝑆𝑆2)+ in the utility function is 
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the participants’ beliefs about Player 1’s expectation (2nd order belief) plays a 
decisive role in guiding their decisions in the Trust Game.  
Choice Rul  
We extended  above od l to allow for stochasticity by pplying to a 
probabilistic choice function. A free parameter 𝜑𝜑 was used to capture the 
stochasticity in the action selectio . The probability 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 of aking a decision 𝑖𝑖 
was comp te by pl ci the ut lity val es fo  each decision int   following 
softmax function 
   𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = e𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈2𝑖𝑖∑ e𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈2𝑖𝑖𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=0                                         (6.2) 
in which 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 denot s the probability that in trial 𝑖𝑖 Player 2 chooses 𝑘𝑘 (with 𝐾𝐾 
standing for the maximum amount of money in that trial they could return) to 
return to Player 1. The fr e parame er 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 is used to capture the sensitivities of 
hoice 𝑖𝑖 to different utilities. If 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖  0, choices are ran om, while if 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖  = 
Infinity, utility is maximised. 
Parameter esti ation 
Participant-specific be t-fitting parameters 𝜃𝜃12 and 𝜑𝜑 were estimated using 
nonlinear parameter optimisation, which where then implemented in the 
MATLAB fmincon function (Nelder & Mead, 1965) for trial-wise maximum log 
likelihood estimation. The estimation was run separately for each individual. 
Thus, we obtained the best fitting parameters 𝜃𝜃12 and 𝜑𝜑 for each of our 
participants.  
Procedure  
Participants in this study were recruited via two different rounds. During the 
first round, 141 participants (105 female, age = 22.22 ± 6.11 [Mean ± SE]) 158 
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Procedure 
Participants in this study were recruited via two different rounds. During the first round, 
141 participants (105 female, age = 22.22 ± 6.11 [Mean ± SE]) were screened using 
the PPI and SRP. Afterwards, PPI total score quartiles were used to split the participants 
into four groups. Twenty-three participants (16 female, age = 22.91 ± 1.05) from 
the two extreme (i.e. lowest and highest) quartile groups were selected to join the 
experiment. Of these, 11 participants had scored high on psychopathic traits (HPT) and 
12 had scored low on psychopathic traits (LPT). Comparing PPI scores, the HPT group 
(M=409.36, SD=48.3) had significantly higher scores than the LPT group (M =307.17, 
SD =24.3, t (21) =1.01, p<.001). During the second round, 42 participants took part in 
the experiment, irrespective of their PPI scores. Some of the participants filled out the 
PPI and SRP questionnaires online at home prior the experiment session while others 
filled out the questionnaires during the experimental session. PPI factor Z-scores were 
calculated based on the total experimental sample size. 
Participants completed the experiment in a behavioural laboratory at Radboud 
University Nijmegen (the Netherlands). Stimulus presentation and data acquisition were 
conducted using E-Prime (manufacturer) software and VisuaStim goggles (Resonance 
Technologies Inc., IL, USA). After having made sure that participants fully understood 
the instructions, participants were given the opportunity to practice several trials (not 
included in later statistical analyses). 
For the experiment proper, all participants played the role of Player 2. For the role of 
Player 1, 30 transfer amounts, along with their expectations of the returned amount, 
were taken from one of our previous experiments (Figure 6.2 (A) and (B)).  Each Player 
1 had identification number assigned to their actual facial photographs. Participants 
were informed that the set of Player 1 they would encounter were other participants 
whose data had been previously collected. For each round, they would play with one 
of the 30 different Players 1 (See timeline in Figure 6.1). Each round began by showing 
participants a picture of their partner – Player 1. Firstly, they were asked to estimate 
how much money Player 1 had invested with them. Then, participants saw the actual 
offer, and were asked how much money they thought Player 1 would expect them to 
return. Next, they decided on the amount of money (from zero to the maximum of the 
transferred money) they wanted to return. Notably, participants had the opportunity 
not to return any money. Afterwards, a summary of the outcome containing the final 
payment for that round for both players was presented on the screen. Participants were 
also then informed of the actual expectation of Player 1 for that round.
Participants made their decisions using a keyboard. Amounts in Euros changed in 10% 
increments on each key press. These increments were randomly selected to either 
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increase from €0 or decrease from the maximum amount of money for that round (which 
varied depending on offer amount by the partner). Participants pressed Key 1 to select 
the amount of money they would like to return and press Key 2 to confirm their choice. 
After participants had completed the experiment, they were sequentially shown the 
outcomes of the 30 rounds with all Player 1’s and were asked to rate their counterfactual 
guilt on a 7-point Likert scale, on which they could indicate the amount of guilt they 
believed they would have experienced if they returned a different amount of money. 
This amount was randomly selected from all choices lower than the amount they had 
returned and one choice higher than the amount they had returned (choices increased 
or decreased in 10% increments). Finally, all participants were paid a bonus based on 
their decisions in one randomly selected round. 
A B
Anne has
offered you
€ 5, which
becomes
€ 20
How much
of € 10 do 
you think 
Anne 
offered
you?
How much
do you
think Anne
expects
you to 
return?
You have
sent back
€ 1
Anne gets
€ 6
You get
€ 19
How much
do you
actually
want to
send back
to Anne?
Anne
expected
you to
return
€ 5
C D E F G H
0 sec 1.5 sec 4.5 sec 14.5 sec 17 sec 27 sec 37 sec 40 sec 43 sec
Your
partner
is Anne
Figure 6.1 The timeline of a single round of the modified Trust Game. A. Each round 
begins with a fixation cross in the middle of the screen. B. Facial pictures of Player 1 
on that round. C. Participants indicate their belief about Player 1’s investment. D. The 
actual offer from Player 1. E. Participants indicated their belief about what Player 1 had 
expected them to return. F. Participants indicated the amount of money they actually 
wanted to return. G. Payoff for both players revealed. H. The real expectation of Player 
1 on that round revealed.
Data analysis 
Statistical analyses were performed using the R statistical package (R Core Team, 2015) 
and MATLAB R2014a (MathWorks, MA). The “lme4” package was used for the mixed 
effect regression with repeated measures (Bates, et al., 2015), in which participants 
were treated as the random effect. The regression coefficients (B), standard error (SE), 
t-value, and p-value in the mixed model were reported. The p-values in the mixed effect 
model was computed in three ways, including normal approximation, Satterthwaite 
approximation using the “lmerTest” package (Kuznetsova, Bruun Brockhoff, & Haubo 
Bojesen Christensen, 2015) and Kenward-Roger approximation using the “pbkrtest” 
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package (Halekoh & Højsgaard, 2014). Consistent results were found. For questionnaire 
subscale variable selection, the “lars” package (Hastie & Efron, 2013) was used for LASSO 
(Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator) regression (Tibshirani, 1996). We 
used the “ggplot2” package for visualisation of the results (Wickham, 2009). For guilt-
aversion model parameter estimation, best-fitting parameters were generated using the 
MATLAB “fmincon” function (Nelder & Mead, 1965). We maximised the log-likelihood 
of the data under each model on the trial-wise basis.
Firstly, we explored descriptive statistics based on data from all the participants, 
irrespective of the PPI or SRP scores. Frequency of the following variables across all trials 
over all participants is shown in Figure 6.2: (A) Player 1’s Investment; (B) The percentage 
of Player 1’s investment (multiplied by 4) that they expected Player 2 to return (1st 
Order Belief, ); (C) The percentage of Player 1’s investment (multiplied by 4) that 
Player 2 believed Player 1 had expected them to return (2’s 2nd Order Belief, ); (D) 
The percentage of Player 1’s investment (multiplied by 4) that Player 2 actually decided 
to return ( ) ; Furthermore, mixed model regressions were implemented between (A) 
Player 1’s 1st Order belief and Player 2’s 2nd Order belief. Significant effects would indicate 
participants were capable of inferring other players’ expectations; (B) Player 2’s 2nd 
Order belief and the amount of money they returned. Significant effects would illustrate 
that participants’ behavioural patterns are inconsistent with the guilt aversion model to 
a certain extent. In addition, for each participant, mixed effect regression was used to 
predict the amount of counterfactual guilt reported if they returned a deviant amount of 
money. According to the guilt aversion model, the deviation from the participants’ actual 
choice and their belief of Player 2’s expectation indexed the anticipated guilt experiences. 
Thus, each participant’s best linear unbiased predictions (BLUPs) demonstrate their 
sensitivity to guilt. The group BLUP was computed based on individual scores. Larger 
slopes indicated higher guilt sensitivity.
Secondly, the total and subscale scores of PPI and SRP based on a sample size of 63 
were computed and are depicted in Table 6.1. To understand the relationships between 
the psychopathic traits as well as the participants’ behaviours, Pearson correlations were 
computed between the global indexes of PPI/SRP scores (the total as well as the two 
main factor scores) and participants’ behavioural responses (Table 6.2, Figure 6.4). The 
significance of the Pearson correlations was tested with a bootstrapping procedure to 
determine the 95% confidence interval (CI). 
Thirdly, we further explored the guilt-aversion model (Equation 6.1). Participants’ 
choice tendencies were investigated by fitting the data to the guilt-aversion model. The 
free parameter of guilt sensitivity for each participant was produced using maximum 
likelihood estimation. Afterwards, Pearson correlation was used to find the relationship 
between the two estimated free parameters, the participants’ behavioural responses 
E2E1S2
E1S2
S2
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(counterfactual guilt and amount of money actually returned), and the PPI total and 
main factor scores. 
To address our research question, we conducted formal variable selection using LASSO 
regularized categorical linear in R. Cross-validation was performed to estimate the 
prediction error of the model. The optimal LASSO regression model (with minimum 
predicted error) was used to search for possible predictors (PPI/SRP subscales) of those 
psychopathic traits that are better at explaining the variance in the three indexes. The 
LASSO approach aims to find the optimal prediction model by shrinking the standardised 
sum of the model coefficients of each variable by adding penalty terms to the model 
(Tibshirani, 1996). The generated optimal model contains an independent contribution 
from each variable, and has the lowest prediction error and highest prediction accuracy 
based on the data. The minimum of the standardised sum of squares of the regularisation 
was set at 0.0 and the maximum was set at 1.0. Compared to the traditional stepwise 
regression analysis, LASSO showed superior performance in selecting variables by 
overcoming the limitation reaching the best-predicted model with a set of predictors 
could not be guaranteed. Moreover, the LASSO regression graphs have the advantage of 
clearly showing the unstable coefficients over the pathway and can quickly be computed 
thanks to the piecewise linear path for each variable (Hartmann, Van der Kooij, & 
Zeeck, 2009; Yuan & Lin, 2006). Following variable selection, Pearson correlations were 
calculated between the selected variables (subscales) in each optimal model and the 
corresponding index. 
Results
General Descriptive Results 
On average across all trials, Player 1 invested 48.3% (SD=28.7%) of their endowment 
(Figure 6.2A) and their expectation (Player 1’s 1st order belief) was that Player 2 would 
return is 39% of the final transferred amount (SD = 17%) (Figure 6.2B). We define Total 
Investment as the amount Player 1 transferred in each trial, multiplied by 4. Player 2 
believed that Player 1 expected them to return on average 44% (SD = 17%) of the Total 
Investment (Figure 6.2C). The average percentage of the Total Investment that Player 2 
actually decided to return was 35.99% (SD = 17.99%) (Figure 6.2D). 
Mixed Effects Regression results
Mixed effects regression results indicated that participants in the role of Player 2 could 
accurately predict Player 1’s expectations (1st Order belief) (B = 0.70, SE = 0.02, t = 
37.80, p < 0.001) (Figure 6.3A). In addition, Players 2 then used their predicted Player 
1’s expectation (2nd Order Belief) to guide their decisions, in that they typically returned 
the amount of money that they believed Player 1 expected them to return (B = 0.87, 
SE = 0.02, t = 42.02, p <0.001) (Figure 6.3B). Furthermore, participants reported that 
they would experience more counterfactual guilt if they had returned less money than 
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they actually did (B = 0.23, SE = 0.02, t = 15.5, p< 0.001) (Figure 6.3C). Taken together, 
these results replicate previous findings, supporting the guilt aversion model (Chang, et 
al., 2011a).
Figure 6.2 Descriptive Behavioural Results
(A) Histogram of Player 1’s Investment across all trials (M = 48.3%, SD = 28.7%)
(B) Histogram of the percentage of their investment (multiplied by 4) that Player 
1 expects Player 2 to return (Player 1’s 1st Order Belief) (M = 39%, SD = 17%)
(C) Histogram of the percentage of the transferred amount (multiplied by 4) that 
Player 2 believes Player 1 expects them to return (Player 2’s 2nd Order Belief) 
(M = 44%, SD = 17%)
(D) The percentage of the transferred amount that Player 2 decides to return (M = 
35.99%, SD =17.99%)
(A)                                                                           (B)
(C)                                                                           (D)
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Figure 6.3 Correlation Behavioural Results
(A) Player 1’s 1st Order Belief ( ) by Player 2’s 2nd Order Belief ( ).
(B) The amount returned by the Trustee (Player 2) ( ) by their 2nd Order Belief 
(C) Player 2’s self-reported counterfactual guilt (the amount of guilt they would 
have felt had they returned less money) by the difference between their 
hypothetical choices from their actual behaviours. The dotted lines represent 
participants’ best linear unbiased prediction (BLUPs).
(A)                                                                           (B)
(C)
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Correlation between the PPI / SRP and the behavioural responses
To examine the relationship between decision-making and individual difference measures, 
we computed the correlation coefficients, and corresponding bootstrapped confidence 
intervals, between participants’ PPI and SRP scores (total, as well as the two main 
factors) and participants’ behavioural responses in the Trust Game (Table 2). Significant 
negative correlations were found between participants’ self-reported counterfactual 
guilt and their PPI total scores (r = -0.33, p < .01, 95% CI from -0.53 to -0.09), their PPI 
Factor 1 scores (r = -0.25, p <.05, 95% CI from -0.46 to -0.04), and their PPI Factor 2 
scores (r = -0.29, p < .05, 95% CI from -0.52 to -0.04). This indicates that individuals 
who scored higher on psychopathic traits reported feeling less counterfactual guilt if 
they had returned less money to Player 1. Furthermore, individuals with higher scores 
in the PPI total and PPI Factor 1 actually returned less money to Player 1 (PPI-Total: r = 
-0.33, p < .01, 95% CI from -0.43 to -0.01, PPI-I: r = -0.29, p<.01, 95% CI from -0.42 to 
-0.13, respectively). We found no significant correlations between the SRP scores and 
participants’ behavioural responses. Therefore, in subsequent analyses of psychopathic 
traits, the PPI scores were used. No significant correlation was found between the PPI/
SRP scores and Player 2’s beliefs about the Player 1’s investment amount and Player 1’s 
expectation.
Table 6.2 | Correlation coefficients and confidence intervals between PPI / SRP scores 
and behavioural responses (r values, [confidence intervals])
PPI SRP
Total Factor I Factor 2 Total Factor 1 Factor 2
CFGuilt   -0.33 **
 [-0.53, -0.09]
-0.25*
 [-0.46, -0.04]
-0.29*
 [-0.52, -0.04]
-0.15
 [-0.31, 0.33]
-0.18
 [-0.44, 0.13]
-0.09
 [-0.22, 0.31]
PredInvest 
(%)
-0.08
[-0.31, 015]
-0.13
[-0.35, 0.09]
-0.01
[-0.25, 0.22]
0.11
[-0.14, 0.36]
0.03
[-0.18, 0.26]
-0.03
[-0.23,0.19]
PredReturn 
(%)
0.11
[-0.08, 0.30]
0.02
[-0.17, 0.21]
0.11
[-0.12, 0.31]
0.09
[-0.15, 0.31]
0.14
[-0.07, 0.36]
0.16
[-0.06, 0.39]
P2Retrun (%) -0.22*
[-0.43, -0.01]
-0.29**
 [-0.42,-0.13]
-0.11
 [-0.40, 0.13]
0.03
 [-0.31, 0.31]
0.04
 [-0.25, 0.29]
0.01
 [-0.20, 0.27]
Note: r indicates the correlation coefficients. The corresponding bootstrapped confidence 
intervals are shown in the square brackets below the r value. * p < .05 level (2-tailed), 
** p < .01 level (2-tailed). CFGuil: participants’ self-reported amount of counterfactual 
guilt they would have felt had they returned less money. PredInvest (%): the percentage 
of Player 1’s investment (multiplied by 4) that Player 2 believes Player 1 expects them to 
return. PredRetrun (%): the percentage of Player 1’s investment (multiplied by 4) that 
Player 2 believes the Player 1 expects them to return. P2Return (%): the percentage of 
Player 1’s investment (multiplied by 4) that Player 2 actually decides to return. 
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                                          (A)                                                                          (B)
 Figure 6.4 Pearson correlation between scores on PPI/SRP and behaviours 
(A) Scatter plot for Pearson correlations between total PPI score and participants’ 
reported counterfactual guilt
(B) Scatter plot for Pearson correlations between PPI Factor 1 score and the 
percentage of the total investment that Player 2 returned
Modelling behaviour
Next, we tested whether the guilt-aversion model can predict participants’ decisions. 
Our aim here was to fit the behavioural data to the guilt-aversion model and derive 
model parameters to indicate individuals’ guilt sensitivities. 
In the guilt aversion model (Equation 6.1), the total utility is comprised of both the 
participants’ income ( ) and the weighted anticipation of guilt . 
The  (guilt sensitivity) parameter quantifies how much a particular participant cares 
about his partner’s expectations. In other words, it represents how sensitive they are to 
the experience of guilt if they let their partner down. For example, if   = 0, they are 
completely self-interested, demonstrating insensitivity to guilt; while if   = 1, they are 
very sensitive to anticipated guilt. The model of guilt sensitivity integrated a stochastic 
of the choice sensitivity parameter , in which both parameters were estimated using 
maximum likelihood estimation. 
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First, we examined initial descriptive statistics of the two parameters across all 
participants. The mean of parameter  is 0.43 (SD = 0.17, range = [0.13, 0.91]) and 
the mean of  is 19.59 (SD =19.93, range = [4.47, 104.11]). Since is constrained 
from 0 to 1, the estimated range of parameter  covers almost all of the range, 
indicating its sensitivity to capturing the individual differences in guilt. Since the PPI total 
score of our sample is a Gaussian distribution,  captures the individual differences in 
guilt sensitivity and the psychopathic traits in our experimental sample. As an additional 
check, we confirmed this by comparing it to a reduced parameter model, in which we 
fixed  at the average or fixed  at the average. We found a better likelihood ratio in 
our first model compared to the reduced models.
Pearson correlation between free parameters, behaviour and PPI scores
To examine the relationships between the variables, Pearson correlations between the 
two free parameters and behavioural responses (counterfactual guilt, the percentage 
of the Total Amount actual returned) as well as PPI (total and two main factors) scores 
were computed (Table 6.3).
Interestingly, a significant positive relationship was detected between the parameter 
 and the amount of counterfactual guilt (r = 0.38, p <.01, 95% CI from 0.15 to 
0.57) as well as between  and the percentage of Total Amount actual returned (r 
= 0.72, p <.01, 95% CI from 0.58 to 0.82). This suggests that individuals who are more 
likely to report counterfactual guilt actually return more in the task and had higher guilt 
sensitivity parameter estimates. Furthermore, the parameter  was significantly 
negatively correlated with the PPI total score (r = 0.28, p <.05, 95% CI from -0.49 to 
-0.03), illustrating that individuals with higher psychopathic traits were less sensitive to 
guilt. The PPI Factor 1 (p = 0.08) and Factor 2 (p = 0.07) also have a marginal negative 
relationship with parameter . We did not find any correlation effects between the 
two parameters and SRP.  For the parameter of , we only find a significant positive 
relationship with the counterfactual guilt (r = 0.27, p <.05, 95% CI from 0.02 to 0.48).
Variable selection  
One of our most important research questions was to examine which psychopathic 
traits, in particular, were associated with both participants’ reciprocal behaviour as well 
as their individual guilt sensitivity. The estimated guilt sensitivity parameter  for 
each participant as well as their self-reported counterfactual guilt was used to index guilt 
sensitivity, whereas reciprocal behaviour was defined by the average percentage that the 
participants returned. A LASSO regression optimal model was performed separately for 
each index to find the best predictors of the PPI subscales (Figure 6.5). The shrinkage of 
the standardised sum of coefficients in each step pushes the coefficients approaching 0 
until the model is optimised, indicated by the vertical dashed line in the figures.
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Using this approach, Machiavellian Egocentricity and Social Potency werethe largest 
contributors to counterfactual guilt, compared to other PPI sub-factors. In addition, 
the optimal model finds the PPI sub-factor Fearlesness as a predictor for the average 
percentage returned, and Machiavellian Egocentricity and Fearlessness were indicated 
as predictors for parameter .
Table 6.3 | Correlation coefficients and confidence intervals between free parameters 
and behaviours and PPI (r values [confidence intervals]
Behaviours PPI
CFGuilt P2Return (%) Total Factor 1 Factor2
0.38**
[0.15, 0.57]
0.72**
[0.58, 0.82]
-0.28*
[-0.49, 
-0.03]
-0.22
[-0.44, 0.02]
-0.23 
[-0.45, 0.02]
0.27*
[0.02, 0.48]
0.06
[-0.19, 0.30]
-0.22
[-0.44, 0.33]
-0.14
[-0.37, 0.31]
-0.19
[-0.41, 0.09]
Note: r indicates the correlation coefficients. The corresponding bootstrapped confidence intervals are shown 
in the square brackets below the r value. *p <.05 level (2-tailed), **p <.01 level (2-tailed). CFGuil: participants’ 
self-reported the amount of counterfactual guilt they would have felt had they returned less money. P2Return 
(%): the percentage of Player 1’s investment (multiplied by 4) that Player 2 actually decides to return.
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Figure 6.5 Variable selection procedures for (A) Counterfactual guilt, (B) Player 2’s 
Return, and (C) the guilt sensitivity free parameter(
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Discussion
Main findings
The present study aimed to quantify the degree to which trait psychopathic individuals 
are sensitive to the anticipation of guilt based on their knowledge of the social expectation 
of others. We also aimed to provide evidence for specific personality traits related to 
psychopathy, especially those related to emotional deficits in terms of decision-making in 
social settings (e.g., reciprocal decisions in the Trust Game). To achieve this, a modified 
Trust Game combined with a guilt-aversion model was utilized, in which both the best 
fit guilt sensitivity parameter - estimated by the computational model on individual level 
- and participant’s self-reported counterfactual guilt were used to index the sensitivity 
to guilt. Additionally, the amount of money (the percentage of the total investment) 
participants returned to the investor was used to index their reciprocal behaviour. 
Further, in order to explore the key psychopathic traits that correspond to these 
interpersonal decisions, a formal variable selection was applied to identify the specific 
trait(s) that would best account for the discovered abnormities related to personality 
traits in psychopathy.
Descriptive results showed that, on average, participants (as Player 2) believed that Player 
1 expected them to return 44% of the Total Investment, and the average percentage 
participants decided to return was 35.99%, replicating the findings of a previous study 
(Chang, et al., 2011b). In terms of the first research question, our results indicate that 
participants were capable of accurately predicting the amount that Player 1 had expected 
them to return. More interestingly, participants’ belief of Player 1’s expectation (i.e., 
2nd Order Belief) forecasted the amount of money they decided to return, indicating 
that they used this knowledge to guide their reciprocal decisions in the Trust Game. In 
addition, the average BLUP of all of the participants indicated that participants reported 
a higher amount of counterfactual guilt if they had returned less money than the other 
expected them to. These results support the guilt-aversion model. 
To address our second research question, trial-wise behavioural data was fitted to the 
guilt-aversion model in order to find the best-predicted guilt sensitivity parameter  
for each participant. Interestingly, the parameter  showed a negative relation with 
the PPI total score, but positive relations with participants’ self-reported counterfactual 
guilt and the percentage of Total Amount they decided to return. Besides, participants’ 
self-reported counterfactual guilt consistently showed a negative relationship with the 
PPI (total and two main factors) scores, which formed, in another sense, the mutual 
corroboration. 
With regard to the third research question, reciprocity behaviour, indexed by the 
percentage of the total investment that participants actually returned, negatively 
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correlated with participants’ PPI total scores and PPI-I scores. Finally, a formal variable 
selection procedure was performed to probe the key psychopathic traits that are closely 
related to manifestations of attenuated sensitivity to anticipated guilt emotion as well 
as diminished trustworthiness behaviours. These traits turned out to be Machiavellian 
Egocentricity and Fearlessness respectively. Additional correlations between the selected 
variables and indexes showed negative relationships with each other.
Our experimental findings support the hypothesis that individuals scoring higher on 
psychopathic personality traits do possess accurate knowledge about others’ social 
expectations, information that could be used to appropriately guide normative social 
behaviours. However, the demonstrably diminished reciprocal behaviours among 
these individuals indicate that they do not appear to apply this knowledge, which may 
result from attenuated sensitivity to guilt. Moreover, Machiavellian Egocentricity and 
Fearlessness appear to be the key traits most valuable in interpreting these deficits. 
One puzzling question for researchers in this area is whether psychopathic personality 
trait individuals are equipped with the ability to acquire knowledge of social 
expectations from others or societies. Previous studies have asked participants about 
the appropriateness of a given choice in a moral dilemma situation (Gao & Tang, 2013; 
Koenigs, Young, Adolphs, Tranel, & Cushman, 2007), and based on evidence from 
these studies in which psychopathic individuals show more ‘Utilitarian’ moral decisions 
one possibility is that they are simply not capable of accessing information that allows 
them to tell right from wrong. However, the present study provides evidence that high 
psychopathic trait individuals are certainly able to obtain information that can help 
them to distinguish morally appropriate social behaviours from morally inappropriate 
behaviours. Participants’ could accurately predict the expectation of their partner here, 
that is, they appeared to have good knowledge of what the other player wanted in 
return for their trust decision, indicating that they accurately can use their 2nd Order 
Belief to guide their interpersonal decisions. Importantly, this result holds across the 
range of PPI scores, and is not driven by those participants who score low on trait 
psychopathy. No relationship was found between psychopathic traits (i.e., PPI scores) 
and the accuracy of the aforementioned predictions. This converges with other evidence 
indicating spared aspects of social inferencing, such as a recent Ultimatum Game study 
in which participants were presented with offers from a partner that were either 
intentionally or unintentionally unfair. Psychopaths exhibited rejection rates similar to 
that of healthy individuals (Radke, Brazil, Scheper, & Bulten, 2013). This result indicated 
that psychopaths do have the ability to access the interpersonal knowledge of others’ 
intentions, consistent with our viewpoint that they are not defective in understanding 
social intentions or expectations.
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Given this apparently largely intact social knowledge about the expectations of others, 
what therefore could be the reason behind the reduced reciprocity behaviour of 
individuals higher in psychopathic traits in our task? Based on our results, we suggest 
that high psychopathic trait individuals have the ability to understand the social 
expectations, but do not incorporate this information appropriately in social decision-
making. A similar point has been made in studies examining how psychopathy is related 
to the use of information to adapt behaviour (brazil ea 2009; von borries ea 2010; brazil 
et al 2013 in JPN). We venture that this is primarily because they are relatively unaffected 
by social emotions, due to deficits in emotion generation and/or processing. Specifically, 
we propose that high psychopathic trait individuals show less reciprocal decision-making 
due to diminished guilt sensitivity, a motivation that often leads to not disappointing 
others in social interactions. Moral emotions, as defined by Haidt (2003), are those “that 
are linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of a person 
other than the judge or agent”. One review has also suggested that the link between 
moral standards and moral decisions is affected by moral emotions in an important way 
(Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). A person with intact self-conscious moral emotions 
would feel emotions such as shame, guilt, and embarrassment when they disappoint 
others. Importantly, people are capable of anticipating their emotional responses if 
they would choose a different choice. As such, self-conscious moral emotions, like guilt, 
can have an effect on moral/social choice and behaviour through delivering feedback 
comparing anticipated behaviour to actual behaviour (Tangney, 1990). 
In our study, two separate means were used to measure participants’ guilt sensitivity. 
The first was a more general self-reported counterfactual guilt measure; the other was 
the best-predicted guilt sensitivity parameter for each participant, obtained through a 
computational modelling approach. Across both measures, we found that the higher 
people scored on PPI total scores, the lower their guilt sensitivity. These results further 
supported our hypothesis that an attenuated sensitivity to moral emotion (guilt) among 
high psychopathic individuals is related to an indifference to others’ welfare and profit, 
and leads them to ignore common social norms. High psychopathic trait individuals 
made fewer reciprocal decisions in our experiment, even though they did appear to have 
adequate social information to make more ‘correct’ choices. 
The evidence from the present study can be integrated well with previous findings. 
Firstly, it has been established previously that the emotional deficits observed in the 
psychopathic population are related to a decreased sensitivity, or weakened response, 
to the properties of stimuli that are central to emotion perception, processing, and 
interpretation. For example, many studies have found diminished physiological reactions 
to negative emotional stimuli (e.g. fearful and angry faces) among psychopathic 
offenders during passive observation, compared to nonpsychopathic controls (Decety, 
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Skelly, Yoder, & Kiehl, 2014; Glenn, Iyer, Graham, Koleva, & Haidt, 2009). Moreover, 
it has been suggested that abnormal emotional processing in psychopathic individuals 
plays an essential role in their lack of empathy (Decety, Skelly, & Kiehl, 2013), and can 
lead to non-normative social behaviours (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 
2004; Smith, Amiot, Vohs, & Decety, 2014). Secondly, patients with vmPFC damage, 
a brain region crucial for social emotion generation and processing, demonstrated 
more ‘rational’ utilitarian choices in a moral dilemma task, which indicates that emotion 
generation is important for moral/social decisions (Koenigs, et al., 2007). Koenigs 
and colleagues have compared the social judgments of vmPFC patients with those of 
psychopathic individuals and found that psychopathic individuals respond quantitatively 
similarly to patients when playing as responders in Ultimatum and Dictator Games 
(Koenigs, et al., 2010). These results are in line with our view that the decreased guilt 
sensitivity and empathic concern of psychopathic individuals as well as the deficits in 
their emotional generation and processing may be leading to their differences in moral/
social behaviours.
A final question of interest was to what extent participants’ guilt sensitivity and 
trustworthiness behaviours are related to different personality traits. Interestingly, 
Machiavellian Egocentricity was a stable trait selected from the three indexes, 
predicting both guilt sensitivity and trustworthiness behaviours. As defined in the PPI, 
Machiavellian Egocentricity encompasses a tendency to consider only personal needs 
(Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996). Specifically, Machiavellian Egocentricity has two apparent 
behavioral features, one of which is self-interest, and the other being indifference to 
others’ needs, welfare, and feelings. The former was found to be negatively associated 
here with the trustworthiness behaviours, in terms of fewer reciprocal decisions in the 
Trust Game, while the latter corresponded to individuals’ attenuated guilt sensitivity, as 
demonstrated by self-reported counterfactual guilt and the guilt sensitivity parameter. 
Previously, researchers have found deficits in affective components of empathy among 
psychopaths (Loftus & Glenwick, 2001; Mullins-Nelson, Salekin, & Leistico, 2006). 
Moreover, individuals with a stronger tendency toward Machiavellian Egocentricity were 
perceived to be less trustworthy (Gordon & Platek, 2009; Gunnthorsdottir, et al., 2002). 
Our results support this notion by exploring the mechanism underlying their reduced 
reciprocity behavior, namely diminished guilt sensitivity among those individuals with 
higher psychopathic traits.
Research on psychopathic behaviours has examined diverse samples. Some studies have 
used a clinical or incarcerated population, which has been more focussed on potential 
clinical implications and interventions (Levenston, Patrick, & Bradley, 2000). Others 
have been more interested in the continuous range of variations in psychopathic traits 
in a non-clinical population (Gao & Tang, 2013). The present study took the latter 
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approach, focussing on healthy adults for the purpose of recruiting a larger sample, 
which we believe allows us to better illustrate the latent structure of psychopathy, and to 
better understand psychopathic traits as continuous characteristics by using continuous 
rather than discrete categorical quantitative statistics (Gordon, Baird, & End, 2004; 
Hare, 1999). Moreover, by using this approach, we can clearly elucidate the distinction 
between individual differences and abnormality (Lilienfeld, Fowler, & Patrick, 2006), 
and avoid the confounding variables that often co-occur with the use of strictly clinical 
samples (Gao, Baker, Raine, Wu, & Bezdjian, 2009). 
Conclusion
The present study showed that individuals high on psychopathic traits have knowledge 
about the social expectations of others, but that they fail to apply this information in 
a direct interaction with economic game partners, demonstrating more selfish, less-
reciprocal, decision-making. Additionally, we find evidence that psychopathic personality 
traits, especially Machiavellian Egocentricity, are related to individuals’ attenuated guilt 
sensitivity. Psychopathy is a question not only of academic interest, but is also of great 
importance for government institutions, the legal system, and the educational system. 
From this standpoint, the current - exciting - findings made using psychological and 
computational modelling approaches may have significant implications for the daily life 
of the affected individuals, and might even help them steer their behaviour in a socially 
more desirable direction.
CHAPTER 7
General Discussion
7
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In this thesis, a line of five empirical studies has aimed to investigate the underlying 
psychological processes and associated neural mechanisms of human decision-making 
in social interactions. To achieve this goal, I addressed my research question in three 
different ways. Firstly, I aimed to understand how social factors, such as social rank, self-
other comparison context, and social reputation might affect decision-making in social 
interactions (Aim 1). Secondly, I endeavoured to understand human social decision-
making in a framework of social norm and norm violation processing (Aim 2). In the third 
part of this thesis, I applied game theory paradigms and a computational approach to 
elucidate the behavioural and pathological mechanisms of psychopathic trait individuals 
(Aim 3). In this concluding chapter, I will first summarise the main results reported in 
this thesis and then discuss these findings in relation to previous findings about decision-
making in social interactions, and will end with a final conclusion. 
Main findings
Chapter 2 described the demonstrable behavioural effects of social rank – resulting from 
comparing one’s own performance to that of others - on cooperative decision-making in 
a Public Goods Game. As shown in our results, individuals tend to be more cooperative 
when ranked higher than when ranked lower, regardless of whether the other ranked 
partners were relevant or not to the cooperative decision. This effect was stronger in 
individuals who had higher social comparison orientation scores. 
 
In Chapter 3, I extended the paradigm used in Chapter 2 by adding a self-comparison 
context, the addition of which – in contrast to an interpersonal comparison context - 
allowed me to further explore the behavioural and neural effects of different types of 
comparison context on subsequent cooperative decision-making. The behavioural results 
showed that individuals made increasingly cooperative decisions when their performance 
was ranked higher in a previous cognitive task, particularly in an interpersonal context. 
Furthermore, the neuroimaging results indicated that downward social comparison 
processes (i.e. when one’s own performance is better than that of others) were associated 
with reward processing in the striatum, and that the TPJ, PCC, mPFC are selectively 
activated when making the decisions to cooperate in an interpersonal context compared 
to a self-relevant context.
In Chapter 4, I was interested how people cooperate with others who have a social 
reputation of prior reciprocity, in both gain-sharing and loss-sharing situations. Results 
revealed that cooperative decisions are largely dependent on a partner’s prior reciprocity 
history, meaning that people are more inclined to cooperate with higher reciprocal 
partners than with lower ones, especially in the gain-sharing context. The neuroimaging 
results indicated that bilateral striatum is associated with making cooperative decisions 
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with higher reciprocity partners as compared to lower ones in the gain-sharing context. 
Moreover, cooperative decision-making is also correlated with brain activation in the 
prefrontal cortex. 
In addition to exploring the influence of social factors in Part 1, I also endeavored to 
investigate decision-making impacted by social norm and norm violation. In Chapter 5, I 
used promise and neutral messages and created promise-keeping and promise-breaking 
conditions in order to examine how individuals’ trust decision-making is influenced by 
non-binding commitment messages, and also to examine reactions when promises are 
broken and trust is abused. Non-enforceable promise messages enhanced trust more than 
did neutral messages. A partner breaking his or her promise suffered greater intensified 
punishment, both in terms of frequency of punishment and the amount of tokens 
spent to punish. In terms of neural activation, the processing of promise messages was 
associated with the vmPFC and dlPFC, whereas trust decisions were positively correlated 
with activation in the TPJ, MTG and IFG. Moreover, the right insula was activated when 
a promiser abused one’s trust as compared to when a neutral message deliverer did. 
This could potentially have motivated the subsequent costly punishment decisions made 
toward the promiser, which are in turn associated with the dorsal ACC and midbrain.
In Chapter 6, I aimed to apply a novel computational model of reciprocity in order to 
investigate trustworthiness and guilt sensitivity in adults with psychopathic traits. 
Results here demonstrated that individuals’ self-reported beliefs about their partners’ 
expectations largely predicted the amount of money they actually returned, and that 
these reciprocal decisions were negatively correlated with psychopathic traits scores. 
The guilt sensitivity parameter obtained from the guilt-aversion model and the degree 
of self-reported counterfactual guilt were negatively correlated with psychopathic trait 
scores. These results indicated that higher psychopathic traits individuals were well 
capable of understanding other’s expectation, but simply did not utilise this knowledge 
when making trustworthiness decisions in social interactions, possibly because of their 
diminished sensitivity to guilt.
Discussion
The results described in this thesis provide a substantial amount of empirical evidence 
from a variety of perspectives, which can be efficiently integrated into the current 
research field aimed at understanding the psychological process and neural mechanisms 
underlying human decision-making in social interactions. 
First of all, we have shown that decision-making in social interactions is influenced by 
many social factors, which further demonstrates that the classical rigid economic models 
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– which assume that humans are largely rational decision-makers – is not suitable for 
assessing real-life choices. Specifically, the results shown in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 
illustrate that social rank and interpersonal comparison processes affect an individual’s 
willingness to cooperate with others. In addition, individuals are shown to vary in their 
cooperative decisions towards their partners, depending on these partners’ reputation 
for being likely (or not) to reciprocate.
Secondly, social norms, and the reactions to norm violations, provide an excellent 
opportunity to explore the deep motivations and mechanisms guiding our decisions 
in social interactions. By manipulating a fundamental social norm – making good on 
your promise, a norm valued highly – we discovered that individuals’ trust was affected 
by non-binding commitments (promises) and increased the desire to punish, even at a 
personal cost, when a partner turns out to break his or her promise. 
Thirdly, we applied game theory paradigms and a computational approach to our 
research in order to provide a novel angle to understand the aberrant social behaviours 
and pathological mechanisms of the psychopathic population. We estimated each 
individual’s guilt sensitivity parameter by fitting the data to a guilt-aversion model. By 
correlating the guilt sensitivity parameters and the self-reported counterfactual guilt 
scores, our results revealed that individuals scoring high on psychopathic traits display 
fewer trustworthiness behaviours, and that this may be is related to a diminished 
sensitivity to guilt rather than to a – commonly assumed – lack of understanding of 
social norms.
This thesis provides empirical evidence to help gain insight into human decision-
making behaviours in social interactions, and also sheds light on the underlying neural 
mechanisms of interactive decision-making. Based on the neuroimaging results, I 
suggest that decision-making in social interactions are potentially associated with the 
following neural processes: reward processing, cognitive control processing, theory of 
mind processing, and affective processing. I will discuss these mechanisms in detail in 
the following sections.
Striatum encodes the reward processing of other-regarding preferences in 
decision-making in social interactions
In this thesis, neuroimaging results have shown neural activation of the striatum, which 
is assumed to be involved in the neural reward circuitry. For example,  downward 
interpersonal comparison (i.e. when one’s own performance is better than that of 
others) increases activation in the bilateral striatum as compared to upward interpersonal 
comparison process, a finding which we interpreted to be the potential mechanism of 
promoting cooperative decisions in a Public Goods Game (Chapter 3). Moreover, the 
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decision to cooperate with high reciprocity partners as compared to low reciprocity 
partners increases the activation in the bilateral striatum (Chapter 4). Furthermore, 
punishment decisions toward a promise breaker (i.e. a social norm violator) activated 
the midbrain, which is a region that is thought to project the reward signal to the 
striatum (Chapter 5). These results potentially indicate that cooperative decisions, as 
well as decisions to punish non-cooperators, are rewarding in the brain, which indirectly 
supports the individual’s other-regarding social preferences. 
Unlike the classical economic models mentioned earlier, the field of neuroeconomics 
takes beliefs, emotions, and social influential factors into consideration while evaluating 
individuals’ decision-making in social interactions. Decision utility, therefore, is comprised 
of self-interest as well as other potential social motivations (such as inequity aversion, 
guilt aversion, warm-glow etc.) (Kahneman, 1994). Thus, one crucial question in the field 
of neuroeconomics is that of how the brain formulates the decisions in social interactions 
while juggling both self-interest and social motives (or other-regarding preferences). 
According to the existing literature, the processing of social motivations is associated 
with activation in the striatum, VTA (ventral tegmental area) and OFC (orbital frontal 
cortex), regions that are involved in the reward processing system. Examples of this 
type of decisions are charitable donations (Harbaugh, et al., 2007; Moll, et al., 2006b), 
mutual cooperation (Rilling, et al., 2002b; Rilling, Sanfey, Aronson, & Nystrom, 2004), 
reciprocating trust (Delgado, et al., 2005), and punishing non-cooperators or unfair offer 
providers (de Quervain, et al., 2004a; Singer, et al., 2006). Our results support this the 
previous literature, and together these findings can be integrated into a more complete 
understanding of the role of reward processing of other-regarding preferences during 
interpersonal decision-making (Fehr & Camerer, 2007a). Also, the reward learning 
perspective potentially provides an explanation for why prosocial behaviours (social 
motives) have been resilient enough to withstand the current societies’ competitive 
approach.
Prefrontal cortex is essential for value computation and cognitive control 
processing in social decision-making 
Given the social motives discussed above, the brain process during social decisions likely 
vacillates between self-interest and other-regarding preferences. Thus, it is not difficult 
to understand that cognitive control and value computation processing are potentially 
involved in making these selections. In this thesis, the neuroimaging results support this 
viewpoint, and demonstrate that cooperative decisions are positively correlated with 
activation in a brain region located in the prefrontal cortex (particularly, the rostral ACC 
extending to the vmPFC, BA 10/11/32) (Chapter 4). Moreover, processing of promise 
messages compared to neutral messages activated the dlPFC (BA 9) and rACC/vmPFC. 
Furthermore, the dorsal ACC (dACC) also increased in activation when making the 
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decision to punish a promise-breaker as compared to when deciding to punish a neutral 
message deliverer. The current results contribute to extending our understanding of the 
functional role of prefrontal cortex in decision-making in the following two ways. 
Firstly, the cognitive function of the region in BA 10/11/32 (vmPFC/ rACC) during 
decision-making is becoming more and more clear. The region of vmPFC (BA 10/11) 
was traditionally thought to be involved in affective processing (Beauregard, Levesque, 
& Bourgouin, 2001; Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002; Phan, et al., 2005), emotion 
regulation, and emotional control. In addition, damage to this region was consistently 
reported to be related to emotional deficits, such as blunted affect, and being short-
tempered and irritable (Anderson, Barrash, Bechara, & Tranel, 2006). Additionally, 
it is commonly acknowledged that the ACC is broadly involved in conflict monitoring 
and cognitive control (Botvinick, et al., 2004) in a variety of tasks, such as stop-signal, 
stroop, go-nogo, task-switching etc. However, very few study have tried to integrate 
the cognitive role of the regions of vmPFC and the affective role of rACC, both being 
involved in the computing of values. By using an economic game, one study revealed 
that the rejection of unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game (UG) activated the ACC, and 
the author interpreted the ACC to be involved in the cognitive-affective that arises when 
making the decision to reject at a personal cost (Sanfey, et al., 2003a). Another study 
compared UG-rejection decisions in patients with brain lesions in vmPFC with those of 
normal participants and showed that patients with vmPFC damage had higher rejection 
rates in the UG (Koenigs & Tranel, 2007), which indicated that the vmPFC played a 
crucial role in emotional regulation when being treated unfairly. However, none of these 
studies took the value computation (a costs-benefits computation, more specifically a 
value competition process inside the brain between the self-interests and social values 
from social motives) into account. I propose that the intersection of this region (BA 
10/11/32) may play a vital role in value computation, balancing decision utility between 
self-interest and social preference. Neuroimaging results showed that activity in the 
vmPFC/rACC was positively correlated with cooperative decision-making (Chapter 4), 
and that this region was also identified as crucial for the processing of promise messages 
(Chapter 5). Prior literature has found the same regions (BA 10/11/32) to be active 
while individuals are making charitable donations with costs as compared to no costs 
(Moll, et al., 2006a), further supporting my viewpoint that activation in this region 
might represent a trade-off between self-interests and social motives.
Secondly, dlPFC and dACC (BA 24) functions are very important in the processing of 
cognitive control. In our empirical studies, we found the dlPFC to be related to processing 
promises in contrast to processing neutral messages. The dACC was identified to be 
active while making punishment decisions toward promise-breakers when compared to 
doing the same toward a neutral message provider. The ACC and dlPFC (BA, 9/46) are 
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consistently reported in relation to implementing the cognitive control (MacDonald, et 
al., 2000). Within neuroeconomics, dlPFC is known to be involved in top-down control 
of one’s self-interests when these compete with social motives (Fehr & Camerer, 2007a; 
Sanfey, 2007). For example, it was suggested in an fMRI study that the dlPFC plays a role 
in controlling the emotional impulse to unfair offers in the UG (Sanfey, et al., 2003a). 
Moreover, stimulation of the right dlPFC using TMS increased the acceptance rate of unfair 
offers in UG as compared to a placebo stimulation (Knoch, et al., 2006). Interestingly, 
in contrast with Sanfey’s interpretation on dlPFC, which has focused on control of 
emotional arousal, this study has shown that the dlPFC is also involved in the control of 
self-interest by accepting more unfair offers in the UG. However, both studies suggest 
that the region (i.e. dlPFC) plays a role in cognitive control processing while making 
decisions in social interactions. Furthermore, a recent study using tDCS stimulation of the 
rLPFC found modified social norm compliance behaviours in the voluntary and sanction-
based conditions relatively, which also suggested a controlling role for the LPFC (Ruff, 
et al., 2013). In this thesis, I identified activation of dlPFC while individuals’ processed 
promise messages (Chapter 5). Results showed that individuals sent more tokens to 
the promisers., suggsting that trust decisions may be related to inhibiting self-interest. 
Several lines of evidence have demonstrated that the dACC (BA 24/32) is involved in 
the processing of physical and social pain (Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004), for instance, 
social exclusion from a peer group (Eisenberger, et al., 2003), anxious social attachment 
(DeWall, et al., 2012), and interpersonal sensitivity (Eisenberger, Way, Taylor, Welch, & 
Lieberman, 2007). However, it is still controversial if dACC is selectively involved in pain-
related neural processing (Lieberman & Eisenberger, 2015; Wager, et al., 2016). In my 
thesis, the dACC was involved while making a punishment decision toward the promiser 
as compared to the when doing so toward a neutral message provider. Two potential 
interpretations were provided to explain the current findings. On the one hand, being 
betrayed by a promiser might generate interpersonal pain related experiences, which 
then motivate the punishment decision toward the promise-breaker. On the other hand, 
the punishment decision is costly for individuals. Therefore, the dACC might play a cost-
benefit computational role while making these punishment decisions.
Theory of mind processing is involved in decision-making in social interaction
Social neuroscience has greatly emphasised the vital role of processing another’s states, 
mind, beliefs, and intentions. This type of processing has been termed as theory of mind 
(ToM) processing. A large amount of literature has indicated the a neural network is 
involved in the theory of mind mechanisms, consisting of brain regions such as mPFC, 
bilateral TPJ, PCC, STS, MTG (Carter & Huettel, 2013; Decety & Lamm, 2007; Deen, 
Koldewyn, Kanwisher, & Saxe, 2015; Fletcher, et al., 1995; Frith & Frith, 2005; Frith, 
2012; Frith & Frith, 2003; Gallagher & Frith, 2003b). Further research has highlighted 
the important role of social cognition in decision-making, especially in social interactions 
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(Frith & Singer, 2008) and social norm enforcement (Baumgartner, Gotte, Gugler, 
& Fehr, 2012a). Consistent with the previous viewpoints, our results showed that 
processing social feedback (receiving social rank feedback based on a performance 
comparison with others) were associated with brain activations in a larger cluster of 
mPFC (including dmPFC), right TPJ, and PCC. Also, making cooperative decisions in an 
interpersonal comparison context as compared to a self-comparison context was shown 
to intensify the BOLD signal in the mPFC (dmPFC) and bilateral TPJ (Chapter 3). In 
addition, brain activation in the TPJ and MTG are positively correlated with interpersonal 
trust, expressed in the amount of tokens invested in one’s partners (Chapter 5). My 
results indicate that social cognition, especially potential theory of mind mechanisms, is 
involved in decision-making processes such as perspective taking, strategic reasoning, 
intention inference and so on and so forth.
Insular cortex functions play an important role in affective processing during 
decision-making in social interactions
In this thesis, I argue that affective processing is involved in social decision-making. 
The insular cortex has traditionally been regarded to be associated with interoception 
and pain perception (Craig, 2003a; Craig, 2003b; Craig, 2009). Recent studies in 
neuroeconomics and social neuroscience have updated our knowledge of these regions, 
in that the activation in the anterior insula is related to affective responses when norms 
are violated in an interpersonal context (during social interactions) (Montague & 
Lohrenz, 2007; Sanfey, et al., 2003a; Spitzer, et al., 2007). For example, anterior insula 
activation was detected while being treated unfairly in an Ultimatum Game (Sanfey, et 
al., 2003a), and this activation was found to predict subsequent reject decisions (Xiang, 
et al., 2013). Moreover, anterior insula activity was observed when participants observed 
a fair player as opposed to an unfair player being punished by means of an electric 
shock (Singer, et al., 2006), which indicated that the insula may play a role in emotional 
involvement in a social situation (or during social interactions) and in empathising with 
others’ pain or emotions. In line with this, in this thesis, the right insula was seen while 
being betrayed by a promiser as compared to neutral message provider (Chapter 5). As 
discussed before, fulfilling a promise is a not only an orally expressed commitment to a 
social individual, but also a fundamental social norm cherished by most of society. Thus, 
it would be hurtful (and a negative emotional experience) when a promise is broken 
and trust is abused. Activation in the right insula may represent this affective processing 
inside the brain. On the other hand, bilateral insula was also detected to show increased 
activation while knowing their partners’ reciprocal reputation (Chapter 4). One previous 
study has reported that anterior insula is more active in response to low rather than 
high expressions of trust in a Trust Game in normal participants, but not in a patient 
group (King-Casas, et al., 2008). I argue that the brain process of the trustworthiness 
of facial expression and personal belief of other’s trustworthiness might well differ from 
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each other. Linking this to our task paradigm, it is not hard to imagine that participants 
already think about their potential cooperative decision with a partners immediately 
after their partner’s reciprocity information is revealed. Here, the insula might reflect 
emotional involvement with the more reciprocal partners. This viewpoint is supported 
by a study that showed that bilateral anterior insula was found in comparing intentional 
as compared to non-intentional cooperators’ faces (Singer, et al., 2004a). Taken 
together, these results suggest that insula may constitute an important part of functions 
in affective processing, which is necessary for decision-making in social interactions.
A Cognitive Neurobiological Model (CNM) of decision-making in social interaction 
In this thesis, I propose a novel cognitive and neurobiological model by integrating 
existing findings about decision-making during social interactions. In this model, we 
assume that the previously discussed types of cognitive processing are combined while 
making a decision in social interactions. 
As illustrated in Figure 7.1, after the vision and perception system has received a (social) 
stimulus input, affective processing in the insula and amygdala is initiated faster than 
other processes (Adolphs, 2009b). The outcome of affective processing could be either 
direct input for value computation or entering the social value representation stage, 
which consists of both theory of mind processing and reward processing. The final stage 
of the model is value computation in order to arrive at a certain choice, which includes 
cognitive control processing (controlling self-interest) and cost-benefit balancing 
(taking social values or social emotions into consideration). 
Future research
Computational approaches for the understanding of individual differences and 
pathological mechanisms of psychiatric population
By fitting individuals’ behavioural and neuroimaging data to well-simulated psychological 
and cognitive processing models, and by combining this with formal computational 
approaches, in the future I am particularly interested in using this approach to explorie 
individual differences in social decision-making, and in further applying this model in 
order to identify the distinctions between the psychiatric and healthy population. 
The integrated role of structural and functional neural connectivity (neural 
networks) on decision-making in social interactions
As seems clear, a particular social choice is likely not to be arrived at by a single brain 
region, but rather a network of areas. Neuroimaging research has examined decision-
making in a social context, and evidence from the existing literature has converged to 
suggest that four potential cognitive processes may be involved in the neural processing 
while making real-life interpersonal choices. However, little is known about how the 
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Figure 7.1 A cognitive neurobiological model of decision-making in social interactions
brain regions or functions, identified by a particular task and integrated with each other, 
play a role in making a social choice. Therefore, structural and functional (resting-state 
or task-related) neural networks are particularly necessary to further our understanding 
of the underlying brain mechanisms in social decision-making.
Conclusion
Two sets of conclusions can be drawn from the findings reported in this thesis. One is 
related to decision-making behaviour in social interactions. Firstly, interpersonal decisions 
are affected by social factors, such as social rank, comparison contexts, social reputation, 
and framed gain-sharing and loss-sharing context. Secondly, manipulating social norms 
and norm violations provides an excellent opportunity to explore the underlying 
psychological processes of how social decisions shaped or shifted in a particular social 
norm. Thirdly, identifying the social cues and motivations in psychiatric groups offers 
a novel angle to investigate and understand the decision-making mechanisms of these 
mental disorders.  
The second set of conclusions is associated with the neural processing mechanisms 
underlying decision-making in social interactions. In this thesis, I propose a cognitive 
neurobiological model, integrating the current findings and those in the existing 
literature in order to better understand the cognitive and neural processes involved 
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in social decision-making. In this model (Figure 7.1), I outlined a sequential model of 
making a particular interpersonal choice, which includes the stages of social stimulus 
inputs, social emotions, social value representation, and value computation. For each 
stage, the cognitive processing is achieved by integrating it with other brain regions and 
functions. This thesis proposes that four different types of neural processes are involved 
in decision-making in social interactions, namely affective processing, theory of mind 
processing, reward processing, and cognitive control (and costs-benefits computation).
Taken together, these conclusions offer some promising avenues for future research in 
the intriguing area of how people make choices in social interactive settings.
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Summary
We, humans, live in an extremely complex dynamic social world. Our decisions during 
social interactions are affected by a plenty of influential factors and often shaped by social 
norms. For example, individuals tend to be more cooperating with higher trustworthiness 
partners; most people would trust more when a promise is pre-delivered. Although 
substantial research findings have been reported in the field of neuroeconomics about 
human social decision-making, so far, our capability of incorporating the predicted goals, 
expectations, emotions, and beliefs of other people into our own social choices are still 
not fully understand.
The aim of this thesis is engaged in deeper investigating and exploring of cognitive/
emotional processes and neural mechanisms underlying decision-making in social 
interactions, providing a useful way of understanding real-life social choices. To this end, 
this research takes an interdisciplinary approach, combining multiple methods, primarily 
behavioral, computational modeling, clinical research, and neuroimaging techniques.
This thesis contains three parts including a line of five empirical studies. Firstly, I aimed 
to understand how social factors, such as social rank, self-other comparison context, 
and social reputation might affect decision-making in social interactions. Specifically, 1) 
We found the demonstrable behavioural effects of social rank- resulting from comparing 
one’s own performance to that of others – on cooperative decision-making in a Public 
Goods Game. Our results have shown that individuals tend to be more cooperative when 
ranked higher than when ranked lower, regardless of whether the other ranked partners 
were relevant or not to the cooperative decision. 2) By adding a self-comparison context, 
the addition of which – in contrast to an interpersonal comparison context – allowed 
furthering explore the behavioural and neural effects of different types of comparison 
context on subsequent decisions. Our results showed that individuals made increasingly 
cooperative decisions when their performance was ranked higher, particularly in an 
interpersonal context. The neuroimaging results revealed that better off than others 
were associated with reward processing in the striatum and that TPJ, mPFC, PCC are 
selectively activated when making the decisions to cooperate in an interpersonal 
context compared to a self-relevant context. 3) I was interested how people cooperate 
with others who have a social reputation of prior reciprocity, in both gain-sharing and 
loss-sharing situations. We found that cooperative decisions are largely dependent on a 
partner’s prior reciprocity history, meaning that people are more inclined to cooperate 
with higher reciprocal partners than with lower ones, especially in the gain-sharing 
context. The neuroimaging results indicated that bilateral striatum is associated with 
making cooperative decisions with higher reciprocity partners as compared to lower 
ones in the gain-sharing context. 
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Secondly, I endeavoured to understand human social decision-making in a framework 
of social norm and norm violation processing. I used promise and neutral messages and 
created promise-keeping and promise-breaking conditions to examine how individuals’ 
trust decision-making is influenced by non-binding commitment messages, and also 
to examine reactions when promises are broken and trust is abused. Non-enforceable 
promise messages enhanced trust more than did neutral messages. A partner breaking 
his promise suffered greater intensified punishment, both in terms of frequency of 
punishment and the amount of money spent to punish. The processing of promise 
messages was associated with the vmPFC and dlPFC, whereas trust decisions were 
positively correlated with activations in the TPJ, MTG, IFG. Moreover, the right insula was 
activated when a promiser abused one’s trust as compared to when a neutral message 
deliverer did. This could potentially have motivated the subsequent costly punishment 
decisions made toward the promiser, which are in turn associated with the dACC and 
midbrain. 
Thirdly, I aimed to apply a novel computational model of reciprocity in order to 
investigate trustworthiness and guilt sensitivity in adults with psychopathic traits. 
Results demonstrated that individuals self-reported beliefs about their partner’s 
expectations largely predicted the amount of money they actually returned, and that 
these reciprocal decisions were negatively correlated with psychopathic traits scores. 
The guilt sensitivity parameter obtained from the guilt-aversion model and the degrees 
of self-reported counterfactual guilt were negatively correlated with psychopathic trait 
score. These results indicated that higher psychopathic traits individuals were well 
capable of understanding other’s expectation, but simply did not utilise this knowledge 
when making trustworthiness decisions in social interactions, possibly because of their 
diminished sensitivity to guilt. 
This thesis provides empirical evidence to help gain insight into human social decision-
making behaviors in social interactions, and also shed light on the underlying neural 
mechanisms of interactive decision-making. Four potential neural processes were 
reported, which includes reward processing, cognitive control processing, theory of 
mind processing and affective processing. By integrating the current results and existing 
findings of decision-making during social interactions, we propose a novel cognitive 
and neurobiological models of human social decision-making. This work helps better 
understanding on the neurobiological mechanisms underlying decision-making in social 
interactions, which providing useful knowledge of of our social behaviors, especially 
social choices, in our daily life.
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Nederlandse Samenvatting 
De mens leeft in een bijzonder complexe en dynamische sociale wereld. Onze beslissingen 
tijdens sociale interacties worden beïnvloed door een veelvoud aan invloedrijke factoren 
en worden vaak gevormd door sociale normen. Bijvoorbeeld: mensen neigen meer 
naar samenwerking met partners die betrouwbaarder zijn, en dit vertrouwen is sterker 
wanneer een belofte van de partner reeds is voldaan. Hoewel er een grote hoeveelheid 
bevindingen is gerapporteerd in het veld van de neuro-economie over de manier waarop 
de mens beslissingen neemt, is onze vaardigheid  om doelen, verwachtingen, emoties en 
assumpties over anderen in onze sociale keuzes te verwerken nog steeds een onderwerp 
waarin veel te ontdekken valt. 
Het doel van deze thesis is om de cognitieve en emotionele processen en de neurale 
mechanismen die ten grondslag liggen aan onze manier van beslissen in sociale situaties 
verder te onderzoeken. Hiermee hoop ik te kunnen bijdragen aan een zinvolle manier van 
het begrijpen van onze dagelijkse keuzes. Om dit op de best mogelijke manier te bereiken, 
heb ik gekozen voor een multidisciplinaire aanpak: in de studies beschreven in mijn thesis 
heb ik gebruik gemaakt van verschillende methoden, waaronder gedragsonderzoek, 
computationele modellen, klinisch onderzoek, maar ook ‘neuroimaging’ methoden die 
het brein in beeld brengen.
Mijn thesis bestaat uit vijf empirische studies verspreid over drie thematische onderdelen. 
In het eerste deel ga ik in op de manieren waarop sociale factoren – zoals sociale rang, 
reputatie en het jezelf vergelijken met anderen – een invloed uitoefenen op de wijze 
waarop je keuzes neemt in sociale interacties. Mijn bevindingen wijzen erop dat 1) er 
aantoonbare gedragsmatige effecten zijn van je sociale rang – die het gevolg is van het 
vergelijken van je eigen prestaties met die van anderen – op je bereidheid om samen te 
werken met anderen in een economisch spel genaamd de Public Goods Game. Men is 
vaker bereid om samen te werken in dit spel wanneer de eigen rang hoog is dan wanneer 
die laag is, zelfs als de mensen met wie je vergeleken bent niet relevant zijn voor de 
beslissing die je op dat moment maakt. 2) Door de toevoeging van een context waarin je 
je prestaties vergelijkt met je eigen eerdere prestaties kon ik onderzoeken wat het effect 
is van verschillende typen vergelijking op daarop volgende beslissingen. Ook hier blijkt 
dat men vaker samenwerkingsbeslissingen maakt wanneer de eigen rang hoog is dan 
wanneer die laag is, en dit effect is sterker in de vergelijking tussen jou en iemand anders 
dan in een vergelijking tussen jouw prestatie van nu en die van een eerder moment. Bij 
het in beeld brengen van het brein tijdens deze beslissingen blijkt dat er een sterkere 
activiteit plaatsvindt in een hersengebied gerelateerd aan beloning, het striatum, en in de 
TPJ, mPFC en PCC wanneer er wordt besloten om samen te werken in de interpersoonlijke 
context dan in de zelfvergelijkingscontext. Daarnaast was ik geïnteresseerd in de manier 
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waarop men samenwerkt met anderen die een goede reputatie van reciprociteit hebben, 
zowel wanneer dit niet alleen het delen van winst betreft, maar ook het delen van 
verliezen. Ik heb gevonden dat de keuze om samen te werken in deze gevallen sterk 
afhangt van de reputatie van de partner, wat betekent dat men eerder samenwerkt met 
partners die eerder een sterke mate van reciprociteit hebben getoond dan met partners 
die dit niet gedaan hebben, en dit effect is het sterkst in situatie waarin het gaat om het 
delen van de winst. De resultaten van ons hersenonderzoek tonen aan dat het bilaterale 
striatum betrokken is bij het nemen van de beslissing om samen te werken met partners 
die meer reciprociteit hebben getoond in de winst-delende context, in tegenstelling tot 
beslissingen om samen te werken met partners van minder goede ‘reputatie’.
In het tweede deel van deze thesis ben ik gaan kijken wat er gebeurt met de manier 
waarop we sociale beslissingen nemen in de context van sociale normen en de schending 
hiervan. Door middel van gebruik van beloftes en neutrale boodschappen in twee 
condities waarin de belofte werd gehouden of juist niet, heb ik kunnen onderzoeken 
op welke manier menselijke betrouwbaarheidsbeslissingen worden beinvloed door 
boodschappen die in principe geen belofte in zich dragen (de neutrale boodschappen 
dus), versus wat er gebeurt met deze beslissingen wanneer een belofte niet nagekomen 
wordt en het vertrouwen geschonden wordt. Zoals verwacht, leidden beloftes tot meer 
vertrouwen dan de neutrale boodschappen. Wanneer een partner een belofte niet 
nakomt, leidt dit tot een sterkere straf van degene aan wie de belofte was gedaan, zowel 
wat betreft de frequentie als de hoeveelheid geld die uitgegeven werd door mensen 
om de ander te straffen. Het verwerken van beloftes was in het brein geassocieerd met 
activiteit in de vmPFC en dlPFC, terwijl beslissingen om te vertrouwen geassocieerd zijn 
met hersenactiviteit in de TPJ, MTG en IFG. Daarnaast is gebleken dat activiteit in de 
rechter insula geassocieerd is met het schenden van een belofte door de partner, wat 
op zijn beurt weer onderdeel kan zijn geweest van de processen die het straffen van de 
partner motiveren, weerspiegeld in de activiteit in de dACC en het midbrain. 
In het derde deel streef ik ernaar de betrouwbaarheid en gevoeligheid voor schuld 
in volwassenen met psychopathische kenmerken te onderzoeken door middel van 
nieuwe computationele modellen. De resultaten demonstreren dat de assumpties die 
gerapporteerd werden door deze mensen in grote mate de hoeveelheid geld die zij 
teruggaven kon voorspellen. Ook is gevonden dat deze beslissingen om geld terug te 
geven aan een partner negatief gecorreleerd zijn aan psychopathische kenmerken. De 
computationele parameter die gevoeligheid voor schuldgevoel representeert op basis 
van het schuld-aversiemodel en de mate van schuldgevoel gerapporteerd door de 
individuen zelf waren negatief gecorreleerd met psychopathische-kenmerkscores. Deze 
resultaten wijzen erop dat mensen met sterkere psychopathische kenmerken zeer goed 
in staat zijn de verwachtingen van anderen te begrijpen, maar er simpelweg niet voor 
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kozen deze kennis te gebruiken bij het nemen van beslissingen tijdens sociale interacties, 
mogelijk door hun verminderde gevoeligheid voor schuld. 
Al met al draagt deze thesis bij door het vergaren van empirisch bewijs en extra inzichten 
in de manier waarop wij mensen beslissingen nemen tijdens sociale interacties. We 
hebben daarmee hopelijk ook bij kunnen dragen aan de kennis die we hebben over de 
neurale mechanismen die ten grondslag liggen aan onze beslissingen in interacties. We 
hebben het gehad over vier neurale processen: het verwerken van beloning, cognitieve 
controle, Theory of Mind-processen, en emotionele verwerking. Door actuele en reeds 
bestaande bevindingen te integreren hopen we te zorgen voor nieuwe cognitieve en 
neurobiologische modellen van de manier waarop mensen beslissingen nemen in sociale 
situaties.
Dit leidt op zijn beurt hopelijk weer tot een beter begrip van ons eigen gedrag, en de 
manier waarop we in het dagelijks leven sociale keuzes maken.
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